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This thesis is a collection of three papers aimed at investigating the macroeconomic effects
of oil price shocks on resource-rich economies as well as the appropriate policy responses for
ameliorating such effects. The first paper begins by examining the implications of physical
capital and oil intensity of domestic production for the response of a small open economy to
an oil price shock. Building on the work by Ferrero and Seneca (JMCB 2019), we find that
the introduction of physical capital amplifies the responses of output and inflation to oil price
shocks whereas the effects are attenuated by the oil intensity in domestic production. Also,
our results reveal that the added features are important for the response of monetary policy
to an oil price shock. Under our model set up, the optimal monetary policy response requires
that the central bank keeps an eye not only on output and inflation, but also the exchange
rate. These results highlight the need for cautious interpretation of the quantitative impacts
of an oil price shock generated based on New Keynesian models of oil producing economies
that abstract from capital. Paper 2 studies the role of oil price shocks in driving business
cycle fluctuations of an oil-producing emerging economy with an inefficient fuel subsidy
regime. Results from our estimated DSGE model for the Nigerian economy show that output
fluctuations are driven mainly by oil and monetary policy shocks in the short run. However,
oil shocks play a less prominent role in driving inflation dynamics owing partly to the low
pass-through effect of international oil price into domestic prices implied by the fuel subsidy
regime. While we find the core inflation-based Taylor rule optimal, we demonstrate that the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) faces a dilemma of either stabilising output or inflation in
the face of an adverse oil price shock. Simulation results show that an “across-the-board”
monetary policy strategy does not exist for dealing with an oil price shock in the resource-rich
economy; thus, it is important that the CBN is aware of the observed trade-offs. The last
paper investigates monetary-fiscal interactions in a resource-rich emerging economy whose
fiscal policy is largely driven by resource-related flows. To achieve this, we analyse Nigeria’s
experience over the last two decades by developing and estimating a suitable DSGE model.
Our results provide convincing evidence of an active monetary and passive fiscal policy over
the full sample. Furthermore, we confirm the presence of revenue substitution; a phenomenon
that alters the “automatic stabilisers” role of fiscal policy in the resource-rich economy. The
2008/09 global financial crisis did not significantly alter these findings. However, our results
are sensitive to (i) the response of fiscal policy to resource-related flows and (ii) the response
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Over the last three decades, oil has remained an important source of energy for house-
holds and firms, accounting for about 35 per cent of total energy supply globally (IEA,
2019)1. Also, about 15-20 per cent of the global value added is accounted for by commodity-
exporting countries (Bergholt and Larsen, 2016). Thus, oil price shocks have implications
not only for the welfare of households, but also global macroeconomic stability. For in-
stance, oil price shocks have been known to be capable of altering consumption decisions
of households (Kilian, 2008); distorting the production plans of firms (Backus and Crucini,
2000; Mork, Mysen and Olsen, 1990); disrupting fiscal and balance of payment positions of
countries (Cashin, Liang and McDermott, 2000); and generating output and welfare losses
(Carruth, Hooker and Oswald, 1998; Mork et al., 1990). Also, changes in oil price have been
associated with external reserves volatility, exchange rate instability, inflation volatility, and
severe macroeconomic imbalances in resource-rich emerging economies (Adeniyi, Oyinlola
and Omisakin, 2011; Akinleye and Ekpo, 2013; Richard and Olofin, 2013). Therefore, de-
velopments in the international oil market will continue to attract significant interests from
macroeconomists in both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries2.
The macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks are not homogeneous across countries
for a number of reasons. One of the reasons for the varied outcomes relates to whether
the economy in question is a net importer or exporter of oil (Cunado and De Gracia, 2005;
Mork et al., 1990). Whereas a number of studies have found empirical support for an inverse
1In net oil-exporting countries, it also represents a major source of foreign exchange earnings and fiscal
revenues.
2Barsky and Kilian (2004) highlights the view that political turmoils in oil producing Middle East coun-
tries generate recessions in advanced economies through their effect on oil price.
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relationship between oil price increases and output in net oil-importing countries such as
the United States (Hamilton, 1983); a positive relationship has been reported for some oil
exporting Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait and Libya (Berument, Ceylan and Dogan, 2010). Also, the macroeconomic impacts
of oil price shocks are usually more severe in small open Oil-Producing Emerging Econom-
ies (OPEEs) as they exhibit certain characteristics that exacerbate their vulnerabilities.
Such characteristics include high oil dependence (Barrell, Kirby and Liadze, 2008; Salti,
2008); presence of hand-to-mouth consumers and financial market inefficiencies (Hallegatte
and Przyluski, 2011); inefficient fuel subsidy programmes (Coady, Parry, Sears and Shang,
2017); fiscal volatility and pro-cyclicality (Abdih, Lopez-Murphy, Roitman and Sahay, 2010;
Barnett and Ossowski, 2002); revenue substitution (Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán, 2003);
low policy buffers (Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2011); and high oil imports dependence arising
from low domestic capacity and weak economic structures (Rodrik, 1999); among others. In
this thesis, we argue that some of these features have significant implications for the response
of OPEEs to oil price shocks.
Several theoretical and empirical studies have extensively examined the macroeconomic
effects of oil price shocks in the context of oil-importing advanced economies, especially
the United States3. For these economies, the consensus among scholars is that oil price
increases cause economic recessions, excessive inflation and lower productivity (Barsky and
Kilian, 2004). In contrast, little and sometimes mixed evidences have been documented
for OPEEs. Consequently, questions regarding the quantitative impacts of oil price shocks,
its transmission mechanism and appropriate macroeconomic policy response remain open
in those economies. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to contribute to the literature
on the oil-macroeconomy nexus in OPEEs, taking cognisance of some of the idiosyncratic
characteristics of those countries. The thesis comprises three papers, each addressing specific
questions. The main ideas and findings of the papers are discussed next.
In the first paper, we focus on the implications of abstracting from two key features
in DSGE models of OPEEs: These are (1) capital accumulation and (2) oil intensity of
output. Most DSGE models commonly used for the analysis oil price shocks and monetary
3See for instance Barsky and Kilian (2001); Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011); Hamilton (2009);
Kilian (2008); Lorusso and Pieroni (2018). The advanced oil-importing economies possess features (including
developed financial markets, high policy buffers, strong domestic production capacity, etc.) that cause them
to respond to oil price shocks differently from their less-developed oil-exporting counterparts. These features
ameliorate the size and persistence of the impacts of an oil price shock.
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policy in OPEEs often abstract from these two key features for the reason of tractability
(see e.g. Ferrero and Seneca 2019; Romero 2008). In the paper, we allude to the argument
by Vásconez, Giraud, Mc Isaac and Pham (2015) that such a decision to ignore capital is
hard to defend on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Apart from the need to reflect
the highly capital intensive nature of oil production, abstracting from capital neutralises
the investments dynamics of domestic firms in response to real interest rate changes and
limits the strength of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission (Rupert and
Šustek, 2016). Also, failure to allow for oil intensity of output mutes the indirect effects of
oil price shocks on domestic prices (Barsky and Kilian, 2004).
To investigate these issues, we build on the DSGE model of Ferrero and Seneca (2019),
extending it along two major dimensions. First, we add capital and introduce real rigidity
into the model via an investment adjustment cost. Second, oil is incorporated as a factor
input in the production technology of domestic firms. We evaluate the implications of these
added features for OPEEs facing an oil price shock by comparing simulation results under
three different model variants. In addition, we assess the relative performance of alternative
monetary policy rules under each model variant based on a central bank policy loss function.
In order to generate quantitative results, we calibrate the model to the Norwegian economy
with most of the parameter values taken from Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
Our simulation results show that a negative oil price shock contracts domestic output and
increases aggregate inflation, consistent with the findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Not-
ably, the addition of capital to Ferrero and Seneca’s (2019) model amplifies these responses;
implying potential under-estimation of the effects of an oil price shock by DSGE models of
small open OPEEs that abstract from capital. Furthermore, we find that the investment
dynamics of firms in response to interest rate adjustments cause the economy to rebound
faster under the extended model. Second, accounting for oil intensity of domestic production
ameliorates the contractionary effects of an oil price shock on output and dampens inflation-
ary pressures arsing from a depreciated real exchange rate. These results highlight the need
for caution in the interpretation of the quantitative impacts of oil price shocks generated
based on DSGE models of OPEEs that abstract from capital and oil intensity.
Third, monetary policy analyses conducted reveal that domestic inflation-based Taylor
rules yield lower losses compared to their headline inflation-based counterparts regardless
of whether the model features capital accumulation and oil intensity or not. Contrary to
the findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019), allowing for interest rate inertia in the central
3
bank’s reaction function reduces policy loss under the model with capital. The inclusion
of exchange rate in the Taylor rule improves performance, regardless of whether the policy
rule responds to CPI inflation or domestic inflation. These findings are robust to changes in
the parameters of the central bank loss function. Thus, a Taylor rule that features domestic
inflation, output, real exchange rate, and interest rate inertia represents an optimal monetary
policy response to a negative oil price shock under our extended model. This is contrary
to the findings under the model without capital, where simple rules without interest rate
inertia and exchange rate yield superior outcomes. In all, our conclusion from the first paper
is that the introduction of physical capital and oil intensity to a small open DSGE model of
an oil-exporting economy matter for (i) the response of the economy to an oil price shock
and (2) the choice of monetary policy response.
Paper 2 examines business cycle dynamics in small open OPEEs with particular attention
to the roles of oil price shocks and fuel consumption subsidies. In addition, we study the
design of monetary policy under an economic environment characterised by fiscal cyclicality
and additional domestic price rigidities arising from a retail fuel pricing rule. Thus, we pose a
number of pertinent questions that have been ignored in the literature. First, how important
is an oil price shock in driving business cycle fluctuations in small open OPEEs with an
inefficient fuel subsidy regime? Second, what is the appropriate monetary policy response
to an oil price shock under an economy with incomplete pass-through of international oil
prices to domestic fuel price? Third, how relevant is Frankel’s (2003) export price-based
monetary policy rule for an oil-producing economy with a fuel subsidy regime facing an oil
price shock? Fourth, how important is the nature of fiscal cyclicality for the achievement of
monetary policy objectives in the oil-producing economy? Fifth, does the presence of hand-
to-mouth consumers matter for the economy’s response to an oil price shock? Sixth, what
are the macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidy reforms for the small open oil-producing
economy?
We address these questions by extending the model developed in the first paper, taking
cognisance of a number of features that are unique to resource-rich emerging economies.
Thus, our model features (i) a fuel pricing rule that introduces additional rigidity to do-
mestic prices and connotes an implicit fuel subsidy regime, (ii) presence of hand-to-mouth
consumers, (iii) oil intensity of domestic non-oil production, (iv) oil in household consump-
tion basket, and (v) fiscal policy cyclicality. Closely related to our model are those developed
by Algozhina (2015); Allegret and Benkhodja (2015); Gali and Monacelli (2005); Medina and
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Soto (2005); Romero (2008) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019). The model developed in the
paper is useful not only for the study of business cycle dynamics in resource-rich, resource-
dependent emerging economies with a subsidy regime, but also the joint analysis of monetary
and fiscal policies in such economies. In all, ten types of structural shocks are incorporated
to drive the stochastic dynamics of the model. We employ Bayesian likelihood approach to
estimate the model for the Nigerian economy using data on eleven macro-economic variables4.
We document a number of useful findings. First, the estimated fuel pricing rule indicates
that the pass-through effect of international oil prices into domestic fuel price for Nigeria is
about 43 per cent. This estimated fuel pricing rule adds additional stickiness to domestic
prices which in turn alters the dynamics of aggregate inflation and the response of monetary
policy to an oil price shock. To our knowledge, this represents the first attempt at estimating
such pass-through coefficient for an oil producing emerging economy with a fuel subsidy
regime. Second, results from the forecast error variance decomposition reveal that monetary
policy and oil-related shocks are important drivers of output in the short run while domestic
supply shocks explain most of the fluctuations in the medium to long term horizons. On the
other hand, inflation dynamics are largely driven by monetary policy and domestic supply
shocks both in the short and medium term horizons. Oil shocks play a less prominent role in
inflation dynamics due to the low pass-through effects implied by the estimated fuel pricing
rule.
Third, a negative oil price shock generates a highly persistent negative impact on total
GDP and a short-lived positive effect on headline inflation. The contractionary effect of
an oil price shock on output is amplified by the fuel subsidy regime and the presence of
hand-to-mouth consumers in the short run. Fourth, our results show that the central bank
faces a dilemma of either stabilising output or inflation in the aftermath of an oil price
shock. While a core inflation-based monetary policy rule outperforms its competitors in
stabilising prices and exchange rate, it leads to a significant output loss in the short run. On
the other hand, the domestic inflation-based Taylor rule is useful for output stabilisation.
Fifth, we fail to find empirical support for the relevance of “Peg the Export Price” (PEP)
hypothesis canvassed by Frankel (2003) in stabilising prices and output. While the export
price-based Taylor rule reverses the contractionary effect of an oil price shock on total GDP,
such an outcome is at the expense of overall domestic macroeconomic stability. Thus, there
4The choice of Nigeria is based on the fact that its economy typifies the key features of our model. The
sample period covers 2000:Q2 - 2018:Q2.
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is no “across-the-board” and “all-seasons” monetary policy strategy for dealing with adverse
terms of trade shocks in the resource-rich economy. It is important that the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) is aware of the policy trade-offs while designing monetary policy strategies
for responding to emerging shocks in Nigeria.
Sixth, the removal of fuel subsidy attenuates the contractionary effects of a negative oil
price shock on aggregate GDP in the short run but generates a more depreciated exchange
rate. However, the effects of exchange rate depreciation on headline inflation is more than
offset by the moderation in domestic inflation; causing the headline inflation to fall. Thus,
contrary to the case under the fuel subsidy regime, the central bank responds to a negative
oil price shock with an interest rate cut under the no-subsidy regime. Such expansionary
monetary policy move ameliorates the contractionary effects of a negative oil price shock
on aggregate GDP. Seventh, we find evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy and show, based
on counterfactual simulations, that macroeconomic stability gains exist under a counter-
cyclical fiscal regime. Finally, monetary policy evaluation based on a specified central bank
loss function shows that the core inflation-based monetary policy rule that features output
and real exchange rate ranks best; thus constituting a useful strategy for stabilising the
economy in the face of an oil price shock.
In paper 3, we study monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a resource-rich emerging
economy whose fiscal policy is substantially driven by resource-related flows. To this end, we
develop a DSGE model that allows for (i) resource earnings in the fiscal rule and (ii) a fuel
subsidy regime that places an additional fiscal burden on the government and impacts on
the evolution of domestic prices. These features matter for the behaviour of monetary and
fiscal authorities as well as the way they interact. The model is estimated for the Nigerian
economy using data on fifteen macroeconomic variables for the period 2000Q2 - 2018Q2.
We report a number of useful findings. First, we find empirical evidence in support of
active monetary and passive fiscal policy over the sample period. This policy mix generates
a stable equilibrium in the sense of Leeper (1991), and is therefore consistent with the
implementation of a successful inflation targeting framework. Second, our results show
that taxes fall while government consumption declines in response to an increase in debt;
implying that government spending plays a critical role in the achievement of government’s
debt objectives. In rational expectations equilibrium, primary deficit falls in response to
increasing debt levels. Third, the estimated tax rule confirms the presence of substitution
effects between tax and oil revenues, a phenomenon that alters the role of fiscal policy as
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automatic stabilisers in the resource-rich economy.
Next, we explore how the monetary-fiscal narrative has evolved over time by splitting the
dataset into two sub-samples based on the occurrence of the 2008/09 global financial crisis
as follows: (i) pre-GFC sample, 2000Q2-2008Q4 and (ii) post-GFC sample, 2009Q1-2018Q2.
We find a stable equilibrium characterised by an active monetary and passive fiscal policy
across the two sample periods, implying that the GFC did not alter the nature of policy
interaction in the country. However, we find that both monetary and fiscal policy are less
persistent in the post-GFC period. Our finding with regards to the fiscal feedback coefficient
in the tax rule is sensitive to (i) the response of fiscal policy to oil-related flows and (ii) the
response of monetary policy to the real exchange rate.
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Chapter 2
Oil Price Shocks and Monetary Policy
in Oil-Producing Economies: Does
Capital Matter?
2.1 Introduction
Oil price shocks have been recognised as an important source of economic fluctuations in both
oil importing and exporting countries, especially since the work of Hamilton (1983). Thus,
debates on its macroeconomic implications, transmission mechanisms, and the response of
monetary policy have remained of significant interest to policy makers as well as researchers
(see for instance Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Bacchiocchi and Sarzaeem, 2015; Barsky
and Kilian, 2004; Bergholt, 2014; Bergholt and Larsen, 2016; Bernanke, Gertler, Watson,
Sims and Friedman, 1997; Berument et al., 2010; Bodenstein, Guerrieri and Kilian, 2012;
Cunado and De Gracia, 2005; De Fiore, Lombardo and Stebunovs, 2006; Engemann, Kliesen
and Owyang, 2011; Ferrero and Seneca, 2019; Hamilton, 2009; Hamilton and Herrera, 2004;
Herrera and Pesavento, 2009; Lorusso and Pieroni, 2018; Medina and Soto, 2005). In oil-
exporting economies, shocks to the resource market generate significant impacts on fiscal
revenues, foreign exchange supply and overall economic performance (Backus and Crucini,
2000; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Lorusso and Pieroni, 2018). However, the size and persistence
of the macroeconomic impacts of such shocks are determined by the appropriateness of policy
response (Berg, Portillo, Yang and Zanna, 2013; Hove, Mama and Tchana, 2015).
A plethora of studies have incorporated oil into standard new-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic
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General Equilibrium (DSGE) models to analyse the channels of oil shocks propagation to
the domestic economy (see e.g. Algozhina, 2015; Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Benkhodja,
2014; Bergholt, 2014; Bergholt and Larsen, 2016; Bodenstein et al., 2012; Ferrero and Seneca,
2019; Hollander, Gupta and Wohar, 2018; Iklaga, 2017; Romero, 2008). However, a number
of these models abstract from two key features: (1) capital accumulation and (2) oil intens-
ity of domestic production1. In this paper, we argue that an assessment of the relevance of
capital accumulation and oil intensity of domestic output in DSGE models of oil producing
economies is important for a number of reasons. First, the process of oil production is highly
capital intensive; thus, failure to feature physical capital in models of oil-producing econom-
ies is hard to defend on empirical grounds (Vásconez et al., 2015). Second, the exclusion
of capital in New Keynesian models prevents an internal dynamic that allows households to
smooth out the effects of output fluctuations on consumption. Third, an abstraction from
capital neutralises the potential investment dynamics of firms in response to real interest rate
changes. For instance, with lower interest rates, households prefer to consume rather than
invest. The increased consumption and lower cost of capital cause firms to increase their
investments and expand production; leading to an increase in aggregate demand. Fourth,
shirking from capital limits the strength of the interest rate channel of monetary policy
transmission (Rupert and Šustek, 2016). Also, since oil is an important factor of production,
abstracting from oil intensity of output could lead to the under-estimation of the effects of
an oil price shock on domestic production and prices (Barsky and Kilian, 2004)2.
A recent strand of literature has focused on evaluating the role of capital in DSGE mod-
els of oil-importing advanced economies. For instance, Vásconez et al. (2015) show that
the introduction of capital into a standard DSGE model for the United States, an oil im-
porting country, amplifies the response of the economy to an oil price shock. However, the
macroeconomic implications of ignoring capital in DSGE models of small open oil export-
ing economies remain unexplored in literature. To address this gap, we pose a number of
questions. First, what are the macroeconomic implications of abstracting from capital in
DSGE models of small open oil-producing economies facing an oil price shock? Second, does
the inclusion of oil in the production technology of non-oil producing firms matter for the
1Most of the commonly used models for small open economies shirk from these features for the reasons
of tractability (see e.g. Ferrero and Seneca (2019); Galí (2015); Romero (2008); Gali and Monacelli (2005),
amongst others).
2Barrell et al. (2008) highlights the fact that oil intensity of output has been quite substantial and
persistent globally.
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economy’s response to an oil price shock? Third, are these two features important for the
choice of monetary policy response to oil price shocks?
This paper addresses these questions by building on the model developed by Ferrero and
Seneca (2019) for the Norwegian economy. We develop three distinct models and benchmark
our results against those reported in Ferrero and Seneca (2019). The baseline model, mod3,
simply replicates Ferrero and Seneca (2019) by ignoring capital and assuming that labour
is the only relevant input in the production technology of domestic non-oil producing firms.
This model is presented in Appendix A.1.3. Next, we argue that apart from ignoring a
critical part of aggregate demand, small open economy models that abstract from capital
accumulation could also be obviating a crucial infrastructure through which monetary policy
is transmitted to the real economy (Dennis, 2017). Thus, the second model, mod2, extends
the baseline model (mod3) by introducing capital accumulation and adding capital into the
production technology of the domestic firms. This model is presented in Appendix A.1.2.
Finally, the benchmark model, mod1, extends the baseline model (mod3) by introducing
capital accumulation and adding oil into the production technology of domestic non-oil
producing firms. This model is described in detail in Section 2 of this paper and Appendix
A.1.1. We address the research questions posed by comparing the responses of the economy
under the alternative models. The relative performance of alternative monetary policy rules
are assessed based on an assumed flexible inflation targeting ad-hoc loss function3. The
model is calibrated to the Norwegian economy with most of the parameter values taken from
Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
We document a number of interesting results. First, simulation results from our bench-
mark DSGE model show that a negative oil price shock contracts output and increases
inflation in the resource rich economy, confirming the oil price shock propagation mechan-
ism observed by Ferrero and Seneca (2019). However, the addition of capital accumulation
amplifies these responses. This is consistent with the findings of Vásconez et al. (2015) for
the US economy. Also, the economy recovers faster under the model with capital due to
the investment response of domestic firms to interest rate changes. Second, including oil as
a factor input in domestic production ameliorates the contractionary effects of an oil price
shock on output and dampens inflationary pressures. To our knowledge, this effort repres-
3We abstract from studying welfare using the second order approximation of the household utility but
rather adopt a standard quadratic loss function for the central bank. This is because our focus is on the
identification of an appropriate policy response to an international oil price shock. Also, we introduce inertia
into the policy rule, which would not be possible under the former.
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ents the first attempt at analysing the macroeconomic implications of ignoring capital and
oil intensity in DSGE models of small open oil-producing economies. Third, contrary to the
findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019), allowing for interest rate inertia in the central bank’s
reaction function reduces policy loss under our benchmark model. Fourth, a Taylor rule
that features domestic inflation, output, real exchange rate, and interest rate inertia repres-
ents an effective monetary policy response to a negative oil price shock. This is contrary
to our findings under the model without capital, where a flexible Taylor rule that responds
only to domestic inflation and output yields superior outcomes. These findings highlight the
need for a cautious interpretation of results emanating from DSGE models of small open
oil-producing economies that abstract from capital and oil intensity.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and derives useful optimality conditions
guiding the decisions of various agents in the economy. The equations derived in the section
characterise the dynamics of the economy. We also calibrate the model in order to generate
relevant quantitative results. Section 4 presents the impulse responses to an international oil
price shock and explores the usefulness of alternative monetary policy responses. The roles
of capital and oil intensity of output in the economy are also discussed in the context of the
questions earlier posed. Section 5 concludes. In Appendix A, we present detailed derivations
of the equilibrium conditions for the three model variants considered in the paper as well as
some useful results.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper is connected to three major strands of literature relating to (i) the design of
monetary policy in small open resource-rich economies, (ii) macroeconomic impacts of oil
price shocks, and (iii) the use of specific model features to explain the discrepancies in the
findings often reported under strands (i) and (ii). There are several theoretical and empirical
studies that have addressed the first two strands. However, only a few have focused on the
third strand, especially in relation to the roles of capital accumulation and oil intensity of
domestic output. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the studies that are closely related to our
paper.
The influential work of Gali and Monacelli (2005) provides a useful framework for study-
ing small open economies and evaluating the usefulness of alternative monetary policy rules.
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Under Gali and Monacelli’s (2005) model set-up, the central bank achieves superior welfare
outcomes by following a domestic inflation-based Taylor rule (DITR). This is followed by its
CPI inflation-based counterpart and the exchange rate peg. The extent to which this policy
ranking holds for small open resource-rich economies have been investigated by studies such
as Algozhina (2015); Allegret and Benkhodja (2015) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
For instance, Ferrero and Seneca (2019) showed that the DITR is welfare optimal for
the oil exporting economy of Norway while a number of other studies have argued that
better macroeconomic outcomes are realisable under a monetary policy rule that responds
to a core measure of inflation (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015) or an exchange rate target
(Algozhina, 2015). There is, therefore, no consensus among macroeconomists on a cross-
cutting monetary policy strategy for dealing with structural shocks confronting small open
resource-rich economies.
Also, studies on the macroeconomic impacts of an oil price shock have reported varied
findings. The variation in findings are often explained by the nature of monetary policy
response to the shock, the degree of oil intensity prevailing in the economy, as well as the
circumstance of the economy with respect to its net oil-trading position (Bernanke et al.,
1997; Cunado and De Gracia, 2005; Mork et al., 1990; Vásconez et al., 2015). For example,
oil price increases are often associated with output contraction, inflationary pressures, and
contractionary monetary policy response in net oil-importing countries (Bernanke et al.,
1997; Hamilton, 1985; Medina and Soto, 2005,0; Vásconez et al., 2015). For net oil-exporting
countries, varied responses to a positive oil price shock have been reported; including: higher
output and prices (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015), higher output and lower prices (Berg-
holt, 2014; Ferrero and Seneca, 2019), lower output and higher prices (Romero, 2008), as
well as lower output and lower prices (Bergholt and Larsen, 2016). Differences in the pre-
vailing exchange rate regime, the extent of the country’s dependence on oil, the nature
of monetary policy response, and modelling strategy are among the reasons for the mixed
findings (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Bergholt, 2014; Bergholt and Larsen, 2016; Ferrero
and Seneca, 2019). For instance, macroeconomists differ in terms of how monetary policy
should respond to an oil price increase. Whereas Allegret and Benkhodja (2015) prescribes
monetary policy tightening, Bergholt and Larsen (2016) advocates monetary policy accom-
modation while studies such as Fischer (1985) argues for monetary policy restraint under





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The third strand of literature, which is still relatively scanty, is related to studies aimed at
explaining some of the varying results obtained in the analysis of the macroeconomic impacts
of an oil price shock. Vásconez et al. (2015) represents the first attempt at investigating the
implications of capital accumulation and oil dependency for the response of the US economy
to an oil price shock within a DSGE framework. Having successfully replicated the stylised
facts, the paper showed that capital accumulation amplifies the response of the economy to
an oil price shock while a reduction in oil dependency attenuates its inflationary impacts. Till
date, Vásconez et al. (2015) represents the only study that have reported the implications
of capital accumulation and oil dependency for the response of an oil-importing economy to
an oil price shock using a DSGE model. To our knowledge, no similar study exists for a net
oil-exporting small open economy, a gap this paper intends to fill.
2.3 The Model
The model economy considered in this paper is a simple cashless New Keynesian small open
economy model in the fashion of Gali and Monacelli (2005), extended by Ferrero and Seneca
(2019) to include an oil sector. However, the benchmark model described in this section,
mod1, departs from Ferrero and Seneca (2019) in several ways. First, we introduce capital
into the model in order to study the role of savings and investment in an environment in
which domestic capital and foreign financial assets act as vehicles of savings to the house-
holds. Physical capital is required for the production of both oil and non-oil goods. Second,
we introduce real rigidity into the model via an investment adjustment cost to capital ac-
cumulation. Third, we permit oil intensity of domestic output by introducing oil into the
production technology of non-oil producing firms in addition to capital and labour. This
section presents a graphical overview of the model, describes the implied economic envir-
onment and derives the associated equilibrium conditions. The log-linearized version of the
model as well as the exogenous processes are reported in Appendix A.1.1.
2.3.1 Graphical overview of the model
Figure 2.1 presents a bird’s-eye view of our benchmark model (mod1). The model is pop-
ulated by six categories of agents: households, final goods-producing firms, intermediate
goods-producing firms, oil-producing firms, fiscal authority, and the central bank. The rep-
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resentative utility-maximizing household consumes both domestic and foreign goods as well
as leisure. To finance its expenditures, the household supplies labour to non-oil producing
firms (earning wages) and accumulates capital, which it leases to both oil and non-oil pro-
ducing firms at a competitive rental rate. We assume households own the firms and thus
receive their profits. Capital, which is accumulated subject to an adjustment cost is perfectly
mobile between the oil and non-oil sectors. Finally, the representative household saves by


















































































Figure 2.1: Flow chart of the economy
The final-goods producers operate in a perfectly competitive market and use an aggreg-
ation technology to bundle varieties of intermediate goods firms. The final goods are not
only consumed by households and government, they are also used as input in the extraction
technology of oil firms. On the other hand, the intermediate goods firms are monopolistic
competitors who combine capital, oil, and labour inputs to produce differentiated goods in-
dexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The assumption of monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods
15
sector allows for nominal rigidities in our model and a firm j in this sector who is able to set
prices in period t is assumed to do so à la Calvo (1983).
The oil firms operate in a competitive market using a diminishing returns production
technology that combines domestic materials produced by final-goods firms and capital sup-
plied by households. The produced oil is sold to domestic intermediate goods firms while
the residual is exported to the rest of the world at a price determined in the international
oil market. The government provides public goods based on revenues received from tax
and transfers from a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). Finally, the central bank implements a
Taylor-type monetary policy rule by setting short term nominal interest rate in response to
inflation and output. In what follows, we describe the economic environment and optimiza-
tion problem of each of these agents in greater details.
2.3.2 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption, Ct, and dis-utility from la-
bour, Nt. This implies that the household’s utility function is strictly increasing in Ct and
decreasing in Nt. Therefore, the representative household optimizes its decisions by maxim-











where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor,
and φ > 0 represents the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. As in Ferrero and
Seneca (2019), we define Ct as a composite consumption index given by a Cobb-Douglas







where γ is a parameter that represents the economy’s degree of openness. It measures the
share of domestic consumption devoted to imported goods4. The budget constraint facing
4In the case of a closed economy, γ = 0 and equation (2.2) collapses to Ct = CH,t
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the household is given as5




t+1 = WtNt +Rh,tKt +Bt + εtB
∗
t +Dt − TX t. (2.3)
On the income side of equation (2.3), four sources are obvious. First, Nt hours of work are
supplied at a nominal wage rate, Wt, yielding a labour income, WtNt. Second, the household
owns an amount of capital, Kt, which it leases to the domestic firms at a rental rate, Rh,t, to
generate a capital income, Rh,tKt. Third, the household receives an aliquot share, Dt from
the profits of the firms. As in Gali and Monacelli (2005), we assume that households have
unfettered access to a complete set of contingent claims traded abroad. Thus, the household
enters the period with the stock of nominal domestic bonds, Bt, and foreign bonds, B∗t
maturing in period t + 1. Bt+1 and B∗t+1 represent household’s investments in domestic
and foreign bonds at the end of period t, respectively while the nominal exchange rate is
denoted by εt. As in Galí (2015), each domestic and foreign bond pays one unit of money
at maturity and their prices are denoted by Qt and Q∗t , respectively. The income received
from these various sources are used to finance the purchase of consumption goods, Ct, and
investment goods, It. The aggregate Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the domestic economy
is represented by Pt. The representative household pays lump-sum taxes, represented by
TXt to the government.
The process of capital accumulation is assumed to follow:














which defines investment adjustment cost, is a positive function of period-to-period changes
in investment. The inclusion of an adjustment cost in equation (2.4) introduces real rigidity
into the model as households are unable to vary their investment from one period to another
in a costless manner. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005); Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2008); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010), we
5This budget constraint is similar to those in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019),
except that we have introduced capital.
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where χ ≥ 0 is the sensitivity parameter for the adjustment in investment and thus governs
the size of the adjustment cost. Putting equation (2.5) into (2.4), we can rewrite the capital
accumulation equation as:










Thus, the representative household maximises equation (2.1) subject to a per period nom-
inal budget constraint (equation 2.3) and a capital accumulation process (equation 2.6) by
choosing
{





. Defining the Lagrange multipliers associated with
household budget constraint and capital accumulation process as λct and λkt , respectively, the
optimization problem of the household yields the first-order conditions for labour, domestic
bonds, capital supply and investment demand as follows
Wt
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where πt = PtPt−1 is CPI inflation - defined as the rate of change in the consumer price index
and rh,t = Rh,tPt denotes the real rental rate on capital.
In addition to the above equilibrium conditions, the representative household seeks to min-
imize its expenditure on the consumption of foreign and domestically produced goods. Thus,
the demands for domestic and foreign goods are obtained by minimizing total expenditure:
PtCt = Ph,tCh,t + Pf,tCf,t, (2.11)
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subject to equation (2.2). Ph,t is the price of domestic goods, and Pf,t is the price index
for imported goods expressed in domestic currency. This optimization problem yields the
demand for home and foreign goods as



















The model economy is characterized by two sectors, namely: non-oil producing firms (which
consist of final good producers and intermediate goods producers) and oil firms. The optim-
isation problems of these two categories of firms are discussed next.
Non-oil producing firms
Final good firms supply manufactured goods to domestic households, government and oil
firms in a perfectly competitive market by bundling intermediate goods. On the other hand,
the intermediate good producers combine capital and labour rented from households with oil
to produce goods that are sold in a monopolistically competitive market. The intermediate
goods producers set prices as in Calvo (1983) by maximizing profit subject to a downward
sloping demand curve for their goods.
Final goods producers: Final goods, Yh,t, are produced by perfectly competitive firms
who bundle differentiated goods, Yh,t (j), produced by the intermediate firms based on an
aggregation technology. Thus, the representative final goods firm’s optimization problem




Ph,t (j)Yh,t (j) dj, (2.15)
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where Ph,t (j) is the price charged on intermediate goods Yh,t (j) produced by an intermediate
goods producing firm and Ph,t is the domestic price index. The parameter ϵ > 1 represents
the elasticity of substitution among different intermediate goods. The first-order condition


















Intermediate goods producers: There is a continuum of intermediate goods firms, in-
dexed by j ∈ [0, 1] producing differentiated goods in a monopolistically competitive envir-
onment. Departing from a single factor input (labour) assumption of similar works such as
Gali and Monacelli (2005), Wills (2014) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019), this paper considers
firms producing each intermediate good j using a constant returns to scale technology that
combines three inputs: capital, oil and labour as follows:




where Yh,t (j) is the output of the intermediate firm, Kh,t (j) represents capital input, Ot (j)
is oil input and Nt (j) denotes labour input employed. The parameters 1 > αkh > 0 ,
1 > αoh > 0 and 1 > αnh > 0 are elasticities of an intermediate firm’s output with respect to





h = 1. Featuring capital and oil inputs in equation (2.19) allows us to analyse
the implications of physical capital and oil intensity for the response of the oil producing
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economy to an oil price shock6. We assume that the total factor productivity, Ah,t, evolves







where 0 < ρAh < 1 and ξ
Ah
t is an independent and identically distributed random variable
with a mean zero and finite standard deviation, σAh . The optimization problem of the in-
termediate goods producers is solved in two stages. In the first stage, each firm chooses its
input factors to minimize total cost
min
Nt(j),Kh,t(j),Ot(j)
WtNt (j) +Rh,tKh,t (j) + Po,tOt (j) , (2.21)
subject to the production technology specified in equation (2.19). Po,t is the domestic cur-
rency price of oil used in the production process. The first-order conditions from this problem
with respect to labour, capital and oil are combined to yield the input ratios for the inter-













where rh,t = Rh,tPt is the real rental rate on capital, po,t =
Po,t
Pt
is the real price of oil in domestic
currency, and wt = WtPt is the real wage. An expansionary monetary policy that decreases the
real rental rate on capital leads to an increase in the intermediate goods producing firm’s
demand for capital (equation 2.22). Also, equation (2.23) indicates that a fall in the real
price of oil increases intermediate goods firm’s demand for oil and decreases its demand for
labour. Substituting the input demands into the production technology and invoking the
relation between terms of trade and relative prices shown in equation (2.38), we obtain the















6Barrell et al. (2008) argues that oil continues to remain an important source of energy for domestic
production globally.
21
where mct = MCtPt is the real marginal cost. In contrast to the set up under Ferrero and
Seneca (2019), equation (2.24) features input prices relating to capital and oil in addition to
wages7. This implies that changes in capital rental rate and domestic oil price are important
for inflation dynamics under our model set up.
In the second stage, the intermediate goods producers choose price to maximize their
expected discounted profit. Following Calvo (1983) staggered pricing model, we allow a
proportion of the intermediate goods producing firms, (1− θ), to reset their prices optimally
in any give period while the other fraction, θ, who are unable to re-optimise their prices
maintain the price as at last fixing. It then follows that the evolution of domestic price level











where θ ∈ [0, 1] is an index of price stickiness (Calvo, 1983) and P •h,t represents the optimal
reset price. For firms who qualify to re-optimise their prices, the optimal reset price, P •h,t, is








(1 + ζ)P •h,t (j)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
, (2.26)







where ζ is the subsidy introduced to offset distortions arising from monopolistic competition.
















ϵ−1 represents a frictionless markup. Equation (2.28) indicates that the optimal price
is set as a constant mark-up over the ratio of an expression relating the expected discounted
7The real marginal cost in Ferrero and Seneca (2019) is given as mct = wtAh,ts−γt
.
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nominal total cost to the expected discounted real output.
Oil sector firms
The representative oil firm combines capital and materials inputs under perfect competition
to extract oil which is sold in the world market, taking price as determined at the interna-
tional oil market. Thus, in addition to materials input featured in the oil firm’s extraction
technology of Ferrero and Seneca (2019), we include capital8. Unlike Ferrero and Seneca
(2019), but consistent with Romero (2008), we assume that a fraction of oil produced by
these firms is used as inputs in the production technology of domestic non-oil sector firms
while the residual is exported to the rest of the world, taking price as given.
The oil firm’s decision problem involves choosing capital, Ko,t, and materials, Mt, inputs
to maximize a profit function
Πo,t = Po,tYo,t −Rh,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (2.29)






where Yo,t represents oil output and Po,t is the price of oil in domestic currency. The para-
meters αko and αmo represent the elasticities of oil output with respect to capital and material
inputs, respectively. The input demand for Mt by the oil firm captures the demand channel
for spillover of oil price shocks to the domestic economy. In line with Romero (2008) and
Ferrero and Seneca (2019), we assume diminishing marginal returns, such that αko +αmo < 1.







where 0 < ρAo < 1 and ξAot is an independent and identically distributed random variable
with a mean zero and finite standard deviation, σAo . Our assumption of a small open economy
implies that the oil producer can not affect the world price, P ∗o,t. Thus, the dollar price of
oil is assumed exogenous. Following Ferrero and Seneca (2019), we define the real price of
8This extension is reasonable due to the capital intensive nature of oil investments.
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is the international price of oil in real terms, εt is the nominal exchange
rate, qt is the real exchange rate, and st is the terms of trade. The definition of the real
exchange rate shown in equation (2.43) has been invoked in equation (2.32). The world price












where 0 < ρo < 1 and ξp
∗
o
t is an independent and identically distributed random variable
with a mean zero and finite standard deviation, σp∗o . The first-order conditions from the


















where rh,t = Rh,tPt is the real rental rate on capital, ph,t =
Ph,t
Pt
is the real price of domestic
goods, and p∗o,t =
P ∗o,t
Pt
represents the international price of oil in real terms. The definition of
the real oil price in domestic currency as well as the expression for real exchange rate shown in
equations (2.32) and (2.43) have been invoked in equations (2.34) and (2.35). Consequently,
the demands for factor inputs by the firm are functions of input prices, terms of trade, the
real dollar price of oil and the aggregate oil output. Substituting equations (2.34) and (2.35)








where πo,t = Πo,tPt . The oil firm’s profits are fully taxed and thus transferred to government
for onward investment in a sovereign wealth fund located outside the domestic economy.
From equations (2.34) and (2.35), it is clear that a positive shock to real dollar price of oil
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leads to increased demand for capital and materials inputs.
2.3.4 Open economy features
We consider a small open economy in which the home economy is insignificant relative to the
foreign economy. Thus, activities in the foreign economy are taken as exogenous since they
are not impacted by developments in the domestic economy. In this section, we examine
how the domestic economy relates with the rest of the world.
Relative prices, real exchange rate and terms of trade
The terms of trade is a crucial relative price in the model as it distributes home and foreign
goods amongst households in both the domestic and foreign economies. Following Gali and
Monacelli (2005), we define the terms of trade facing the domestic economy as the price of





where st denotes the terms of trade at time t. A decline in the price of domestically produced
goods, Ph,t, increases st and depreciates the real exchange rate as shown in equation (2.43).
The equation for the aggregate CPI, equation (2.14) can be combined with equation (2.37)





Log-linearising equation (2.38) yields P̃t = P̃h,t + γs̃t. Applying time difference yields π̃t =
π̃h,t + γ∆s̃t, which expresses CPI inflation as a function of domestic inflation, the home
economy’s degree of trade openness as well as the change in terms of trade. The tildes
represent log-deviations of the variables from their steady state levels. Similarly, equations









where πf,t = Pf,tPf,t−1 represents imported inflation and ∆st =
st
st−1
is the change in terms of
trade. Based on equations (2.38) and (2.39), the demand for home goods (equation 2.12)
and foreign goods (equation 2.13) can be rewritten respectively as




Equations (2.41) and (2.42) imply that an increase in the terms of trade increases demand
for domestically produced goods but decreases the demand for foreign goods.
The real exchange rate, qt, is defined as the nominal exchange rate, εt, multiplied by the
ratio of CPI in the foreign economy, P ∗t (in foreign currency) to CPI in the domestic economy,




. In order to derive a relation between the real exchange rate and the
terms of trade for the domestic economy, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that
the domestic economy does not export consumption goods to the foreign economy, implying
that γ∗ = 0. Since the analogous equation for aggregate consumer price index in the foreign




h,t, it then follows by our assumption
that P ∗t = P ∗f,t. Second, we assume law of one price holds, which implies that Pf,t = εtP ∗f,t.
Combining the results from these two assumptions with the expression for domestic terms of





such that the real exchange rate prevailing in the domestic economy evolves as a function of
the terms of trade, st, and the trade openness parameter, γ.
Uncovered interest parity
Under the assumption of complete markets for international financial assets, the Euler equa-
tions for the domestic and foreign economies can be combined to obtain the standard un-
covered interest parity condition. We assume that households trade in a portfolio of both
domestic bonds, Bt, and foreign bonds, B∗t , as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Ferrero
and Seneca (2019). Maximising equation (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (equation



























Combining equations (2.44) and (2.45) yields the uncovered interest parity condition which
expresses the domestic interest rate as a function of the world interest rate and the expected









given that Q−1t = 1+Rt. Where Rt is the nominal net return on a one-period risk-free bond
in the domestic economy and its foreign economy equivalent is R∗t .
International risk sharing
As demonstrated in Gali and Monacelli (2005), the relationship between consumption in the
small open economy and the rest of the world is defined by the international risk sharing
condition. Assuming perfect market for bonds, a condition similar to equation (2.44) holds

































































where ϱ = Ct+1
C∗t+1qt+1
is the relative net asset position, which is assumed symmetric (i.e. ϱ = 1)
as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019). In equation (2.48), we have
invoked the definition of real exchange rate, qt, given in equation (2.43) in line with Ferrero
and Seneca (2019). Foreign consumption, C∗t , is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with
exogenous shock. In summary, equation (2.48) expresses aggregate domestic consumption,
Ct, as a function of consumption in the rest of the world, C∗t ; the terms of trade, st; as well
as the trade openness parameter, γ.
2.3.5 Government
The government receives revenues from taxes and annual transfers from the sovereign wealth
fund. These receipts are used to finance a given government expenditure on goods, Gc,t,
bought at a domestic price, Ph,t, from the final goods firms. Thus, in line with Ferrero and
Seneca (2019), we assume the government respects a budget constraint
Ph,tGc,t = TRt + TXt, (2.49)
where TXt denotes lump-sum tax paid to government and TRt is the transfer to government
from the sovereign wealth fund (SWF). We assume Gc,t follows an AR (1) process, whereas








where 0 < ρ < 1 is a fixed proportion of the initial dollar value of the sovereign wealth fund,
F ∗t−1, allocated for government spending each period and R∗t−1 represents foreign interest
rate in the previous period. The SWF evolves based on its initial residual value (i.e. after
deductions have been made to the fiscal authority), interest earnings on the fund and finally,
the oil sector profits. This dynamic is depicted as
εtF
∗












< 1 in order to
ensure that the SWF is stationary. This implies that government spending is roughly equal
to the average yield on the SWF per period.
2.3.6 Central bank
We consider a monetary authority that sets interest rate and faces a dual mandate of achiev-
ing stability in both prices and output. Therefore, following Canova (2009); Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999); Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019), we assume
that monetary policy is conducted based on a simple three-parameter Taylor type rule that












exp (ξrt ) , (2.52)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank, ρr is the interest rate smooth-
ing parameter capturing monetary policy inertia, ωπ and ωy are the feedback coefficients on
inflation and output, respectively and ξrt represents an independent and identically distrib-
uted monetary policy shock. The incorporation of interest rate inertia measured by ρr in
equation (2.52) implies that monetary policy seeks to correct deviations of current domestic
inflation, πh,t = Ph,tPh,t−1 , and output, Yh,t, from their steady state values by gradually adjusting
the short term nominal interest rate. According to Sack and Wieland (2000), such gradual
adjustments are often done in sequences of small steps in the same direction while a reversal
of direction is effected only infrequently. The benefits of including a smoothing parameter in
central bank policy reaction function are discussed in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and
Woodford (2003)9.
Our choice of the modified Taylor rule in equation (2.52) hinges on the argument that
interest rate rules that react to both inflation and output work better than rules that focus
on either of them. In particular, Romero (2008) noted that Taylor rules that include in-
flation and output better characterize the behaviour of most central banks in oil producing
9It has been argued that policy reaction functions that exclude interest rate inertia are restrictive, not
representative of the behaviour of the Funds rate and limits the performance of forward looking models.
According to Sack and Wieland (2000), the uncertainties regarding data and relevant model parameters are
also important reasons for incorporating interest rate smoothing. This is because aggressive monetary policy
reactions to such uncertainties yield unnecessary fluctuations in the interest rate and generate unintended
effects on output and inflation.
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economies. However, in section 2.3.8, we modify equation (2.52) to accommodate a case
where the central bank has a third objective of responding to the exchange rate10.
2.3.7 Market clearing and aggregation
The aggregate demand equation derives from the model set up, whereby goods produced
domestically are consumed by households, intermediate goods firms, oil-producing firms,
and the fiscal authority. Thus, the resource constraint is as follows:
Yh,t = Ch,t +Mt + I t +Gt. (2.53)
Also, total capital supplied by the household clears the demands by the oil and non-oil
sectors




Kh,t (j) dj. Lastly, consumption goods produced in the foreign economy, C∗t
are consumed abroad, C∗f,t, and imported to the domestic economy, Cf,t, as follows:
C∗t = C
∗
f,t + Cf,t. (2.55)
2.3.8 Policy regimes
In this section, we specify alternative monetary policy rules with a view to evaluating their
relative performance in stabilising the small open oil-producing economy following an in-
ternational oil price shock. We define a central bank loss function with three arguments,
namely: inflation volatility, output volatility and changes in interest rate for the purpose of
conducting policy ranking and exploring optimal monetary policy.
Simple policy rules
In order to study optimal monetary policy, we specify eleven Taylor-type interest rate rules.
The specifications considered enable us to answer questions regarding the relevance of interest
10Whereas Williams (2003) argue that increases in rule complexity yield only trivial reductions in aggregate
variability, the extent to which this holds under our model set up is of interest to this paper.
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rate inertia and the exchange rate in the central bank’s reaction function as well as the
appropriate measure of inflation to include in the policy rule11.
Table 2.2 presents the log-linearized form of the eleven Taylor-type interest rate rules
considered in this paper. The parameter ρr defines policy inertia while the feedback coef-
ficients for inflation, output and exchange rate are denoted as ωπ, ωy and ωq, respectively.
In the first two rules, we consider cases in which the central bank responds solely to either
CPI inflation (CITR) or domestic inflation (DITR). In the next two rows, we specify flexible
cases of the Taylor rule that focus on domestic output movements in addition to the infla-
tion variants considered in the first two rows. Thus, we define a CPI inflation-based Taylor
rule that also features output level (FCITRy) as well as its domestic inflation counterpart
(FDITRy).
Table 2.2: Alternative Taylor rule specifications
Taylor Rule Specification
CITR R̃t = ωππ̃t
DITR R̃t = ωππ̃h,t
FCITRy R̃t = ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t
FDITRy R̃t = ωππ̃h,t + ωyỹh,t
IFCITRy R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t]
IFCITRyq R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t]
IFDITRy R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃h,t + ωyỹh,t]
IFDITRyq R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃h,t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t]
SCITR π̃t = 0
SDITR π̃h,t = 0
SNGDPGT π̃h,t +∆ỹh,t = 0
In the next four set of rules, we extend the flexible Taylor rules by incorporating interest
rate inertia as well as exchange rate. The inclusion of interest rate inertia in the policy
reaction function has been justified on a number of grounds. For instance, Clarida et al.
(2000) argue that policy reaction functions that abstract from interest rate inertia do not
characterize the behaviour of the Funds rate and are too restrictive. Sack and Wieland
(2000) also note that uncertainties regarding data and relevant model parameters are major
reasons why central banks imbibe interest rate smoothing. According to him, aggressive
11Taylor and Williams (2010) noted that a key issue for simple rule is the appropriate measure of inflation
to include in such rules.
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monetary policy reactions to such uncertainties yield unnecessary fluctuations in the interest
rate and generate unintended effects on output and inflation. Also, Taylor and Williams
(2010) opine that accommodating significant degree of inertia in the Taylor rule can help
improve performance in forward looking models. Therefore, we consider flexible Taylor rules
which feature interest rate inertia: the CPI inflation based type (IFCITRy) and its domestic
inflation-based variant (IFDITRy).
Another issue that has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature relates to
the implications of including asset prices, such as the exchange rate or equity prices, in
the monetary policy reaction function (Clarida, 2001; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007; Taylor
and Williams, 2010). To explore this argument for resource-rich economies, we consider a
central bank that also responds to the exchange rate (Garcia and Gonzalez, 2010,1; Laxton
and Pesenti, 2003). Thus, we specify two additional variants of flexible Taylor rules that
feature the real exchange rate: the CPI inflation based type (IFCITRyq) and its domestic
inflation-based variant (IFDITRyq).
In the last three rules, the central bank pursues simple policy rules that strictly target zero
CPI inflation (SCITR), zero domestic inflation (SDITR) and completely stabilises nominal
gross domestic output (SNGDPGT ). The relative performance of these alternative monetary
policy rules are evaluated based on the macroeconomic fluctuations implied by them as well
as the associated policy loss (equation 2.56).
Loss function and optimal policy
In policy evaluation literature, a measure of welfare is often adopted as a basis for drawing
conclusions regarding the relative performance of alternative policies. While some studies
estimate welfare based on the utility function of the representative household (Ferrero and
Seneca, 2019), others assume an inter-temporal loss function for the central bank and maps
the loss function to an aggregate measure of household welfare (Hove et al., 2015). As shown
by Woodford (2002) and noted by Dennis (2004), welfare loss functions that are derived from
second-order approximations to household utility yield similar approximations to the type
defined by a central bank loss function.
For simplicity, we consider a standard ad-hoc quadratic loss function in deviation from
steady state (Benchimol and Fourçans, 2019; Dennis, 2004; Garcia and Gonzalez, 2014; Hove
et al., 2015; Hunt, 2006; Ilbas, Røisland and Sveen, 2012; Laxton and Pesenti, 2003; Nisticò,
2012). This approach appeals to us due to the fact that the primary intention of this paper
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is not to derive optimal monetary policy based on representative household’s utility function
but rather to evaluate the relative performance of the alternative policy rules specified in
Table 2.2 in generating stabilizing effects following an oil price shock. As alluded to by
Nisticò (2012), the possibility of adjusting the loss function weights under this approach
allows us to accommodate diverse monetary policy arrangements often employed by central
banks around the world. Thus, we assume that the central bank’s inter-temporal loss can
be defined as a discounted weighted sum of the unconditional variances of inflation, output















where λy ≥ 0 and λr ≥ 0 are parameters representing the degree of central bank’s dislike for
output volatility, ỹ2h,t, and interest rate variability, ∆R̃2t , respectively. The first two terms in
equation (2.56) represent the costs associated with nominal and real fluctuations while the
third term stands for the costs associated with swings in interest rates (Taylor and Williams,
2010). Since the model developed in this section is calibrated to the Norwegian economy,
we adopt a loss function in equation (2.56) that reflects the Norges bank’s monetary policy
objective of stabilising inflation, output and interest rate as in Ilbas et al. (2012).
We interpret the loss value implied by equation (2.56) as the central bank’s perception
regarding overall macroeconomic instability in the system. Therefore, the central bank’s
problem is to choose the parameters of a policy rule to minimize the central bank’s expected
loss subject to the constraints imposed by the model12. In general, policies associated with
lower values of the loss function are ranked better than those with higher values while optimal
monetary policy is the one which minimizes the value of the loss function (Adolfson, Laséen,
Lindé and Svensson, 2011). In this paper, we use equation (2.56) to gauge the relative
performance of the different monetary policy rules specified in Table 2.2. Following Wolden-
Bache, Brubakk and Maih (2008) and Garcia and Gonzalez (2010), we assume that λπ = 1,
λy = 0.5 and λr = 0.2 under our benchmark parametrization.
12The quadratic terms, especially those involving inflation and output, represent the policy maker’s view




In order to generate quantitative results and facilitate meaningful comparison with the results
presented in Ferrero and Seneca (2019), the model developed in this chapter is calibrated to
the Norwegian economy. The parametrization of the model is done following relevant extant
literature, including Gali and Monacelli (2005) for a typical small open economy as well as
Romero (2008), Wolden-Bache et al. (2008), Hove et al. (2015) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019)
for emerging markets and resource-rich economies. As much as possible, our parametrization
is aligned with Ferrero and Seneca (2019). The parametrization presented in Table 2.3 is
done to fit quarterly data. The discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.9963, consistent with a
real interest rate of about 1.5% in the steady state as in Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Following
Brubakk, Husebø, Maih, Olsen and Østnor (2006) and Wolden-Bache et al. (2008), we assume
capital depreciates at a rate δ = 0.018 on quarterly basis.
Table 2.3: Parameter calibration for the representative economy
Parameter Definition Symbol Value
Degree of openness γ 0.4000
Inverse of labour supply elasticity φ 3.0000
Price stickiness θ 0.7500
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital αkh 0.3000
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to oil αoh 0.2000
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to labour αnh 0.5000
Proportion of SWF transfer to government ρ 0.0100
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods ϵ 6.0000
Depreciation rate δ 0.0180
Degree of interest rate smoothing in Taylor Rule ρr 0.7500
Coefficient of inflation in Taylor Rule ωπ 1.5000
Coefficient of output in Taylor Rule ωy 0.1250
Coefficient of exchange rate in Taylor Rule ωq 0.1250
Elasticity of oil output with respect to capital αko 0.3000
Elasticity of oil output with respect to materials αmo 0.2800
Discount factor β 0.9963
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, φ, is set to 3.0 in agreement with
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Brubakk et al. (2006), Unalmis, Unalmis and Unsal (2009) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
The Frisch elasticity measures the household’s degree of disutility for supplying an additional
unit of labour. Following Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019), we set
the share of foreign imported goods in the total consumption basket of domestic households
(a measure of degree of trade openness) to γ = 0.40, a value that has been found to be fairly
consistent with a typical resource rich economy like Norway. We assume the investment
adjustment cost parameter, χ = 4.85 (Bergholt and Larsen, 2016). Following Gali and
Monacelli (2005), Hove et al. (2015) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019), the Calvo parameter,
θ, is set to 0.75, consistent with a situation in which firms can reset prices only once in
every four quarters on average13. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods ϵ = 6.0, implying a steady state monopolistic markup value of 20 per
cent14, which is in agreement with existing literature for oil producing economies, such as
Brubakk et al. (2006), Romero (2008) and Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
Following the work of Wolden-Bache et al. (2008) for the Norwegian economy, we assume
the elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital, αkh, is 0.30. This is close to the
value of 0.33 assumed in an earlier work by Brubakk et al. (2006). The share of oil in
non-oil domestic production is set to 0.20 in agreement with Bergholt and Larsen (2016).
The share of capital in oil production, αko , is assumed to be 0.3 (Bergholt and Larsen, 2016)
while the share of materials input is αmo = 0.28 as in Ferrero and Seneca (2019). In the
Taylor rule, we assume an interest rate smoothing parameter, ρr, of 0.75 while the policy
feedback coefficients with respect to inflation and output are respectively ωπ = ωπh = 1.5
and ωy = 0.125 (Galí, 2015)15. Finally, ρ = 0.01 proportion of the sovereign wealth fund is
transferred to the treasury for the purpose of financing government consumption (Ferrero
and Seneca, 2019).
13Expected duration between price changes is computed as 11−θ (Walsh, 2010)
14ϵ is a measure of the degree of competition in the market for intermediate goods. Higher values of the
elasticity are associated with higher level of competition amongst the firms in the market and lower price
markup above marginal cost in steady state (Brubakk et al. (2006)).
15This is also as in Gali and Gertler (2007), Romero (2008), Unalmis et al. (2009) and Ferrero and Seneca




In this section, we present the results from our benchmark model (mod1). As earlier ex-
plained, the benchmark model allows for capital accumulation and oil intensity of domestic
output. In the first part, we show the impulse response functions of the economy to an oil
price shock under different monetary policy rules. The roles of capital and oil intensity in
the model dynamics are discussed in the second part. We conduct some monetary policy
exercises in the third part and report some sensitivity analyses in the last part.
2.4.1 Impacts of an oil price shock
The dynamic responses of some selected macroeconomic variables to a negative international
oil price shock under alternative monetary policy rules are discussed here. The responses are
shown under three monetary policy rules: domestic inflation-based targeting rule (DITR),
CPI inflation-based targeting rule (CITR) and an optimized simple rule (OSR)16.
Oil price shock under simple rules
The impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation
negative shock to international oil price shock are presented in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
Qualitatively, the economy’s response are broadly similar under the three monetary policy
rules considered. Following a negative international oil price shock, the oil firm’s profit de-
clines, leading to a reduction in its demands for capital and material inputs (Figure 2.3).
However, upon impact, the magnitude of the decline in the demand for materials input
is slightly higher than the decline in the demand for capital. The lower input demands,
especially with regards to materials input produced by domestic non-oil producing firms
generates contractionary effects on domestic output. The contractionary effect is more pro-
nounced under a monetary policy rule that targets CPI inflation as the interest rate cut
required under such a rule is relatively smaller (Figure 2.2). This is in line with the findings
by Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Domestic output remains below steady state for only about
3-4 quarters compared to over 20 quarters reported in Ferrero and Seneca (2019). This im-
plies that, under our model set up, the contractionary effect of an oil price shock on domestic
16In this case, an optimal simple rule algorithm is used to numerically search for parameters of the policy
rule that mimimize the weighted sum of the variances in relevant macroeconomic variables as depicted in
equation (2.56).
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output is rather shorter-lived. The faster rebound under our model set up is driven by the
investment dynamics of the non-oil firms in response to lower factor prices as well as the
relatively higher lax in monetary policy. Non-oil firm’s demand for capital rose whereas the
demands for labour and oil fell.
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CITR DITR Optimized Simple Rule
Figure 2.2: Responses to a negative international oil price shock under the benchmark model
(mod1). The values of the optimized parameters under the optimised simple rule are: ρr =
0.7250, ωπ = 9.3813, ωy = −0.0676.
Consumption of domestically produced goods rises following the decline in oil price due
to the increased terms of trade and the expansionary monetary policy implemented to boost
aggregate demand (Figure 2.2). As implied by equation equation 2.37, an increase in the
terms of trade implies that domestic goods are relatively cheaper than foreign goods thereby
causing an increase in the consumption of the former. Indeed, following a negative oil price
shock, real marginal cost falls, leading to a decline in domestic inflation. On the other hand,
the depreciated real exchange rate causes a rise in imported goods inflation.
On the non-oil production side, the decline in domestic output leads to a reduction in
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the equilibrium level of labour in the economy as well as real wages (Figure 2.3). Contrary
to the situation in the oil sector, the demand for capital by the non-oil sector increases due
to the increased demand for consumption goods and the interest rate cut implemented by
the monetary authority. The net effect of the demand for capital in both the oil and non-oil
sector generates a decline in the rental rate. Also, the demand for oil inputs for domestic
production increases steadily for about 20 quarters following a decline in the domestic price
of oil. The decline in input prices (i.e. wages, rental rate and domestic price of oil) causes
marginal cost to fall.
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Figure 2.3: Responses to a negative international oil price shock under alternative monetary
policy rules, with a model that includes capital as well as oil in the production technology of
domestic firms (mod1). Under the optimised simple rule, equation (2.52) is optimised. The
values of the optimized parameters are: ρr = 0.7250, ωπ = 9.3813, ωy = −0.0676.
The decline in marginal cost provides incentives for domestic firms to adjust prices down-
wards, providing impetus for the central bank to cut the nominal interest rate (Figure 2.2).
The increased terms of trade as well as the expansionary monetary policy leads to a depre-
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ciation of the real exchange rate, which in turn causes the domestic price of foreign goods
to increase (imported inflation), relative to the price of domestically produced goods. The
effect of the increase in imported inflation outweighs the slight decline in domestic inflation,
causing the headline inflation in the small open economy to rise in response to a negative
oil price shock. The lower real exchange rate depreciation under the CITR is due to the less
expansionary monetary policy stance occasioned by the central bank’s response to a broader
measure of inflation that encompasses the price of imported goods.
In terms of monetary policy response under alternative Taylor rules, Figures 2.2 and 2.3
show outcomes that are similar qualitatively, but slightly different in quantitative terms.
Under the domestic inflation-based Taylor rule (DITR), the central bank responds to a de-
clining domestic inflation rate with a larger cut in the nominal interest rate relative to the
case under the alternative rules. The exchange rate depreciates more, leading to higher head-
line inflation and an elevated response of domestic consumption to terms of trade effects.
Also, the larger interest rate cut implemented under the DITR generates higher domestic
consumption and less contraction in domestic output, especially in the first 5 quarters fol-
lowing the oil price shock. On the other hand, CPI inflation-based Taylor rule (CITR) leans
against the slightly lower CPI inflation, causing the central bank to cut nominal interest
rate. However, the size of the downward adjustment to interest rate is smaller under the
CITR compared to the case under the DITR. Consequently, compared to the case under
the DITR, the contractionary effect of a negative oil price shock on domestic output and
consumption is more severe under the former.
The CITR yields short run benefits in terms of lower domestic inflation (in the first
2-3 quarters), lower imported inflation, lower CPI inflation, and lower real exchange rate
depreciation (which further dampens the effect of international oil price changes on the
domestic price of oil). However, the downside risks associated with a CITR monetary rule
are in terms of lower domestic consumption and output. It is clear from Figure 2.2 that
the optimised simple rule (OSR) leads to some gains in terms of domestic output, domestic
consumption and domestic inflation compared to the other rules. However, this rule is
associated with greater depreciation of the real exchange rate and by implication, higher
imported inflation. As expected, the exchange rate acts as a buffer against external shocks
under our model set up. These findings tend to suggest that the stance of monetary policy
plays an important role in shaping the response of the small open economy to an oil price
shock (Bernanke et al., 1997).
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Overall, we conclude that a negative shock to the international price of oil yields contrac-
tionary effects on the domestic output of an oil-producing economy while domestic inflation
falls. Second, depending on the measure of inflation included in the Taylor rule, the monet-
ary authority responds by embarking on expansionary monetary policy to boost the domestic
economy and push inflation to its steady state. The real exchange rate depreciates, caus-
ing headline inflation to rise. A central bank reaction function that responds to domestic
inflation (DITR) generates less contractionary effects on output, but leads to higher CPI
inflation and greater depreciation of the real exchange rate. On the other hand, the CITR,
which encompasses imported inflation is useful for containing headline inflation and lowering
the extent of real exchange rate depreciation. It however generates a more contractionary
effects on output. These findings confirm the trade-off faced by the central bank of com-
modity exporting economies highlighted by Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Therefore, a good
policy choice for an oil-producing economy whose objective is to ameliorate the recessionary
effects of negative oil price shock is a DITR. However, if the overriding objective of the
central bank is to stabilise prices and exchange rate, the CITR provides a better anchor for
monetary policy.
Optimal policy under commitment and discretion
In this section, we make assumptions regarding the ability of the monetary authority to
either or not commit to a given plan in the conduct of monetary policy. Under commitment,
it is assumed that the central bank is able to commit to a state-contingent policy plan and
thus conducts monetary policy in terms of the ex ante optimal policy (Galí, 2015). Woodford
(2003) argues that optimal policy under commitment enhances monetary policy effectiveness
and avoids policy sub-optimality. However, in the absence of an ability to commit, the
central bank is assumed to conduct monetary policy in a time-consistent manner without
any obligation to uphold past commitments. In this case, the central bank exercises discretion
in setting monetary policy instruments based on its understanding of the economy and the
need to act in the public interest (Woodford, 2003)17.
Figure 2.4 presents the economy’s responses to a negative international oil price shocks
under three policy scenarios: optimal policy under commitment, optimal policy under dis-
cretion and an optimized simple rule. Generally, under both discretionary and commitment
17Woodford (2003) argues that discretionary optimization causes bias in average levels of inflation and
results in sub-optimal responses to shocks
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policies, a negative international oil price shock leads to similar qualitative effects on real
variables, such as domestic output and consumption. Also, the responses of the real exchange
rate and the terms of trade are quite similar. However, the earlier observed contractionary
effects on domestic output is reversed.
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Figure 2.4: Responses to a negative international oil price shock under optimal commitment
and discretion, with a model that includes capital as well as oil in the production technology
of domestic firms (mod1). Under the optimised simple rule, equation (2.52) is optimised.
The values of the optimized parameters are: ρr = 0.7250, ωπ = 9.3813, ωy = −0.0676.
Under both policy regimes (i.e. commitment and discretion), a negative international
oil price shock causes a decline in oil output, a reduction in input demand by oil firms, a
decline in input prices, a fall in marginal cost, and lower domestic inflation. In response to
lower domestic prices, the central bank cuts the interest rate to boost aggregate demand.
However, the size of the interest rate cut under discretionary policy is larger than under
commitment. Compared to the optimised simple rule, commitment and discretionary policies
generate higher real exchange rate depreciation, higher CPI inflation, higher terms of trade
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and consequently higher domestic consumption in the short-run.
The OSR requires a sharp but short-lived contractionary monetary policy in response to
increased inflationary pressure, which in turn causes output to remain below its steady state
level in the first 3 quarters and above the steady state subsequently18. The contractionary
effects cause lower input demand, which lead to lower input prices and a significant decline in
marginal cost. Consequently, domestic inflation is substantially lower under the OSR. CPI
inflation rises due to exchange rate pass-through effect on prices, though less significantly
compared to the case under commitment policy. The macroeconomic fluctuations associated
with these policy regimes are discussed in section 2.4.4.
2.4.2 Role of capital
In this section, we investigate the macroeconomic implications of introducing capital into
the Ferrero and Seneca (2019) model. We do this by comparing the impulse responses to a
negative international oil price shock under two model variants: a baseline model (mod3) and
an intermediate model (mod2). The baseline model, mod3, replicates Ferrero and Seneca
(2019) and differs from the benchmark model presented in section 2 by: (i) completely
abstracting from capital, and (ii) excluding oil input from the production technology of non-
oil producing firms. On the other hand, the intermediate model, mod2, features capital,
but excludes oil input from non-oil production. In Table 2.4, we show the key differences
between mod2 and mod3 in terms of the relevant log-linearized equations. As can be seen,
the equations relating to the demand for capital, investment assets, rental rate on capital,
demand for capital by the oil firm, and the capital accumulation process are absent in mod3
while the marginal cost equation under the intermediate model (mod2) features the real
rental rate of capital.
The comparison between the two models is done under two alternative monetary policy
regimes: Domestic inflation-based Taylor rule (DITR) and the CPI inflation-based Taylor
rule (CITR). Figure 2.5 presents the impulse responses under a domestic inflation-based
Taylor rule. The economy’s responses to a negative international oil price shock under the
intermediate model, mod2, are represented by the dashed red lines while the dotted black
18It is important to note that the during the few quarters of domestic output contraction, the real interest
rate remained negative serving to boost output. In this regards, the optimal policy is to initially pursue an
expansionary policy to boost output and immediately revert to a regime of gradual monetary tighening to
contain inflation (see the impulse response of real interest rate).
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lines replicate the economy’s responses under the Ferrero and Seneca (2019) model, mod3.
Table 2.4: Differences between mod2 and mod3
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As can be seen from Figure 2.5, the economy’s responses to a negative international
oil price shock are qualitatively similar under the two models. Thus, our results confirm
the transmission mechanism enunciated in Ferrero and Seneca (2019) where the effects of
a negative international oil price shock are transmitted into the domestic economy through
a reduction in the oil sector’s demand for material input. However, an interesting result is
that, following a negative international oil price shock, the reduction in demand for materials
input by the oil firms is substantially larger in the model with capital ( mod2), leading to a
more severe contractionary effects on domestic output when compared to the case under the
model without capital, mod3. Also, the contractionary effect of of a negative oil price shock
on output is shorter-lived under the model with capital, mod2, as the economy rebounds
faster compared to the case under mod3. Under the model with capital, there is a larger
terms of trade effect that amplifies the expenditure-switching mechanism arising from lower
domestic prices in the small open economy. Thus, while the duration of output contraction
lingers longer under mod3 (spanning over 40 quarters), domestic output remains below its
steady state level for only about 10 quarters under mod2. This quicker recovery is driven by
higher domestic consumption driven by the larger terms of trade effect and the consequent
higher demand for capital inputs by non-oil producing firms. More so, the lower prices
recorded under the model with capital give ample headroom for larger interest rate cut by
the central bank.
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Mod. 2 (Model with capital) Mod. 3 (Model without capital)
Figure 2.5: Responses to a negative international oil price shock under domestic inflation-
based Taylor rule for the intermediate model (mod2, which features capital) and the baseline
model (mod3, which abstracts from capital)
Furthermore, the reduction in demand for input factors causes a decline in marginal
cost. This causes non-oil producing firms to adjust their prices downwards, leading to lower
domestic inflation. However, the declines in the marginal cost and the domestic inflation
are relatively larger under mod2. Consequently, while the central bank embarks on a lax
monetary policy under the two models, the response is more dovish under the model with
capital, mod2. Expectedly, the economy recovers faster under the model with capital, mod2,
while the real exchange rate depreciated more. In other words, the greater interest rate
cut under mod2 leads to a relatively higher level of depreciation in the real exchange rate
which in turn translates into higher CPI inflation in the short-run. Overall, we show that
adding capital to Ferrero and Seneca’s (2019) model amplifies the economy’s responses to
a negative international oil price shock with the amplification cutting across both real and
nominal variables.
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Figure 2.6 presents the impulse response functions of the two models under a CPI
inflation-based Taylor rule (CITR). The analysis and findings presented under the DITR
also holds for CITR. However, a number of variations are discernable. First, the extent of
the decline in domestic inflation is greater under the CITR, driven by the lower marginal
cost faced by domestic producers compared to the case under the DITR. Second, in contrast
to an expansionary policy implemented under under the DITR, the central bank pursues a
contractionary monetary policy under the CITR in response to the increased CPI inflation
caused by the depreciation in the real exchange rate. Third, the contractionary monetary
policy pursued under the CITR generates a deeper recession in the aftermath of a negative
international oil price shock. We conclude that a monetary policy rule that responds to a
broader measure of inflation, such as the CITR, is more successful at stabilising real ex-
change rate and achieving lower CPI inflation compared to a policy that responds to a more
restrictive measure of inflation, such as the DITR.
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Mod. 2 (Model with capital) Mod. 3 (Model without capital
Figure 2.6: Responses to a negative international oil price shock under a CPI inflation-based
Taylor rule for the intermediate model (mod2, which features capital) and the baseline model
(mod3, which abstracts from capital)
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Based on the analyses conducted in this section, some useful results are documented. We
find that adding capital to the DSGE model of the small open oil-producing economy amp-
lifies the response of the economy to an international oil price shock, regardless of whether
monetary policy responds to domestic or headline inflation (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). This con-
clusion is consistent with the findings of Vásconez et al. (2015) for the US economy. Second,
the presence of capital causes the economy to recover faster from the economic recession in-
duced by a negative international oil price shock. While the demands for most factor inputs
by both oil and non-oil producing firms fall following a negative oil price shock, the non-oil
sector’s demand for capital increases in order to be able to satisfy the increased consumption
demand for domestic goods. Thus, capital plays a critical role in the recovery process of the
economy (Figure 2.3). Third, the central bank is generally more active in its interest rate
adjustments under the model that features capital owing to a higher pass-through effect of
exchange rate to prices and the higher policy headroom created by the lower marginal cost
(Figures 2.5 and 2.6).
2.4.3 Oil intensity of domestic production
In this section, we investigate the implications of incorporating oil intensity of domestic
production for the response of the economy to an oil price shock. To this end, we show the
impulse responses to a negative oil price shock under the benchmark model (mod1, which
features both capital and oil intensity) and the intermediate model (mod2, which features
capital, but ignores oil intensity). In Table 2.5, we show the key differences between the
benchmark and intermediate models in terms of three relevant log-linearized equations. In
Figure 2.7, we present the economy’s responses under a domestic inflation-based Taylor rule
(DITR) while the dynamic responses under CITR are presented in Figure 2.8. The impulse
responses for the benchmark model, mod1, are represented by the dashed lines while the
impulse responses for the intermediate model, mod2, are represented by the dotted lines.
Table 2.5: Differences between the benchmark and intermediate models
Benchmark Model (mod1) Intermediate Model (mod2)
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Notably, the impulse responses for the two models are qualitatively similar and the oil
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price shock transmission channel is preserved. In other words, a negative shock to interna-
tional price of oil causes oil firms to cut down on their demand for factor inputs. This lowers
input prices, reduces marginal cost, causes domestic inflation to moderate and leads to an
interest rate cut.
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Mod. 2 (Model without oil intensity) Mod. 1 (Model with oil intensity)
Figure 2.7: Responses to a negative oil price shock under domestic inflation-based Taylor
rule for a model with oil oil intensity (mod1) and without oil intensity (mod2)
While these behaviours are in line with our findings in Section 2.4.1, we note that the
extent of the decline in domestic inflation is more pronounced under the benchmark model,
mod1 (which features oil in the production technology of domestic firms). This outcome is
in line with the dictates of the log-linearized equation for the real marginal cost shown in
Table 2.5. In contrast to the case under the intermediate model (which ignores oil intensity),
the real marginal cost facing non-oil producing firms under our benchmark model includes
an additional term relating to the real price of oil. Thus, any shock hitting the system that
causes the real price of oil to fall subsequently leads to a larger decline in marginal cost, and
hence domestic inflation under the benchmark model, mod1, falls more substantially.
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Mod. 2 (Model without oil intensity) Mod. 1 (Model with oil intensity)
Figure 2.8: Responses to a negative oil price shock under CPI inflation-based Taylor rule for
a model with oil intensity (mod1) and without oil intensity (mod2)
Responding to the lower domestic inflation as well as the contraction in output, the
central bank, under DITR, immediately cuts interest rate in order to re-inflate the economy
and boost aggregate demand. However, the extent of the interest rate cut is deeper under
the benchmark model, mod1. Consequently, the contractionary impact of a negative oil
price shock on domestic output is less pronounced and shorter-lived under mod1 compared
to the case under mod2. These findings imply that accounting for oil intensity of domestic
production ameliorates the contractionary effect of a negative international oil price shock
on domestic output. Under the DITR, the amelioration is more pronounced.
In conclusion, the impulse response functions presented in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that
DSGE models of oil-producing economies that ignore oil intensity of domestic production
may generate results that overstate the contractionary effect of a negative international oil
price shock on domestic output. However, including oil in the production technology of
domestic firms generates lower domestic inflation and limits the the pass-through effects of
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exchange rate into CPI inflation via lower domestic inflation. Furthermore, irrespective of the
measure of inflation included in the monetary policy reaction function, the central bank’s
interest rate adjustments in response to a negative international oil price shock are more
aggressive under the benchmark model, mod1, compared to the case under the intermediate
model, mod2. This seems to suggest that oil producing economies with high oil intensity
of domestic output are susceptible to higher interest rate volatilities as the lower domestic
inflation provides greater headroom for monetary policy to boost domestic output.
2.4.4 Monetary policy analysis
In this section, we compare the macroeconomic fluctuations and losses associated with the
alternative monetary policy rules specified in Table 2.2 for our benchmark model, mod1. The
results for the other two model variants (i.e. the intermediate model, mod2, and the baseline
model, mod3) are presented in Appendix A.2.2. The policy loss corresponding to each policy
rule is calculated based on the central bank’s loss function specified in equation (2.56). Table
2.6. shows the policy outcomes under eleven simple rules as well as the outcomes for optimal
policy under commitment and discretion. The optimised Taylor rule parameters for the
respective policy rules presented in Table 2.6 below are shown in Table A.3 of Appendix
A.2.2.
The first question we ask is: are there gains from the central bank of an oil-producing
economy committing to a monetary policy plan? As shown in Table 2.6, the best performance
in terms of policy loss is achieved under an optimal commitment policy (with a policy
loss of 0.3252), thus highlighting gains from monetary policy credibility. Under this policy
regime, the volatilities of domestic inflation and interest rate are relatively low. When
compared to the outcomes under discretionary policy, optimal commitment policy yields
superior outcomes in terms of stabilising domestic consumption, CPI inflation, domestic
inflation, exchange rate as well as the nominal interest rate. However, discretionary policy
performed slightly better in stabilising domestic output. Overall, the best outcomes in term
of systemic stability is recorded when the central bank of the oil-producing economy is able
to commit to a policy plan.
In the first two rows of Table 2.2, we compare the performance of simple inflation-based
Taylor rules that either feature CPI inflation (CITR) or domestic inflation (DITR) in terms
of the policy loss value. Of the duo, DITR performs better in terms of generating lower policy
loss and also yielding lower volatilities of domestic inflation and interest rate. However, the
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CITR, is more successful in stabilizing domestic output, domestic consumption, CPI inflation
as well as exchange rate, following an international oil price shock.
Table 2.6: Macroeconomic fluctuations and losses under mod1
Taylor Standard Deviations (%) Policy
rule ỹh,t c̃h,t π̃t π̃h,t q̃t R̃t loss
CITR 0.7723 2.1906 0.0828 0.1183 1.3144 0.1759 0.5977
DITR 0.8030 2.4043 0.3299 0.0123 1.4426 0.1549 0.3322
FCITRy 0.7711 2.1902 0.0820 0.1181 1.3141 0.1729 0.5963
FDITRy 0.8008 2.4010 0.3282 0.0138 1.4406 0.1542 0.3315
IFCITRy 0.7701 2.1810 0.0785 0.1240 1.3086 0.1528 0.5910
IFCITRyq 0.8246 2.3301 0.2511 0.0555 1.3980 0.1110 0.3894
IFDITRy 0.7998 2.3843 0.3077 0.0167 1.4306 0.1441 0.3275
IFDITRyq 0.7979 2.3876 0.3076 0.0178 1.4326 0.1446 0.3258
SCITR 0.7928 2.1256 0.0000 0.1524 1.2753 0.1294 0.7306
SDITR 0.8104 2.4081 0.3319 0.0000 1.4448 0.1435 0.3347
SNGDPGT 0.7823 2.3739 0.2990 0.0392 1.4243 0.1563 0.3340
Commitment 0.7978 2.3891 0.3050 0.0179 1.4334 0.1441 0.3252
Discretion 0.7901 2.3935 0.3169 0.0646 1.4361 0.1897 0.3821
Next, we consider the case of a central bank that reacts to output in addition to prices
by specifying flexible variants of the two simple rules discussed above. These are flexible
CPI inflation-based Taylor rule with output (FCITRy) and flexible domestic inflation-based
Taylor rule with output (FDITRy). Our results show that the FDITRy outperforms its CPI
inflation-based counterpart (FCITRy) in terms of policy loss as well as the its ability to
stabilise domestic inflation and interest rate. However, in terms of stabilising real variables
such as domestic output and consumption, the FCITRy performs better. In addition, the
FCITRy is superior to the FDITRy in stabilising the exchange rate. Thus, while responding
to a negative international oil price shock, the central bank of an oil-producing, oil-dependent
economy is able to reduce policy loss by keeping an eye not only on inflation, but also output.
Should the central bank of a resource-rich economy bother about interest rate smoothing?
To answer this question, we compute the policy losses associated with flexible Taylor rules
that also include interest rate inertia. These are CPI inflation-based flexible Taylor rule with
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inertia (IFCITRy) and its domestic inflation-based counterpart (IFDITRy). The results
shown in Table 2.6 indicate that adding interest rate inertia to our previous specifications
(i.e. FCITRy and FDITRy ) further lowers policy losses. Also, we find that a central bank
reaction function that features domestic inflation, domestic output and interest rate inertia
(IFDITRy) outperforms its CPI inflation counterpart, IFCITRy, in terms of generating lower
losses. Again, the IFCITRy is superior to IFDITRy in stabilising the real economy.
Furthermore, we evaluate the relevance of including exchange rate in the reaction func-
tion of a typical central bank of an oil-producing economy by computing the policy losses
and the corresponding macroeconomic fluctuations associated with such rules. To this end,
we include an exchange rate term in the IFCITRy and IFDITRy specifications to have IF-
CITRyq and IFDITRyq, respectively. We find that the policy losses associated with simple
flexible rules that include exchange rate are generally lower, implying that such policies
generate superior outcomes. Also, these rules are quite successful in stabilizing domestic
inflation and interest rate under the CPI inflation based Taylor rule variants. However, they
generate relatively higher volatilities of real variables and the CPI inflation, especially under
the IFCITRyq . Once the exchange rate is added to the IFDITRy, it emerges better than
its CPI inflation counterpart in stabilising domestic output and domestic inflation.
Finally, we examine the optimality of strict targeting rules, which are CPI inflation
(SCITR), domestic inflation (SDITR) and nominal growth in gross domestic product (SNG-
DPGT ). Table 2.6 indicates that, of these three, a central bank policy that strictly targets
nominal growth in gross domestic product yields the lowest policy loss and performs well in
stabilising non-oil output. However, it yields inferior outcomes in terms of interest rate sta-
bilisation. Under strict CPI inflation targeting regime (SCITR), CPI inflation is completely
stabilized while domestic inflation is fully stabilized under the strict domestic inflation tar-
geting rule (SDITR). For a central bank that cares about stability in exchange rate, SCITR
performs best within this group of strict targeters.
In conclusion, our results suggest that a flexible Taylor rule that features output, domestic
inflation, exchange rate and interest rate inertia (IFDITRyq) represents an optimal strategy
for an oil-producing, oil-dependent economy facing negative international oil price shocks.
This is followed by (IFDITRy) and (FDITRy). This implies that focusing on domestic
inflation as opposed to CPI-inflation generates superior policy outcomes. However, if the
central bank has a dual mandate of maintaining stability in both output and prices, an
aggregate CPI inflation-based Taylor rule represents a viable alternative.
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Next, we evaluate the robustness of our findings across the three model variants: bench-
mark model -mod1, intermediate model - mod2, and the baseline model - mod3. Table 2.7
presents the losses for the three models under the alternative monetary policy rules. The
optimised Taylor rule parameters for the policy loss calculations presented in Table 2.7 are
shown in Tables A.3 - A.5, Appendix A.2.2. Our results show that the inclusion of capital to
the Ferrero and Seneca (2019) model has significant implications for the choice of monetary
policy rule in the small open economy. While a flexible domestic inflation based Taylor rule
that features interest rate inertia, domestic output and exchange rate (IFDITRyq) repres-
ents the optimal monetary policy strategy under the benchmark (mod1 ) and intermediate
(mod2 ) models, it yields inferior outcome under the baseline model (mod3 ). In other words,
simple rules such as DITR, FDITRy and SDITR are superior to the IFDITRyq under the
Ferrero and Seneca (2019) model. Also, Ferrero and Seneca (2019) showed that the inclusion
of interest rate smoothing into the central bank’s reaction function leads to increased loss,
a finding that is confirmed under our baseline model, mod3. However, this conclusion is
reversed once capital is added to the model (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.7). In other
words, once capital is added to the model, the central bank achieves better macroeconomic
stability by implementing gradual interest rate adjustments in response to an oil price shock.
Table 2.7: Losses under the three model variants
Regime mod1 mod2 mod3
CITR 0.5977 0.3025 0.0130
DITR 0.3322 0.0359 0.0051
FCITRy 0.5963 0.2814 0.0101
FDITRy 0.3315 0.0359 0.0051
IFCITRy 0.5910 0.2186 0.0102
IFCITRyq 0.3894 0.0671 0.0056
IFDITRy 0.3275 0.0337 0.0055
IFDITRyq 0.3258 0.0332 0.0055
SCITR 0.7306 0.4143 0.0158
SDITR 0.3347 0.0359 0.0051
SNGDPGT 0.3340 0.0692 0.0085
Commitment 0.3252 0.0324 0.0051
Discretion 0.3821 0.0354 0.0056
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We also find that Taylor rules which feature exchange rate perform quite well, especially
under mod1 and mod2, implying that the central bank of an oil-producing, oil-dependent,
economy needs to pay attention to exchange rate developments in the face of a negative
international oil price shock in order to minimise policy loss. In terms of the implications
of adding output to the simple inflation-based rules, the three model variants confirm that
such addition generate lower policy losses; a finding that is in line with the conclusion by
Ferrero and Seneca (2019). As expected, optimal policy under commitment yields better
policy outcomes across the three models compared to the case under discretionary policy.
2.4.5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the monetary policy analysis conducted above
to changes in the loss function parameters specified in equation (2.56). To this end, we
follow Laxton and Pesenti (2003) and assume different values for the loss function weights
ranging from 0.5 to 2. We allow for step increments of 0.5 for each weight as in Hove et al.
(2015). The respective weights on inflation, output and interest rate volatilities are λπ, λy
and λr. Thus, different configurations of these weights characterise the preferences of the
central bank with regards to its monetary stabilization objectives. The results presented in
Tables 2.8 - 2.10 are based on the benchmark model, mod1.
Table 2.8 presents the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis for two inflation-based Taylor
rules (CITR and DITR) and their flexible variants (FCITRy and FDITRy), which includes
an output term. Following a negative international oil price shock, the best policy outcomes
are recorded when the central bank places more weight on inflation in its loss function.
Also, the policy outcomes under the domestic inflation based Taylor rules (i.e. DITR and
FDITRy) are relatively insensitive to varying values of λπ in the loss function. As in Ferrero
and Seneca (2019), we find that the inclusion of an output term in the CITR reduces policy
loss regardless of the parameter configuration, provided the weight placed on inflation is
higher than the weights on interest rate and output in the central bank’s loss function.
However, the same is not true for DITR once the weight on inflation is greater than 1.0
while holding the weights placed on the other variables constant at 0.5. However, contrary
to the findings by Ferrero and Seneca (2019), adding interest rate smoothing to FCITRy and
FDITRy reduces loss regardless of the parameter settings in the central bank loss function.
Also, the sensitivity of our results to different parameter configurations in the central
bank’s loss function are evaluated under a scenario in which the reaction function of the
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monetary authority features interest rate inertia. The results are presented in Table 2.9.
First, we find that relative to the benchmark parameter configuration (shown in the first
row), a central bank that places equal weights on the three variables performs better. Second,
the sensitivity analyses confirm our earlier findings that the inclusion of exchange rate in the
reaction function of the central bank yields superior policy outcomes regardless of whether
the policy rule is CPI or domestic-inflation based. Even with higher weights placed on either
output or interest rate than inflation, the improved policy outcomes under the central bank
reaction function that features exchange rate remains valid. Third, as is the case under the
four earlier rules, increasing the weight on inflation in the loss function while holding the
weights on the other variables fixed yields increased policy losses while increasing the weight
on output performs even worse. However, placing higher weight on interest rate in the loss
function leads to superior policy outcomes once an interest rate smoothing term is added to
the CPI inflation-based central bank’s reaction function (Table 2.9).
Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis on loss function weights
Weights Loss
λπ λy λr CITR DITR FCITRy FDITRy
1.0 0.5 0.2 0.5977 0.3322 0.5963 0.3315
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5986 0.3421 0.5983 0.3417
1.0 0.5 0.5 0.7105 0.3431 0.7097 0.3429
1.5 0.5 0.5 0.8222 0.3435 0.8209 0.3441
2.0 0.5 0.5 0.9340 0.3437 0.9322 0.3442
0.5 1.0 0.5 0.8919 0.6565 0.8832 0.6531
0.5 1.5 0.5 1.1708 0.9585 1.1528 0.9497
0.5 2.0 0.5 1.4382 1.2490 1.4107 1.2328
0.5 0.5 1.0 0.7107 0.3601 0.7872 0.3601
0.5 0.5 1.5 0.8371 0.3761 0.9542 0.3761
0.5 0.5 2.0 1.1704 0.3921 1.1016 0.3921
In Table 2.10, we consider the case of strict inflation targeting central banks as well as the
implications of optimal policy under commitment and discretion for the policy loss. Under
different parameter configurations in the loss function, we uphold our earlier conclusion that
a policy rule that strictly targets domestic inflation generally outperforms its CPI inflation-
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based counterpart. Also, we confirm that there are gains from commitment regardless of the
parameter settings in the central bank’s loss function. As in the previous rules, increasing
the weight placed on output in the loss function while holding the weights for other variables
constant yields worsening policy outcomes. Under the strict CPI inflation-based Taylor rule,
the central bank generates better policy outcomes when it places higher weight on interest
rate compared to the cases in which higher weights are placed on either inflation or output.
However, with optimal policy under commitment, attaching higher and increasing weights
on inflation in the loss function yields superior policy outcomes compared to the cases under
which the weight on either output or interest rate is higher. Interestingly, when the central
bank exercises discretion in the conduct of monetary policy, increasing the weight placed on
inflation in the loss function leads to a reduction in the policy loss value.
Table 2.9: Sensitivity analysis on loss function weights (cont’d)
Weights Loss
λπ λy λr IFCITRy IFCITRyq IFDITRy IFDITRyq
1.0 0.5 0.2 0.5910 0.3894 0.3275 0.3258
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4786 0.3643 0.3276 0.3254
1.0 0.5 0.5 0.6325 0.4307 0.3316 0.3292
1.5 0.5 0.5 0.7738 0.4145 0.3332 0.3309
2.0 0.5 0.5 0.9061 0.4381 0.3341 0.3322
0.5 1.0 0.5 0.7718 0.6944 0.6336 0.6311
0.5 1.5 0.5 1.0560 0.9926 0.9248 0.9227
0.5 2.0 0.5 1.3292 1.2742 1.2026 1.2012
0.5 0.5 1.0 0.4906 0.3651 0.3331 0.3304
0.5 0.5 1.5 0.4975 0.3650 0.3375 0.3343
0.5 0.5 2.0 0.5029 0.3655 0.3412 0.3376
The results presented in Tables 2.8 - 2.10 show that when equal weight of 0.5 is attached
to the three variables in the central bank’s loss function, a flexible domestic inflation-based
Taylor rule that features output, exchange rate and interest rate smoothing (IFDITRyq)
yields the best policy outcome. This is followed by IFDITRy and FDITRy. This implies
that, given an international oil price shock, monetary policy rules that target domestic
inflation generally outperforms its CPI inflation-based counterparts. This is consistent with
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the findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
Table 2.10: Sensitivity analysis on loss function weights (cont’d)
Weights Loss
λπ λy λr SCITR SDITR Commitment Discretion
1.0 0.5 0.2 0.7306 0.3347 0.3252 0.3821
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6123 0.3443 0.3295 0.5236
1.0 0.5 0.5 0.7980 0.3443 0.3254 0.3756
1.5 0.5 0.5 0.9837 0.3443 0.3260 0.3486
2.0 0.5 0.5 1.1694 0.3443 0.3266 0.3393
0.5 1.0 0.5 0.9266 0.6726 0.3610 1.1821
0.5 1.5 0.5 1.2408 1.0010 0.4196 2.3297
0.5 2.0 0.5 1.5550 1.3293 0.4997 3.8914
0.5 0.5 1.0 0.7247 0.3602 0.3302 0.5142
0.5 0.5 1.5 0.8371 0.3761 0.3309 0.5135
0.5 0.5 2.0 0.9495 0.3920 0.3318 0.5159
With an increase in the weight placed on inflation in the loss function from 0.5 to 2.0,
IFDITRyq retains its position as the best policy rule followed by IFDITRy and DITR. Under
a parameter configuration in which the weight on output is increased from 0.5 to 2.0 while
holding the weights on the other variables constant at 0.5, we find that the IFDITRyq still
yields the best policy outcomes followed by IFDITRy and FDITRy. Similarly, when the
weight on interest rate is increased from 0.5 to 2.0 while holding the weights on the other
variables constant at 0.5, the IFDITRyq yields the best policy outcomes while IFDITRy
follows as the second best. The analyses conducted in this section suggests that our earlier
conclusions are robust to changes in the parameters of the policy loss function. Thus, the
central bank of an oil-exporting, oil-dependent economy minimizes policy loss in the face of
oil price shocks by reacting to domestic inflation and maintaining a parameter configuration
that places higher weight on inflation in its loss function19.
19This contrary to the findings of Hove et al. (2015), who argued that targeting CPI inflation yields better
welfare outcome in a commodity exporting economy of South Africa. It is important to note that Hove
et al. (2015) abstract from capital accumulation while also assuming labour as the only factor input in the
production technology of domestic firms.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the macroeconomic implications of ignoring two key features, (i)
capital accumulation and (ii) oil intensity of domestic output, in New-Keynesian models
often used to analyse the impacts of an oil price shock and monetary policy in resource-rich
economies. We rely on the small open economy model of Gali and Monacelli (2005), which
was extended by Ferrero and Seneca (2019) to include an oil sector. The implications of
these additional features for the response of the economy to an oil price shock are analysed
by considering three model variants. First, a Ferrero and Seneca (2019) type model, referred
to as mod1; which features capital accumulation, an investment adjustment cost and oil
intensity of domestic output. Second, a version ofmod1 that excludes oil intensity of domestic
output, denoted as mod2. Last, a Gali and Monacelli (2005) type model that includes an
oil sector as in Ferrero and Seneca (2019) referred to as mod3. This approach enables us
to compare results across the different models. We calibrate the model to the Norwegian
economy with most of the parameter values taken from Ferrero and Seneca (2019).
We report a number of useful results. First, we show that under our extended model,
mod1, a negative shock to the international price of oil generates contractionary effects on
domestic output through the reduction in demand for materials input by oil firms from the
non-oil goods producing firms. This confirms the oil price shock propagation mechanism
observed by Ferrero and Seneca (2019). However, we find that adding physical capital to
Ferrero and Seneca’s (2019) model amplifies the effects of an oil price shock on the domestic
economy regardless of the monetary policy rule in place. This finding is consistent with the
results of a similar study for an oil-importing economy of the US by Vásconez et al. (2015).
Also, the duration of recession arising from a negative international oil price shock, which
was found to last beyond 20 quarters in previous works such as Ferrero and Seneca (2019),
is found to be substantially shorter in a model that includes capital (10 quarters). Second,
the amplified response of the economy to an oil price shock generated under the model with
physical capital is attenuated once we allow for oil intensity of domestic production. In
addition, accounting for oil intensity shortens the duration of the oil shock-induced recession
further to about 3 quarters.
Third, the monetary policy rule that responds to domestic inflation generates larger
interest rate cuts compared to its CPI inflation counterpart. Consequently, it is more effective
in reducing the size and duration of output contraction caused by the negative oil price shock.
However, it generates higher volatility in prices and a more depreciated real exchange rate.
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Contrary to the findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019), allowing for interest rate inertia in
the central bank’s reaction function reduces policy loss under our benchmark model. Fourth,
of the eleven alternative monetary policy rules considered under our benchmark model, a
Taylor rule that features inflation rate, output, real exchange rate and interest rate inertia
(IFDITRyq) emerges a superior strategy as it minimises the policy loss in the aftermath
of a negative oil price shock. The inclusion of exchange rate in the Taylor rule improves
performance, regardless of whether the policy rule responds to CPI inflation or domestic
inflation. This is contrary to the findings of Taylor and Williams (2010). If the central
bank’s mandate includes both output and inflation stabilisation, a policy rule that responds
to headline inflation represents a better anchor for monetary policy.
In summary, the addition of capital and oil intensity of domestic production has non-
trivial implications for the response of the oil-producing economy to an oil price shock.
Also, once capital is added to the baseline DSGE model, monetary policy rules that feature
interest rate inertia and real exchange rate emerges as a superior strategy for minimising
overall macroeconomic instability. These findings are robust to changes in the parameters
of the central bank loss function. In particular, across different combinations of the loss
function parameters, a Taylor rule that features domestic inflation, output, real exchange
rate, and interest rate inertia represents an effective monetary policy response to a negative
oil price shock. Thus, monetary policy analyses conducted based on DSGE models of oil-
producing economies that abstract from capital accumulation should be interpreted with
caution.
The benchmark model considered in this paper is useful for studying the macroeconomic
impacts of an oil price shock as well as monetary policy in small open oil producing emerging
economies. While the model characterises a typical oil producing economy, its features can
be generalised for the analysis of most small open resource-rich economies. However, we
acknowledge that adding a number of other features to the benchmark model developed in
this paper may represent a useful exercise. First, the extent to which oil producing economies
are dependent on oil as a source of energy may not have been adequately captured in our
paper. Thus, including oil in the consumption basket of households as in Medina and Soto
(2005) represents a useful extension for analysing the direct effects of oil price shocks on
households consumption. It would also enable an evaluation of the appropriateness of core
inflation-based monetary policy rule under our model set up. Second, the model ignores
labour market rigidities and its potential implications for the response of the economy to an
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oil price shock. Third, the role of consumption habits (Dennis, 2009) is ignored. Fourth,
our models ignore fuel subsidies, which is a common phenomenon among most small open
oil producing emerging economies (Di Bella, Norton, Ntamatungiro, Ogawa, Samake and
Santoro, 2015; Estache and Leipziger, 2009). Such subsidies have been associated with
domestic price distortions, inefficient consumption, and large fiscal burdens (Coady et al.,
2017; Sdralevich, Sab, Zouhar and Albertin, 2014). Fifth, we ignore the presence of hand-
to-mouth consumers and its potential implications for monetary policy analysis (Gali, Pez-
Salido and Valles, 2004). Finally, the role of fiscal policy is downplayed in our model; thus
limiting its usefulness for the joint analysis of monetary and fiscal policies in small open
resource rich economies. The decision to abstract from some of these features is driven by
our intention to compare the results generated under our benchmark model to those reported
by Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Thus, these possible extensions are left for the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Oil Price Shocks, Fuel Subsidies and
Business Cycles in an Oil-Producing
Emerging Economy
3.1 Introduction
Business cycles are an intrinsic feature of any economy. An interesting strand of the business
cycle literature points to the fact that the sources of business cycles have evolved overtime.
The documented sources range from the traditional total factor productivity shocks identified
in the real business cycle models of the 1980s to more contemporary ones such as financial
risks, excessive optimism and self-fulfilling prophecies that emerged in the aftermath of
the last global economic crisis (Andrle, Bruha and Solmaz, 2017; Angeletos, Collard and
Dellas, 2018; Spatafora and Sommer, 2007). Indeed, one of the legacies of the 2007/09
global financial crisis is the realization that business cycles generated in a relatively large
economy can easily spread to other countries and generate non-trivial consequences for the
global economy. Since, the sources and severity of business cycles fluctuations differ from
one country to another (Agénor, McDermott and Prasad, 2000; Mehrara and Oskoui, 2007;
Rand and Tarp, 2002), studies investigating business cycle dynamics in different economies
are of significant interest to macroeconomists and policy makers.
In commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries alike, terms of trade shocks
- such as relating to oil price movements have been identified as a prominent source of busi-
ness cycles (Bacchiocchi and Sarzaeem, 2015; Bergholt, Larsen and Seneca, 2017; Brown
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and Yücel, 2002; Engemann et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2008; Hollander et al., 2018; Mehrara
and Oskoui, 2007; Mork et al., 1990). Almost four decades after Hamilton’s (1983) influen-
tial paper, the consensus in theoretical and empirical literature is that oil price shocks are
capable of generating non-trivial macroeconomic and welfare implications (Fueki, Higashi,
Higashio, Nakajima, Ohyama and Tamanyu, 2018). To ameliorate the negative impacts of
oil price shocks, fuel subsidy programmes have become popular, especially in oil-producing
emerging economies (Di Bella et al., 2015; Estache and Leipziger, 2009). However, in recent
times, there has been an increasing call for fuel subsidy reforms globally with policy-makers
expressing concerns regarding the efficacy and fiscal implications of such programmes1 (see,
for example, Coady, 2015; Ebeke and Ngouana, 2015; Jakob, Chen, Fuss, Marxen and Eden-
hofer, 2015; Salehi-Isfahani, Wilson Stucki and Deutschmann, 2015; Sdralevich et al., 2014).
It has been argued that, contrary to its intention, badly-targeted subsidy programmes have
worsened the problem of inequality and generated macroeconomic imbalances. Consequently,
a strand of the literature on oil-macroeconomy relationship has focused on investigating the
macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidies in resource-rich countries (Adeniyi et al., 2011;
Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012; Berument et al., 2010; Coady, 2015; Coady et al., 2017; Krane
and Monaldi, 2017; Medina and Soto, 2005). Our research falls within this strand of the
literature.
In this paper, we study the role of oil price shocks in driving business cycle dynamics
of small open OPEEs with a fuel subsidy regime and a low oil refining capacity. We pay
attention to the design of appropriate monetary policy response to an oil price shock under an
economic environment that allows for additional price rigidities arising from a domestic fuel
pricing rule. The following specific questions that have been ignored in literature are posed.
First, what are the key sources of business cycle fluctuations in an oil-producing emerging
economy with an inefficient fuel subsidy regime? Second, what are the macroeconomic
implications of a fuel subsidy reform for the small open oil-producing economy2? Third,
what is the appropriate monetary policy response to an oil price shock under an economy
1Clements, Coady, Fabrizio, Gupta, Alleyne and Sdralevich, 2013 lists the consequences of fuel subsidies
to include: aggravating fiscal imbalances, crowding-out priority public spending, and depressing private
investment, distorting resource allocation by encouraging excessive energy consumption, and accelerating
the depletion of natural resources, amongst others.
2This question has been answered for an oil-importing economy of Bangladesh (Amin, Marsiliani and
Renstrom, 2018) and an oil-exporting economy of Nigeria (Oladunni, 2020) using calibrated DSGE models.
To our knowledge, no study has been conducted for an oil-producing emerging economy using an estimated
DSGE model that allows for a computed pass-through coefficient of international price of oil to domestic
retail price of fuel.
61
with incomplete pass-through of international oil prices to domestic fuel price? Fourth,
how relevant is an export price-based monetary policy rule in stabilising the oil-producing
emerging economy following an oil price shock? Fifth, how important is the nature of fiscal
cyclicality in facilitating the achievement of monetary policy objectives? Sixth, does the
presence of hand-to-mouth consumers matter for the economy’s response to an oil price
shock?
To address these questions, we develop a standard Two Agents New Keynesian (TANK)
model that incorporates relevant features of a small open resource-rich emerging economy.
We allow for Ricardian and hand-to-mouth consumers in order to reflect the limited access
to financial markets by households in most emerging economies and generate empirically
plausible response of private consumption to government spending shocks as enunciated by
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007). The model also features a well-specified fiscal sector
that captures commodity revenues as well as a fuel subsidy regime, which is a common social
safety net programme among oil-exporting emerging economies, such as Nigeria, Algeria,
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, e.t.c. (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015). We include a commodity
sector that exports crude oil to the rest of the world and whose revenues are shared by its
owners: government and foreign investors (Algozhina, 2015). In order to reflect oil intensity
of domestic output and capture the indirect effects of an oil price shock on domestic prices,
we include oil in household consumption (Medina and Soto, 2005) and in the production
function of domestic firms (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015). In all, ten structural shocks are
incorporated to drive the stochastic dynamics of the model.
We fit the model to Nigerian data via Bayesian methods using data on eleven macroeco-
nomic variables covering the period 2000:Q2 - 2018:Q2. We find the Nigerian case interesting
for a number of reasons. First, the economy typifies a number of features embedded in our
model set up; including high oil intensity of domestic output, inefficient fuel subsidies, low
domestic oil refining capacity, substantial foreign direct investment in the oil sector, and
the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers. Second, the few existing studies on the Nigerian
economy have failed to reach a consensus regarding the macroeconomic implications of oil
shocks and fuel subsidy reforms. Whereas Siddig, Aguiar, Grethe, Minor and Walmsley
(2014) found that subsidy removal boosts the GDP, Ocheni (2015) showed that such policy
reform hurts economic growth and reduce household income. While the discrepancies in
findings could be due to differences in methodological approaches adopted by the studies, we
argue that a proper assessment of the effects of subsidy reforms under an inefficient subsidy
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regime requires a knowledge of the degree of pass-through from international oil price to do-
mestic retail price of fuel. Third, no previous study has investigated business cycle dynamics
in Nigeria using an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that
accounts for the country’s fuel subsidy regime3. Thus, using Nigerian data allows us to: (i)
identify business cycle drivers in a country with an inefficient fuel subsidy regime (ii) assess
the macroeconomic implications of potential fuel subsidy reforms in Nigeria and (iii) explore
the relevance of alternative monetary policy rules in stabilising the economy after an oil price
shock.
A number of interesting results are reported. First, our results show that output fluctu-
ations are driven mainly by oil and monetary policy shocks in the short run (1-4 quarters)
and domestic supply shocks in the medium term. Particularly, oil shocks account for about
23 per cent of variations in output up to the fifth year, while fiscal policy appears muted. On
the other hand, monetary and domestic supply shocks jointly account for around 72 per cent
of short run variations in aggregate inflation while oil shocks play a less prominent role due
to the low pass-through effect arising from the fuel subsidy regime. We find that a negative
oil price shock generates a persistent negative impact on the GDP and a short-lived positive
effect on headline inflation consistent with the findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019) for the
Norwegian economy.
Second, we estimate that about 43 per cent of changes to international oil prices is
transmitted into domestic fuel price in Nigeria. Following a negative oil price shock, a
zero-subsidy regime generates lower output contraction, higher private consumption, lower
headline inflation, but higher real exchange rate depreciation in the short run. These results
imply that the fuel subsidy regime accentuates the contractionary effects of an adverse oil
price shock while also constraining the capacity of fiscal policy to drive output growth in the
long run.
Third, we confirm the trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation highlighted in
Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Given an oil price shock, core inflation-based monetary policy
rule outperforms its competitors in stabilising prices and exchange rate but leads to output
instability in the short run. However, a domestic inflation-based monetary policy rule ap-
3The existing studies applied either the computable general equilibrium model (Adenikinju, 2009; Siddig
et al., 2014), ordinary least squares estimation (Nwachukwu, Mba, Jiburum and Okosun, 2013), analysis of
survey data (Ocheni, 2015), or the narrative approach (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). These approaches are
limited in terms of their usefulness for studying business cycle dynamics and conducting monetary policy
analysis.
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pears to represent a useful strategy for stabilising output. An export price targeting rule
reverses the contractionary effects of an adverse terms of trade shock at the expense of
overall domestic stability (Vogel, Hohberger and Herz, 2015). It is important that these
trade-offs are considered by the CBN in the design of monetary policy response to an oil
price shock. Based on results from our monetary policy analysis using a specified central
bank loss function, we find that the core inflation-based monetary policy reaction function
that features output and real exchange rate represents an optimal strategy for stabilising
the Nigerian economy in the aftermath of an oil price shock. Our obtained policy ranking
is robust to alternative assumptions regarding the inclusion/exclusion of fuel subsidy regime
in our model.
Fourth, our simulation results support the view that a counter-cyclical fiscal policy aids
the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilising both real and nominal variables following
an oil price shock. This highlights the need for effective interaction between monetary and
fiscal policies. The presence of hand-to-mouth consumers amplifies the contractionary effects
of lower oil prices on output and consumption in the oil-producing economy. Also, following a
negative oil price shock, the inflationary pressures resulting from exchange rate depreciation
are ameliorated in the absence of hand-to-mouth consumers.
This paper is organized into 7 sections. In Section 2, we present a brief stylised fact on the
relevance of oil to the Nigerian economy. Section 3 presents a summary of related literature.
Section 4 describes the theoretical model by elucidating the economic environments and
deriving the optimality conditions guiding the decisions of the various agents in the model
economy. The estimation procedure as well as the data are discussed in Section 5. In Section
6, we present the estimation results and discuss them in the context of the questions earlier
posed. Finally, some concluding remarks and policy implications are offered in Section 7.
Detailed derivations of the equilibrium conditions as well as some useful results are presented
in Appendix B.
3.2 The Nigerian Economy and Oil: Stylised Facts
Oil plays important roles in the Nigerian economy, contributing about a third of the country’s
gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1980s and 1990s. Although its share of the economy
has waned in the subsequent decades due to declining oil prices and the changing structure of
the economy, the oil and gas sector still accounts for about 11.2 per cent of the GDP during
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the period 2010 - 2018 (Table 3.1). Also, the contribution of oil to government revenue has
remained quite high, increasing from 70.2 per cent during the 1980s to about 80.0 per cent
in the period 2000 - 2009.
In terms of trade, oil accounts for about 93.1 per cent of exports and 24.4 per cent of
imports during the period 2010-2018. The share of refined oil in the country’s total imports
has increased over time, rising from about 9.0 per cent in the 1980s to about 24.4 per cent
during 2010 - 20184. This is reflective of increasing oil intensity in the country, as households
and firms depend on fuel as the source of energy for their economic activities. Also, it reflects
the low domestic oil refining capacity in the economy, which stood at about 16 per cent
during the period 2010-2018. Figure 3.1 shows that the average capacity utilisation rate of
the country’s three oil refineries have been poor, volatile and dwindling during 1997 - 20185.
Table 3.1: Oil and the Nigerian economy, 1980 - 2018
Indicators (%) 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018
Share of oil in GDP 31.23 31.99 24.07 11.21
Share of oil in govt. revenue 70.19 77.11 79.85 64.77
Share of oil in total exports 95.14 97.35 96.97 93.05
Share of fuel in total imports 8.39 20.12 21.30 24.41
Oil refining capacity utilisation - 40.78 28.68 15.97
Nigeria’s dependence on crude oil exports and fuel imports implies that volatility in
the global crude oil market is of significant consequence for her economy. For instance,
the decline in global crude oil prices which began in the early 2014 generated deleterious
effects on the economy as fiscal revenues declined, foreign exchange earnings plummeted,
and foreign exchange market pressure worsened. Since the economy relies substantially on
imports for its intermediate inputs, the scarcity of foreign exchange resulting from falling oil
prices constitute a negative productivity shock to the economy. Consequently, output growth
declined steadily from 2014 in tandem with the falling oil price and the economy slipped into
a recession in 2016 (Figure 3.2). This tends to suggest that the Nigerian economy, as is the
case for most small open resource-rich emerging economies, is largely susceptible to business
cycles initiated in other economies.
4About 91 per cent of Nigeria’s fuel requirement is imported from the rest of the world due to poor
domestic refining capacity.
5Data was sourced from various editions of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Annual
Statistical Bulletin
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The Nigerian government introduced a fuel subsidy regime in the 1980s as part of
strategies for cushioning the macroeconomic and welfare impacts of oil price shocks on the
economy. Under this arrangement, the government regulates the domestic price of fuel and
pays domestic marketers the difference between the regulated domestic price and the Expec-
ted Open Market Price (EOMP), which is determined by the country’s Petroleum Products
Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPPRA)6. It is estimated that about N10 trillion (approx-
imately US$55.13 billion, at an average exchange rate of N181.39/US$) was spent in fuel



































Figure 3.1: Domestic oil refining capacity utilisation rate, 1997 – 2018
The mismatch between the domestic demand for petroleum products and the domestic
oil refining capacity explains the growth in fuel imports over the years. Thus, Nigeria is a
net exporter of crude oil and a net importer of refined fuel, causing the economy to remain
highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the international oil market. This unique feature of the
economy complicates the process of subsidy reforms in the country as previous attempts have
been largely resisted. A number of studies have focused on examining the implications of fuel
subsidy for the economy. It has been reported that Nigeria’s subsidy regime distorts fiscal
6This agency was established in 2003 to amongst others design the pricing policy of petroleum products
in Nigeria
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planning, encourages inefficient consumption, and increases inequality as richer households
benefit more (Siddig et al., 2014; Soile and Mu, 2015; Umar and Umar, 2013). In terms of
the impacts of subsidy reforms, Siddig et al. (2014) found that subsidy reduction increases
the GDP and reduces household income. Other studies have argued that that fuel subsidy
removal in Nigeria could cause inflation and reduce economic welfare (Adenikinju, 2009);
hurt economic growth and reduce household income (Ocheni, 2015); and make firms less
competitive (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). Thus, there is yet to be a consensus on the output

























































































































































































GDP Growth Oil Price
Figure 3.2: Quarterly crude oil price and real GDP growth in Nigeria, 2011Q1 – 2016Q4
Figure 3.3 presents Nigeria’s GDP growth and the contribution of its components during
the period 2011Q1-2018Q2. The figure shows that output growth trended downwards during
the period, with negative growth rates recorded in 2016 and the first quarter of 2017. It is
also clear from the figure that growth was above its linear trend during the periods 2013Q2
– 2015Q1 and 2017Q3 – 2018Q2 while it stayed below trend during the periods 2011Q3 –
2012Q2 and 2015Q4 – 2017Q2. Figure 3.3 also shows that the country’s business cycles
are subject to irregular behaviour in terms of size and space. For instance, the below-trend
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output growth for 2011Q3 – 2012Q2 is shorter and less severe than that of 2015Q4 – 2017Q2.
The sources of these sort of irregularities in the evolution of real GDP growth (often regarded











Q1-2011 Q1-2012 Q1-2013 Q1-2014 Q1-2015 Q1-2016 Q1-2017 Q1-2018
  Aggregate Consumption Aggregate Investment Government Consumption
 Net Exports YoY Real GDP Growth Linear (YoY Real GDP Growth)
Figure 3.3: Contribution of output components to GDP growth, 2011 - 2018
A decomposition of output growth according to its various components further shows
that aggregate consumption and net exports are the key sources of GDP growth in Nigeria.
The average output growth of 4.7 per cent recorded in the pre-recession period of 2011Q1 –
2015Q4 was largely accounted for by aggregate consumption as its share in GDP stood at
62.8 per cent (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Components of output, 2011 - 2018
2011Q1-2015Q4 2016Q1 -2018Q2
Component Average share Contribution to Average share Contribution to
of GDP in GDP (%) GDP growth (%) in GDP (%) GDP growth (%)
Consumption 62.8 2.3 60.0 -1.5
Investment 15.6 0.4 15.4 -0.3
Government 7.0 -0.3 4.5 -0.3
Net exports 14.6 2.3 20.0 2.1
Total 100.0 4.72 100.0 0.01
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On the other hand, while the other components of GDP recorded negative growth rates in
the 2016Q1 -2018Q2 period, net exports (with a share of GDP at 20.0 per cent) grew by 2.1
per cent. Thus, the positive average GDP growth of about 0.01 per cent recorded during the
period was exports-led, further highlighting the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks.
Finally, we note from Table 3.2 that changes in the average GDP growth are not uniformly












































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Crude oil price and Nigeria’s monetary policy rate, 2002 - 2016
In terms of monetary policy response, Figure 3.4 shows the time series plot of crude
oil price (OP) and the monetary policy rate (MPR) of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
during the period 2002 – 2016. As indicated by the circles, episodes of substantial decline in
the price of crude oil recorded during the years 2006, 2008 and 2014 were followed by interest
rate cuts (albeit with some inertia), suggestive of a counter-cyclical monetary policy stance.
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3.3 Summary of Related Literature
The oil price shock of 1973 and the subsequent recession in the US led to the resurgence of
studies investigating the oil-macroeconomy nexus. The debate has developed along several
dimensions with the key strands focusing on (i) the macroeconomic implications of oil shocks,
(ii) the oil price shock transmission mechanism and (iii) the appropriate policy responses for
ameliorating the impacts of the shocks. The results and policy prescriptions are varied de-
pending on the circumstance of the economy in question (oil-importing versus oil-exporting),
the nature and persistence of the oil shock, and the type of policy response to the shock.
In terms of the first strand of the literature identified above, there is considerable evidence
supporting the view that oil price shocks generate non-trivial impacts on output, prices and
asset prices (Bergholt and Larsen, 2016; Berument et al., 2010; Cashin, Mohaddes, Raissi
and Raissi, 2014; Cunado and De Gracia, 2005; Engemann et al., 2011; Ferrero and Seneca,
2019; Hamilton, 1983; Hollander et al., 2018; Hooker, 1996; Kilian, 2008; Mork et al., 1990;
Romero, 2008). However, the nature and severity of the impacts depend on whether the
economy in question is a net oil-exporter or a net oil-importer (Cashin et al., 2014). In
the case of net oil-importing countries, oil price increases have been associated with output
losses and inflationary pressures. This sort of stagflationary effects have been reported by
studies such as Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002); Barsky and Kilian (2001); Engemann et al.
(2011); Hamilton (1983, 2008); Hollander et al. (2018); Hooker (1996); Kilian (2008); Leduc
and Sill (2004); Lorusso and Pieroni (2018); Medina and Soto (2005); Mehlum, Moene and
Torvik (2006); Mork (1989) and Vásconez et al. (2015). For instance, in furtherance of the
findings earlier reported in his 1983 seminal paper, Hamilton (2008) demonstrated that nine
out of the ten post-World War II recessions in the US occurred after oil price increases.
According to Ferderer (1996), Hamilton’s findings have been upheld by several other studies
using alternative data, estimation procedure, and other countries. For example, in a study of
seven countries, Engemann et al. (2011) show that oil price shocks increase the probability
of recession in most of the countries7. They argued that for the US, the probability of a
recession following an oil price shock increases by about 50 percentage points after four
quarters and up to 90 percentage points after eight quarters.
Contrary to the findings for oil-importing countries, positive oil price shocks have been
reported to boost output in oil exporting countries (see for instance Abayomi, Adam and
7The countries studied are Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United
States
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Alumbugu, 2015; Adeniyi et al., 2011; Akinleye and Ekpo, 2013; Akinlo, 2012; Benkhodja,
2014; Bergholt and Larsen, 2016; Bergholt et al., 2017; Bjørnland, 2009; Ferrero and Seneca,
2019; Huseynov and Ahmadov, 2014; Iklaga, 2017; Romero, 2008; Sadeghi, 2017). In a study
for Norway, Bergholt et al. (2017) found that a positive oil price shock boosts economic
activities with the real GDP growth reaching a peak of 0.6 per cent after about 12 quarters.
The study emphasised the “supply chain channel” under which the increased profitability of
the oil firms following a positive oil price shock causes economic activities to increase in the
non-oil sector. Thus, aggregate consumption, investment and manufacturing output increase
while prices decline in response to an oil price increase8. A number of empirical studies
have also documented similar findings for some less developed oil-producing economies (see
Adeniyi et al., 2011; Berument et al., 2010; Mehrara and Oskoui, 2007).
In terms of the transmission mechanism of oil price shocks, a number of channels have
been identified in literature. These include the output channel, the income channel, and the
real balance channel (Brown and Yücel, 2002; Ferderer, 1996; Holmes and Wang, 2003). The
output channel relates to a supply side shock that emphasises the role of oil and capital as
complementary inputs in the production process. Under this channel, firms adjust to an oil
price increase by reducing the amount of both oil and capital inputs used in the production;
thus, causing output to decline (Brown and Yücel, 2002; Ferderer, 1996). The income channel
occurs through the transfer of income from oil-importing countries to the oil-exporting ones
following an increase in oil price (Brown and Yücel, 2002; Dohner, 1981; Romero, 2008). Such
income transfers imply a reduction in aggregate demand in oil-importing countries, which
causes economic recessions. The real balance channel posits that oil price increases generate
inflationary outcomes that reduce the quantity of real balances in the system, which in turn
causes economic recessions via monetary channels (Ferderer, 1996). Studies such as Barsky
and Kilian (2001); Bernanke et al. (1997); Herrera and Pesavento (2009); Kilian (2010);
Leduc and Sill (2004) and Kormilitsina (2011) have also emphasised the indirect effects of
oil price shocks on output through the role of money supply. They argue that the output
losses often associated with oil price shocks are partly attributable to the counter-inflationary
response of monetary policy to such shocks9. The arguments contained in Bernanke et al.
(1997) and other related studies highlight the need for carefully calibrated policy responses
to oil price shocks.
8Similar findings were also reported by Ferrero and Seneca (2019) using a calibrated DSGE model.
9A few studies such as Kilian and Lewis (2011) belie this argument and posit that monetary policy
response to oil price shocks should be driven by the underlying causes of the shock.
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Several suggestions have been put forward by various studies on the appropriate response
of monetary policy to oil price shocks. The policy prescriptions are often derived from the
nature of the observed oil shock transmission mechanisms at play in a given country as well
as the mandate of the central bank in question. While some studies have recommended
interest rate hikes in response to a positive oil price shock (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015),
others have prescribed either monetary policy easing (Bergholt and Larsen, 2016; Shangle
and Solaymani, 2020) or monetary policy restraint (Fischer, 1985). For instance, Ferrero and
Seneca (2019) suggested that a reduction in interest rate represents an optimal monetary
policy response to negative oil price shock in Norway - an oil-exporting country. They further
cautioned that a central bank with a price stability mandate could implement an interest
rate hike, albeit at the expense of worsening the contractionary effect of a negative oil price
shock on output. In terms of monetary policy strategy, it was demonstrated that a domestic
inflation based Taylor rule outperformed its CPI-based counterpart in stabilising output.
However, in a similar study for Algeria - an oil exporting country with a fuel subsidy regime,
Allegret and Benkhodja (2015) showed that the core inflation based monetary policy rule
maximises welfare.
The literature review presented in this section reveals that positive oil price shocks gen-
erate stagflationary effects in oil-importing economies whereas oil-exporting countries tend
to experience increased output via the income transfer channel. While most of the existing
studies have focused on oil-importing developed countries, the literature is still quite scanty
for oil-exporting emerging economies. Studies using the New Keynesian framework to in-
vestigate the impacts of oil price shocks on emerging economies with fuel subsidy regimes
are particularly few. To our knowledge, the existing ones include Allegret and Benkhodja
(2015) and Oladunni (2020). Allegret and Benkhodja (2015) developed a DSGE model that
incorporates a fuel subsidy regime for the Algerian economy and found that a positive oil
price shock increases aggregate output, investment and non-oil output while headline in-
flation rises, albeit weakly. On the other hand, Oladunni (2020) demonstrated based on
a DSGE model for Nigeria that a negative oil price shock increases non-oil output while
headline and core measures of inflation rise marginally. These results imply that there is no
consensus among researchers on the macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks on a typical
oil-exporting country with a subsidy regime. In this chapter, we contribute to the literat-




The model we develop in this paper is an extension of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Ferrero
and Seneca (2019). It incorporates: (i) an oil sector that is owned by government and
foreign investors as in Algozhina (2015); (ii) oil in household consumption basket and firms’
production technology as in Medina and Soto (2007) and Allegret and Benkhodja (2015);
(iii) five different measures of inflation10 as in Medina and Soto (2007); (iv) an inefficient
financial sector as in Smets and Wouters (2007); (v) fiscal policy rule as in Algozhina (2015);
(vi) a fuel pricing rule that connotes an implicit subsidy regime as in Allegret and Benkhodja
(2015); and (vii) non-Ricardian consumers11. Furthermore, we allow for the law of one price
gap in imports and by implication assume incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import
prices (Monacelli, 2005; Senbeta, 2011). As standard in most DSGE models, we assume that
wages as well as prices of domestically produced goods are sticky. Finally, an investment
adjustment cost is incorporated into the model, a useful feature for generating the observed
hump-shaped investment response to shocks.
The assumption that the household’s utility function is inter-temporally separable is
relaxed via the incorporation of consumption habits. Thus, we assume that household’s con-
sumption depends on the economy’s aggregate consumption, a phenomenon often referred to
as “keeping with the Joneses” in literature. This modification is premised on the empirical
fact that households, having been accustomed to a certain consumption level, do not imme-
diately alter their consumption pattern in the aftermath of a sudden shock to their income
level. The incorporation of this feature helps to address the issues of excessive volatility
in consumption and the exaggerated sensitivity of consumption to changing income levels
(Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher, 2001).
The presence of non-Ricardian consumers relaxes the usual assumption that all house-
holds rationally optimise their inter-temporal consumption in order to maximise utility. The
assumption that households are rational optimisers is based on the life-cycle hypothesis in
which household’s consumption is expressed not as a function of total income, but as being
dependent on the household’s permanent income. This is underpinned by the assumption
that all households have access to the financial market and can thus embark on inter-temporal
consumption smoothing. However, empirical evidence shows that the permanent income hy-
10These are core inflation, oil inflation, imported inflation, domestic inflation, and total inflation.
11A survey conducted in 2018 showed that about 36.8 per cent of adults in Nigeria were financially excluded
that year (EFInA, 2018).
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pothesis can not be upheld in economies with imperfect capital and under-developed financial
markets. These imperfections, which are quite prevalent in emerging economies, debar some
households from engaging in inter-temporal optimisation as they are financially constrained.
To accommodate this feature, we incorporate hand-to-mouth consumers and allow for a share
of consumers to be non-Ricardian in a fashion akin to a Two Agent New-Keynesian (TANK)
model described by Galí (2018). In their seminal work, Galí et al. (2007) showed that the
incorporation of non-Ricardian agents has desirable implications for the response of private
consumption to fiscal policy shocks.
Furthermore, we allow for law of one price gap in imports (occasioned by the ability of
the monopolistically competitive importing firms to optimise their prices) and by implication
assume incomplete exchange rate pass-through (Monacelli, 2005; Senbeta, 2011). Following
Smets and Wouters (2007), we reflect the usual inefficiencies in the financial sector of most
emerging economies by incorporating an exogenous risk premium in the return to bonds. In
order to reflect the energy pricing realities and the attendant energy subsidy programmes in
most emerging oil-exporting countries, we incorporate a fuel pricing rule as in Allegret and
Benkhodja (2015). Thus, ours is a new Keynesian open-economy model enhanced with bells
and whistles that are relevant to small open emerging economies in general and oil exporters
in particular.
3.4.1 Graphical overview of the model
Figure 3.5 presents a bird’s-eye view of the economy, highlighting the economic agents as well
as the inter-relationships among them. The model economy is inhabited by seven agents:
households, non-oil goods producing firms, final goods producers, import goods retailers, oil
producing firms, fiscal authority and the central bank.
The final goods producers buy intermediate goods and transform them into final goods,
which are either consumed by domestic households, the government, the oil firm, or exported
to the foreign economy by way of non-oil exports. The intermediate goods firms produce
differentiated goods by combining labour, capital, and imported refined oil; and they set
their prices a la Calvo (1983). The imported goods retailers buy intermediate goods from
the foreign economy, which are then combined by perfectly competitive assemblers into final
foreign goods and sold to households and the government. The representative oil firm uses
materials sourced from the domestic economy as well as capital sourced from government
and foreign investors to produce crude oil, which is exported to the rest of the world at
74
an exogenously determined price. The government imports refined fuel, which it sells to
































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Flow chart of the model economy
Households consume goods (which include domestically produced goods, imported goods
and fuel), supply labour to earn wages, and pay taxes to the government. However, only
Ricardian consumers are able to save, invest in bonds and accumulate capital, subject to an
investment adjustment cost. The accumulated capital is leased to non-oil domestic interme-
diate goods producing firms at a rental rate. The government receives tax revenues from
households, oil revenues from the oil firm, and issues one period bonds. These revenues are
used to purchase domestically produced and imported public goods as well as finance the
energy subsidy programme. In our model, government consumption represents a key fiscal
policy instrument available to government. The central bank acts as the monetary authority,
setting interest rate based on a standard Taylor rule in order to achieve macroeconomic sta-
bility. Details regarding the economic environments within which each of the agents operates
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as well as the rules guiding their decisions are discussed next.
3.4.2 Households
The model features two types of households: Ricardian (R) and non-Ricardian or hand-to-
mouth (NR). The former comprises a fraction (γR) of households who are optimisers and
have access to financial markets. Each household j in this category can buy and sell financial
assets without any form of constraints (Galí, 2018). Thus, they are able to smooth their
consumption over time. The latter category, NR, represents the remaining fraction (1− γR)
who are non-optimisers. They completely consume their labour income within the period
(Gabriel, Levine, Pearlman and Yang, 2010; Melina, Yang and Zanna, 2016). However, both
categories of households have identical preferences as the representative household j derives
utility from private consumption, Ct, as well as government consumption, Gc,t, and dis-utility
from labour, Nt. Thus, the representative household j maximises an expected discounted














where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor,
σ is relative risk aversion coefficient, and φ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply. The utility derived by household from government spending, h(Gc,t), is
taken as given, and it is merely included in the utility function as a reduced form way to
motivate the incorporation of government spending into our model set up. Thus, since it
is additively separable in equation (3.1), it does not affect household choices and does not
matter for the equilibrium dynamics. While equation (3.1) is separable in both consumption
goods and labour effort, we assume that consumption is subject to external habit formation,
implying that the external habit stock is proportional to aggregate past consumption. The
parameter ϕc ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption, with
ϕc = 0 implying that there is no habit formation. By these assumptions, the utility of a
representative household depends positively on the difference between the current level of
individual consumption, Ct (j), and the lagged economy-wide consumption level, Ct−1 and
negatively on the number of hours worked, Nt (j).
Household consumption is a composite index comprising non-oil (referred to as core hence-
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where parameter ηo > 0 measures the degree of substitution between core and fuel con-
sumption and γo represents the share of domestic consumption devoted to fuel consumption,
Co,t (j). Expenditure minimization subject to equation (3.2) yields the demand for core
consumption, fuel consumption and the corresponding aggregate consumer price index as
follows:





Ct (j) , (3.3)





Ct (j) , (3.4)
Pt =
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where the price of fuel and core goods are denoted as Pro,t and Pno,t, respectively. The
price of imported fuel is not simply the domestic currency price of fuel but rather a convex
combination of the landing price of fuel and the domestic price of fuel in the previous period12.
Pt is the aggregate consumer price index. Furthermore, core consumption bundle, Cno,t (j) is
defined as a composite index given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator
















where ηc > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in
the core consumption basket and γc indicates the degree of trade openness of the domestic
economy, measuring the share of domestic consumption devoted to imported foreign goods.
The demands for Ch,t (j) and Cf,t (j) as well as the core consumption price index, Pno,t, are





lo,t where the landing price of fuel, Plo,t, is the current world price of fuel expressed in local
currency.
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determined by expenditure minimization subject to equation (3.6), yielding the following:





Cno,t (j) , (3.7)





Cno,t (j) , (3.8)
Pno,t =
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where Ph,t represents the price of domestically produced goods and Pf,t is the price of im-
ported goods.
Ricardian consumers
Each optimising household j makes inter-temporal consumption and savings decisions in a
















where the parameters and variables in the equation above are as previously defined under
equation (3.1) and the superscript R indicates that the household is Ricardian. Equation
(3.10) is maximised subject to a per period budget constraint given by:
PtC
R












t (j) +Rh,tKh,t (j) +Bt (j) + εtB
∗
t (j) +Dt − TXt. (3.11)
On the income side of equation (3.11), the Ricardian consumer supplies NRt (j) hours of work
at a nominal wage rate, Wt, earning a labour income, WtNRt (j). Second, the household owns
an amount of non-oil capital, Kh,t (j), which it leases to the domestic non-oil goods producing
firms at a rental rate, Rh,t, to generate a capital income, Rh,tKh,t (j). Third, the household
receives an aliquot share, Dt from the profits of the firms. The household also enters the
period with the stock of nominal domestic bonds, Bt (j), and foreign bonds, B∗t (j) maturing
in period t + 1. Bt+1 (j) and B∗t+1 (j) represent the Ricardian household’s investments in
domestic and foreign bonds at the end of period t, respectively while the nominal exchange
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rate is denoted by εt. Each domestic bond pays a gross nominal rate of return, Rt in domestic
currency while its foreign counterpart pays an exchange rate adjusted nominal rate of return,
R∗t .
Following Smets and Wouters (2007) and Hollander et al. (2018), we allow for domestic risk
premium, µt over the monetary policy rate when households hold domestic assets as well as
a stochastic disturbance term that represents the risk premium faced by households when
borrowing abroad, µ∗t . As described in Smets and Wouters (2007), the disturbance term, µt,
is a wedge between the central bank controlled interest rate and the return on assets held
by households. Thus, a positive shock to the domestic risk premium has the potentials of
reducing consumption and increasing the cost of capital. It is assumed that µt and µ∗t evolve
as first order autoregressive, or AR (1), processes. The income received by the household
is used to finance the purchase of consumption, CRt (j), and non-oil investments, Ino,t (j),
goods. Pt is the aggregate Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the domestic economy while Pi,t
represents the price index of investment goods. Lastly, TXt represents per-capita lump-sum
net taxes from the government.
As with consumption, non-oil investment goods, Ino,t, in equation (3.11) comprise do-
mestically produced investment goods, Ih,t, and foreign-produced investment goods, If,t,
















where γi is the share of imports in aggregate non-oil investment goods and ηi is the elasti-
city of intra-temporal substitution between domestic and imported investment goods. Cost
minimisation by the representative Ricardian household subject to equation (3.12) yields the
demand equations for home and foreign imported investment goods as follows:























Furthermore, the Ricardian household accumulates non-oil capital based on the following
process:








where parameter 0 < δh < 1 represents the rate at which capital depreciates. The investment




















where the parameter χ ≥ 0 governs the size of the adjustment cost. Putting equation (3.17)
into (3.16), we can rewrite the capital accumulation equation as follows:










Overall, the representative Ricardian household maximises equation (3.1) subject to a
per period nominal budget constraint (equation 3.11) and a capital accumulation process
(equation 3.18) by choosing
{
CRt (j) , Bt+1 (j) , B
∗




the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the capital accumu-
lation process to be λRC,t and λRK,t, respectively. The relevant first order conditions enable
us to derive the equations for consumption Euler (equation 3.19), demand for foreign bonds





































































where πt = PtPt−1 is the CPI inflation and rh,t =
Rh,t
Pt
is the capital rental rate in real terms.
Non-Ricardian consumers
The non-Ricardian consumers are hand-to-mouth households and are thus incapable of inter-
temporal optimisation. The representative non-Ricardian consumer j chooses its consump-











subject to the nominal budget constraint:
PtC
NR
t (j) = WtN
NR
t (j)− TXt. (3.24)
Allowing the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the non-Ricardian







Labour supply and wage setting
We assume that the determination of wages is based on Calvo (1983) rule. Households
sell their differentiated labour, Nt (j), in a monopolistic market to a representative firm
that aggregates the different labour types into a single labour input, Nt. Thus, the labour-













where parameter ηw is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated jobs. To derive
the demand equation for differentiated labour, j, and the aggregate wage level, the labour-



















Following Calvo (1983), we assume that 1 − θw fraction of households are chosen at
random to optimally set their wages in each period. The remaining fraction, θw, keep their
wages at the previous period’s level. Each household who is able to optimally reset its wage
contract evaluates the disutility of labour relative to the utility arising from its labour income.
Thus, the optimal wage setting problem involves maximising equation (3.1) subject to the
household budget constraint as well as the demand for the differentiated labour (equation
3.27). This yields the optimal reset wage equation given by:
















where W •t (j) is the optimal reset wage, and θw measures the degree of nominal wage rigidity.














t + (1− γR)CNRt , (3.31)
Nt = γRN
R













13Following Medina and Soto (2016), we make a simplifying assumption that the non-Ricardian households
set wages equal to the average wage set by the the Ricardian households.
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NNRt (j) dj for each non-Ricardian household.
3.4.3 Non-oil goods producing firms
Final-goods firms: Final goods are produced by a set of perfectly competitive firms for
domestic use (Yh,t) and exports (Y ∗h,t). Accordingly, these firms use their respective aggreg-
ation technologies to bundle domestically produced differentiated goods, Yh,t (zh), meant
for the domestic market and Y ∗h,t (zh) meant for the export market. In bundling domestic




Πh,t (zh) = Ph,tYh,t−
1w
0
Ph,t (zh)Yh,t (zh) dzh, (3.33)











where Ph,t (zh) is the price charged on intermediate goods, Yh,t (zh) , Ph,t is the domestic price
index, and the parameter ϵh > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among different
intermediate goods. The first-order condition for the above optimization problem yields the

















Analogously, the demand function of the final goods firms seeking to assemble intermediate
varieties for the export market is given by:


















where P ∗h,t (zh) is the price charged on export-bound intermediate goods Y ∗h,t (zh).
Intermediate-goods firms: There is a continuum of intermediate goods firms, indexed
by zh ∈ [0, 1] producing differentiated goods in a monopolistically competitive environment.
Each representative intermediate-goods firm uses a constant returns to scale technology that
combines three inputs: capital, refined oil and labour as follows:




where Yh,t (zh) is the output of the intermediate firm zh, Kh,t (zh) represents capital input,
Oh,t (zh) is oil input, and Nt (zh) denotes the amount of labour input employed. The para-
meters 1 > αkh > 0 , 1 > αoh > 0 and 1 > αnh > 0 are elasticities of an intermediate firm’s
output with respect to capital, oil and labour inputs, respectively. By our assumption of
constant returns to scale, αkh + αoh + αnh = 1. We assume that the total factor productivity,





The optimization problem of the intermediate goods producers is solved in two stages. In
the first stage, each firm chooses its input factors to minimize total cost given by:
min
Nt(zh),Kh,t(zh),Ot(zh)
WtNt (zh) +Rh,tKh,t (zh) + Pro,tOt (zh) , (3.40)













where rh,t = Rh,tPt is the real rental rate on capital, pro,t =
Pro,t
Pt
is the real domestic price
of fuel (which is determined based on a pricing rule that limits the pass-through effect of
international oil price to domestic price), and wt = WtPt is the real wage. Substituting the
input demands into the firm’s production technology, equation (3.39), yields an expression
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where mct = MCtPt is the real marginal cost and ph,t =
Ph,t
Pt
is the real price of domestically
produced goods. In the second stage, the intermediate goods producer who qualifies to
choose its price does so by maximizing its expected discounted profit. Following Calvo
(1983) staggered pricing model, we allow a proportion of the intermediate goods producing
firms, (1− θh), to optimally reset their prices in any given period while the other fraction,
θh, who are unable to re-optimise their prices maintain the price as at last fixing. Thus,
profit maximisation subject to the demand for intermediate goods (equation 3.35) yields the















where θh ∈ [0, 1] is an index of price stickiness (Calvo, 1983). It then follows that the
evolution of price level for domestically produced goods meant for the domestic market is





h,t−1 + (1− θh)
(
P •h,t
)1−ϵh] 11−ϵh , (3.45)
In an analogous manner, profit maximisation subject to the demand for differentiated ex-
portable goods (3.37) yields the optimal reset price for domestically produced goods meant

















where P ∗•h,t is the optimal reset price for the intermediate good meant for the export market
and θhf is the Calvo parameter for such commodity.
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3.4.4 Import goods retailers
In order to accommodate incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import prices in the
short run, we introduce local currency pricing (Medina and Soto, 2005). We consider a
set of competitive assemblers that produce a final foreign good, Yf,t, which is consumed by
households and used for accumulating new capital goods. To produce Yf,t, the competitive












where the parameter ϵf > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among different imported
goods. With Pf,t being the price index for imported goods and Pf,t (zf ), the price charged on
an imported intermediate product, the optimisation problem of the firm involves choosing
Yf,t (zf ) by maximising its profit function:
Πf,t (zf ) = Pf,tYf,t−
1w
0
Pf,t (zf )Yf,t (zf ) dzf , (3.48)
subject to the aggregation technology, equation (3.47). The first-order condition for the above
optimisation problem yields a downward sloping demand function for imported intermediate
goods:

















Each imported goods retailer has monopoly power to determine the domestic price of
its varieties, albeit infrequently as in Calvo (1983). The frequency at which prices can be
optimally reset is guided by a price stickiness parameter, θf . Thus, an importing firm has
a probability, θf , of keeping the price of its good fixed in the next period and a probability,
1 − θf , of optimally resetting its price. For a firm that can reset its price, P •f,t (zf ), it does
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s Yf,t (zf )
[
P •f,t (zf )− εt+sP ∗f,t+s
]
, (3.51)
subject to the demand for the imported variety in equation (3.49). Making use of the
equation for law of one price gap (shown in equation 3.62 under section 3.4.6) in the above





















f,t−1 + (1− θf )
(
P •f,t
)1−ϵf] 11−ϵf . (3.53)
3.4.5 Oil producing firm
We assume that the oil firm operates under perfect competition, combining technology (Ao,t),
materials sourced from the domestic economy (Mt) and oil-related capital (Ko,t). The pro-
duced oil, Yo,t, is exported to the rest of the world at a price determined at the international
crude oil market. In our model, we modify the oil sector in Ferrero and Seneca (2019) by
introducing oil-related capital into the production technology of the oil firm. Therefore, the




o,tYo,t −Ro,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (3.54)






where P ∗o,t is the international price of oil and Ro,t is the rental rate on oil-related capital.
The parameters αko and αmo ∈ (0, 1) represent the elasticities of oil output with respect to
oil-related capital and material inputs, respectively and αko + αmo = 1. Maximising equation
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(3.54) subject to equation (3.55) yields optimal demands for oil-related capital, Ko,t, and






















and qt is the real exchange rate. As in Algozhina
(2015), we assume that the oil firm, which is jointly owned by foreign direct investors and the
government, receives its profits net of royalties levied on production quantity at a rate given
by τ . Following Algozhina (2015), we assume that the oil-related capital, Ko,t is accumulated
by foreign direct investment, FDI∗t as follows:
Ko,t = (1− δo)Ko,t−1 + FDI∗t , (3.58)
where δo represents the rate at which oil-related capital depreciates. Foreign direct invest-




)ρfdi (p∗o,t)1−ρfdi , (3.59)
where the parameter ρfdi measures the degree of smoothing in the accumulation of for-
eign direct investment. The real international price of oil and oil technology follow AR (1)


















3.4.6 Open economy features
The model we consider is a small open economy in which activities in the foreign economy
are not impacted by developments in the domestic economy and are thus taken as exogenous.
We proceed in this section to enunciate the interactions between the domestic economy and
the foreign economy.
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Real exchange rate, terms of trade and incomplete pass-through
We assume law of one price gap as in Monacelli (2005) such that importing firms have some
power in the determination of the prices of goods they import and distribute. The law of
one price gap, Ψt, is given by the ratio of foreign price index in terms of domestic currency







where P ∗t is aggregate consumer price index of the foreign economy and Pf,t is the average
price of imported goods in domestic currency. The nominal exchange rate is denoted as εt.
The law of one price gap, Ψt, takes the value of one if the law of one price (LOP) holds.
However, while we assume that LOP does not hold for imports, it does hold for exports.
The real exchange rate, qt, is defined as the ratio of price index of the rest of the world (in







Making use of the definition of real exchange rate in equation 3.63, we can re-write the





where pf,t = Pf,tPt denotes the real price of imported goods. Also, log-linearising equation
(3.63) and taking the rate of change yields an equation for the evolution of the real exchange
rate, qt, shown in equation (B.152), Appendix B.3. In the small open economy, the terms of
trade, St , is an important relationship and it measures the competitiveness of the economy.
We define the terms of trade of the domestic economy as the domestic currency price of
imports, Pf,t, relative to the export price (price of domestically produced tradable goods),





and log-linearised as in equation (B.153), Appendix B.3.
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International risk sharing
In order to link domestic consumption with foreign consumption, we assume that agents in
the rest of the world have access to the same set of bonds and share the same preferences
with their domestic counterparts. Thus, the Euler equation for the domestic economy and




















Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), we make use of the definition of the real exchange rate,










































 q 1σt (C∗t (j)− ϕcC∗t−1) ,








where ϱ represents a constant that depends on the relative initial conditions in asset holdings










The assumption of complete asset market allows us to derive the link between domestic and










where equations (3.19) and (3.20) have been combined to derive equation (3.68). Rt and R∗t
are the gross nominal interest rate on domestic bonds and foreign bonds, respectively while
Φt = (µ
∗
t/µt) is the exchange rate premium. A positive shock to Φt lowers the expected
future nominal exchange rate in the small open economy (Hollander et al., 2018).
3.4.7 Fiscal authority
The government collects lump-sum tax, TXt, receives oil revenues in form of royalties from
oil firms, ORt, and issues one period bonds that results in a net debt position, Bt. These
receipts are used to finance a given government expenditure on public goods, Gc,t, effect
fuel subsidy payments, OSt, and make interest and principal payments amounting to Bt+1Rt .
Consequently, we assume the government respects a budget constraint given by:























where ηg is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods consumed by
government and γg is the share of foreign goods in government’s consumption basket. Cost
minimisation by government subject to equation (3.70) yields the demands for home and
foreign goods as follows:























where Pg,t is the deflator of government expenditure. Government consumption is a key
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where parameter ρg is the government consumption smoothing parameter, while ωgy, ωb
and ωor are government consumption feedback coefficients with respect to GDP, domestic
debt and oil revenues, respectively. The feedback parameter, ωgy, defines the cyclicality of
government spending and εGct represents government spending shock.
In order to incorporate fuel consumption subsidies, we assume that the price paid by
consumers for fuel is different from the supply cost that would have prevailed in the absence
of subsidies. The supply cost is the opportunity cost, which corresponds to the spot price
in international market adjusted to take into account the cost of transport and distribution.
In Nigeria, fuel subsidy has been in place since the 1980s. It is often perceived as a de facto
entitlement and seen as a sort of generalized “in-kind” transfer that addresses the citizens’
expectations of sharing in the country’s resource. The government also justifies the continued
provisioning of the energy subsidy by the need to shield the economy from shocks caused by
large swings in commodity prices.
The economy has a low oil refining capacity. Consequently, we assume that refined
oil (fuel), Ot, is produced abroad and imported into the domestic economy (Allegret and
Benkhodja, 2015). The government imports fuel at a foreign price P ∗o,t (denominated in












The variable P ∗o,t is the foreign currency price of oil abroad, εt is the nominal exchange rate
and Ψot is the law of one price gap associated with the price of imported fuel. In our model,
Ψot captures inefficiencies in the pricing of fuel in the domestic economy. A positive shock
to Ψot increases domestic fuel price and increases subsidy payments (Equations (3.75) and
14This is similar to the specification in Poghosyan and Beidas-Strom (2011)
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(3.77)). The parameter 0 < ν < 1 captures the pass-through effect of international price of
oil to the domestic fuel price. Therefore, it governs the level to which government subsidises
fuel consumption. A value of ν = 1 corresponds to a situation where there is complete pass-
through and the subsidy regime seizes to exist. On the other hand, a value of ν = 0 implies
that the domestic price of fuel is fully stabilised. The fuel subsidy payment by government
is given by the difference between the value of fuel imports (in domestic currency) and the
amount realised from fuel sales in the domestic economy:
OSt = (Plo,t − Pro,t)Ot, (3.77)
where total imported fuel, Ot, comprises fuel consumption by households to satisfy their
energy demands, Co,t, and consumption by domestic firms for the production of non-oil
goods, Oh,t.
On the revenue side of the budget constraint, the government collects lump-sum taxes




where τ is the royalty rate on oil production quantity. Since fiscal debt clears the govern-
















where the parameters φb , φg , φos and φor represent the responses of lump-sum tax to
lagged fiscal debt, lagged government consumption, fuel subsidy payments and oil revenue,
respectively. The variables in equations (3.74) and (3.79) represent their respective ratios to









and txt = TXtPtYt . The
bars denote steady state levels of the variables.
3.4.8 Monetary authority
We assume that in setting the short term nominal interest rate (Rt), the central bank follows
a simple Taylor rule by gradually responding to aggregate inflation (πt), domestic output
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exp (ξrt ) . (3.80)
where the bars denote steady state levels of the variables. The parameter ρr is the interest
rate smoothing parameter capturing monetary policy inertia to structural shocks. The mon-
etary policy feedback coefficients on inflation, output and real exchange rate are ωπ, ωy and
ωq, respectively. The monetary policy shock, ξrt , is assumed independent and identically
distributed (iid). In line with one of our objectives, we vary the monetary policy reaction
function in equation (3.80) to obtain three other variants in other to examine the responses of
key macroeconomic variables to an oil price shock under alternative monetary policy rules15.
These alternative monetary policy rules are specified in Table 3.3 in log-linear form.
Table 3.3: Alternative Taylor rule specifications
Taylor Rule (TR) Specification
Total inflation-based TR R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t]
Core inflation-based TR R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωπnoπ̃no,t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t]
Domestic inflation-based TR R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωπh π̃h,t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t]
Export price-based TR R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωπo ((1−Θo)π̃h,t +Θoπ̃ot ) + ωyỹh,t]
Thus, in addition to a Taylor rule that responds to aggregate inflation (total inflation-
based TR) specified above, we consider cases in which the policy-controlled interest rate re-
sponds to core inflation (core inflation-based TR) and domestic inflation (domestic inflation-
based TR). For oil exporting economies whose headline inflation measure features oil, it
is a natural exercise to evaluate the stabilisation roles of the total inflation-based TR and
the core inflation-based TR in the economy. Finally, we analyse a variant of the Taylor
rule that incorporates commodity export price (export price-based TR) in line with the ar-
gument canvassed by Frankel (2003). Oil inflation in domestic currency is represented by
πot = ∆p
∗
o,t+∆qt while the weights Θo and (1−Θo) represent the shares of oil and core goods
in the aggregate GDP, respectively. This is as in Algozhina (2015).
15The results are presented in section 3.6.5.
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3.4.9 Market clearing and aggregation
The aggregate demand equations derive from the model set up, where domestic output
(Yh,t) is absorbed by aggregate domestic consumption (which comprises consumption of
domestically produced goods by households - Ch,t , materials input used up by oil producing
firms - Mt, and consumption of domestically produced goods by government - Gh,t); non-
oil exports (C∗h,t); and domestic investment16 (Ih,t). The domestic resource constraint is
therefore given by:




h,t + Ph,tMt + Ph,tIh,t + Ph,tGh,t. (3.81)
On the other hand, the aggregate nominal GDP, which combines oil GDP (Yo,t) and non-oil
GDP (Yh,t) is given by:
PtYt = Ph,tYh,t + εtP
∗
o,tYo,t + IMt = Ph,tCh,t + Ph,tMt + Ph,tIh,t + Ph,tGh,t +NXt. (3.82)
and net exports (NXt) is given by:
NXt = EXt − IMt, (3.83)
where EXt is aggregate exports and IMt represents aggregate imports. Aggregate exports,
EXt, comprises oil exports (EXo,t measured as εtP ∗o,tYo,t) and non-oil exports (EXno,t meas-








Aggregate imports, IMt, comprises oil imports (IMo,t measured as Plo,tOt) and non-oil im-
ports (IMno,t measured as Pf,tYf,t) and is specified as:
IMt = Plo,tOt + Pf,tYf,t, (3.85)
where the aggregate amount of imported non-oil goods is given as Yf,t = Cf,t + If,t +Gf,t.
Since the economy is open and we assume there is no external reserves accumulation by
the central bank, the current account is set equal to the financial account. We therefore
16Which is used to augment the stock of physical capital available for use in the production process in
period t+ 1
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. The labour and capital














3.4.10 Rest of the world








where P ∗h,t is the price of domestic goods in foreign currency, P ∗t is the aggregate consumer
price index in the foreign economy, and C∗t is aggregate foreign consumption. The parameter,
η∗, represents the foreign price elasticity of demand for domestic goods while the share of
domestic goods in foreign consumption is captured by γ∗.













where ϕ∗c is the habit formation parameter in the foreign economy and σ∗ is the relative
risk aversion coefficient. The variables C∗t , R∗t and π∗t represent consumption, interest rate
and inflation rate in the foreign economy. The central bank reaction function for the foreign



















where the bars denote the steady state levels of the variables and ξr∗t represents monetary
policy shock in the foreign economy. The parameter ρr∗ represents the interest rate smooth-
ing parameter in the foreign economy while ωπ∗ and ωy∗ are the feedback coefficients for
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inflation and output, respectively. Inflation rate in the foreign economy is assumed to follow




)ρπ∗ exp (ξπ∗t ) . (3.90)
Overall, the small open economy model developed in this section is driven by ten stochastic
shocks: real international oil price (ξp
∗
o
t ), oil sector productivity (ξaot ), law of one price gap
in oil price (ξψ
o
t ), domestic total factor productivity (ξ
ah
t ), domestic monetary policy (ξrt ),
fiscal policy (ξgt ), domestic risk premium (ξ
µ
t ), foreign monetary policy (ξr
∗
t ), foreign inflation





The model developed in the previous section is estimated using Bayesian methodology out-
lined in Schorfheide (2000). This estimation strategy helps to combine robust micro found-
ations that are useful for policy analysis with an intuitive probabilistic distribution of the
observables (Smets and Wouters, 2007). It allows us to estimate the key structural paramet-
ers of our model through the incorporation of additional information on the model parameters
in the form of prior distributions. In conducting Bayesian estimation, the first step is to solve
a system of linear rational expectations equations. To do this, we solve the system of log-
linear rational expectations equations presented in Appendix B.3 and express the solution
as a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) representation in zt:
zt = Γ1(Ω)zt−1 + Γ2(Ω)ξt, (3.91)
where zt is a vector containing the variables of the model expressed in log deviations from
their steady state values and the vector ξt contains the exogenous disturbances that drive
the model dynamics. The coefficient matrices Γ1(Ω) and Γ2(Ω) are non-linear functions of
the structural parameters of the model. The parameter vector Ω collects the structural para-
meters governing the model dynamics, the coefficients in the policy rules and the standard
deviation of shocks.
After obtaining the model solution, measurement equations are added in order to link the
observable variables to the vector of state variables. Thus, we assume there is a vector gt of
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observable variables that is of a lower dimension than zt and related to the variables in our
model via a measurement equation that can be written as:
gt = Hzt, (3.92)
where H is a selection matrix containing ones and zeros that selects the observable variables
from the vector zt. The state space representation of gt is given by equations (3.91) and
(3.92). In our proposed model, the vector of observable variables is:
gt ≡
[










while the remaining variables are considered unobserved. The relevant measurement equa-
tions are specified in equation (3.93) below. Equation (3.93) allows us to construct the likeli-
hood function17 for the structural parameters via Kalman Filter18. The likelihood density is
then combined with the prior distribution of the parameters in order to obtain the posterior
density function19. In the final step, we numerically derive the posterior distribution of the
parameters using Metropolis-Hastings Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm. We
then simulate 3 million draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings, discarding 30 per
cent of the first draws as burn-in. The covariance matrix is scaled to achieve an acceptance
ratio that is within the 20 - 40 per cent often targetted by most practitioners (Herbst and
Schorfheide, 2015)20.
3.5.2 Data
The model is estimated using data for eleven macroeconomic variables spanning the period
2000Q2 - 2018Q221. These comprise seven domestic variables, three foreign variables, and
17The likelihood function represents the probability of observing the data given the parameters. It is
useful for updating our a priori beliefs about the model parameters, given the available data on observable
variables (Herbst and Schorfheide, 2015).
18The Kalman Filter is a recursive forecasting procedure for the unobserved states given the observables in
the linear state space form (Miao, 2014). We compute the Kalman Filter under the assumption of normally
distributed disturbances.
19The posterior density summarizes what we know about the parameters after observing the data.
20This was achieved by setting the Metropolis-Hastings jump scale to 0.26 heuristically. The random walk
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm computes the acceptance ratio as the number of accepted draws divided by
the number of proposals.
21The choice of the estimation sample is largely influenced by data availability for the Nigerian economy.
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the international price of oil. As earlier explained, Nigeria represents the small open economy
in our model. The foreign economy consists of Nigeria’s major trading partners of the Euro
area, the United States, and India22. The domestic observables, which relate to the Nigerian
economy are: per capita real domestic GDP (yobsh,t ), per capita real consumption (cobst ), per
capita real investment (iobsno,t), real effective exchange rate (qobst ), aggregate Consumer Price
Index (pobst ), core Consumer Price Index (pobsno,t), and nominal interest rate (Robst ). Data set
on these variables are sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN).
On the other hand, the foreign variables include trade-weighted foreign real GDP per
capita (y∗obst ), trade-weighted foreign aggregate CPI (P ∗obst ), trade-weighted foreign interest
rate (R∗obst ), and the international price of oil (P ∗obso,t ). The data set used for the computation
of the trade-weighted foreign variables as well as the international price of oil (P ∗obso,t ) are
retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) database and the International




























































yh,t − yh,t−1 + ξyobst
ct − ct−1 + ξcobst











Necessary transformations are conducted on the data set in order to make them model
consistent. We demean and deseasonalise relevant variables using the TRAMO-SEATS pro-
cedure. Also, in line with their model counterparts, data on interest rate and inflation rate
are expressed in quarterly terms. With the exception of the two interest rates, we measure
the observables in log-differences. The relationships between each of the observed variables
22These three regions account for about 65 per cent of Nigeria’s total external trade over the last two
decades. In the normalised weights for the computation of foreign variables, the Euro area is predominant
with a trade weight of 0.39 while the weights for the United States and India are 0.36 and 0.25, respectively.
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and their model counterparts are presented in the measurement equation (3.93). In order
to avoid the problem of stochastic singularity when evaluating the likelihood function, we
balance the number of observables with the number of stochastic disturbances in our model
by incorporating three measurement errors relating to output (ξyobst ), consumption (ξcobst ),
and investment (ξiobst ).
3.5.3 Model parameters
Parametrization
The values of calibrated parameters, which are kept fixed in the estimation process are
derived from three sources. The first category are based on standard values assumed in
the literature for small open economies as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and resource-rich
emerging economies such as Romero (2008), Wolden-Bache et al. (2008), Hove et al. (2015),
Ferrero and Seneca (2019), and Iklaga (2017). These values are borrowed from related studies
due to data paucity for the Nigerian economy. The second category are parametrized so as
to match the corresponding data sample mean while the last set of parameters correspond
to the implied steady state values from the model setup. The parametrization is done to fit
quarterly data. Table 3.4 presents a list of these parameters and their values.
We set the discount factor, β, equal to 0.99 (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 2017);
the depreciation rate, δ, equal to 0.025 (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 2017); share
of imports in household’s consumption, γc, equal to 0.35 based on sample data for Nigeria
and close to 0.4 assumed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) and share of imports in household’s
investment, γi, equal to 0.2. We derive the share of fuel in household’s consumption, γo, as
0.085 based on household consumption data for the sample period. The elasticity parameters
in the firm’s production functions are set as follows: elasticity of domestic output with respect
to capital, αkh = 0.33 (Rasaki and Malikane, 2015); elasticity of domestic output with respect
to labour, αnh = 0.55 (Ncube and Balma, 2017); elasticity of oil output with respect to capital,
αko = 0.7 (Algozhina, 2015) and elasticity of oil output with respect to materials, αmo = 0.3
(Algozhina, 2015; Ferrero and Seneca, 2019). The elasticity of substitution between foreign
and domestic goods consumed by government, ηg, is set to 0.6 (Hollander et al., 2018); while
the foreign economy’s monetary policy reaction to inflation, ωπ∗ , and output, ωy∗ , are set
equal to 1.50 and 0.50, respectively (Hollander et al., 2018).
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Table 3.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Definition Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.990
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Share of imports in household’s consumption γc 0.350
Share of fuel in household’s consumption γo 0.085
Share of imports in household’s investment γi 0.200
Calvo - wages θw 0.750
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital αkh 0.330
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to oil αoh 0.120
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to labour αnh 0.550
Elasticity of oil output with respect to capital αko 0.700
Elasticity of oil output with respect to materials αmo 0.300
Share of imports in government’s consumption γg 0.120
Elasticity of substitution between foreign & domestic goods - Govt. ηg 0.600
Response of public consumption to fiscal debt ωb 0.300
Response of public consumption to oil revenue ωor 0.800
Response of lump-sum taxes to fiscal debt φb 0.400
Response of lump-sum taxes to government consumption φg 0.950
Response of lump-sum taxes to fuel subsidy payments φos 0.100
Response of lump-sum taxes to oil revenue φor 0.300
Coefficient of inflation in Taylor Rule - foreign economy ωπ∗ 1.500
Coefficient of output in Taylor Rule - foreign economy ωy∗ 0.500
Steady state ratios
Consumption - output CH/YH 0.690
Investment - output INO/YH 0.150
Domestic materials - output M/YH 0.010
Government consumption - output Gc/YH 0.070
Export - output C∗H/YH 0.070
Import - output IM/YH 0.150
Most of the parameters relating to fiscal policy and the fuel pricing rule are based on
Algozhina (2015) as follows: share of imports in government’s consumption, γg = 0.12,
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response of public consumption to fiscal debt, ωb = 0.30, response of public consumption
to oil revenue, ωor = 0.80, response of lump-sum taxes to fiscal debt, φb = 0.40, response
of lump-sum taxes to government consumption, φg = 0.95, response of lump-sum taxes to
fuel subsidy payments, φos = 0.10, and response of lump-sum taxes to oil revenue, φor =
0.30. Aggregate Nigerian data and implied model values are used to calibrate the remaining
domestic economy steady-state parameters.
Prior moments
Table 3.6 presents our assumptions regarding the prior distributions of the estimated para-
meters. The priors for the small open economy are chosen based on calibration, the data
and partly based on Iklaga (2017). On the other hand, the foreign priors are based on Smets
and Wouters (2007). In cases where we have limited information to form a credible prior, we
impose less informative priors; allowing the data to determine the location of the parameter.
We assume that the proportion of Ricardian consumers23 (γR) is represented by a beta
distribution with a mean of 0.6 and standard deviation of 0.10 (Iklaga, 2017; Ncube and
Balma, 2017). The labour supply elasticity (φ) is set to 1.45 in line with Algozhina (2015)
and assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a standard deviation of 0.10. The risk
aversion parameter24, (σ), is represented by an inverse gamma distribution with a mean of
2.0; consistent with Iklaga’s (2017) assumption for Nigeria and higher than 1.5 assumed
by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US economy. The external habit parameter, ϕc, is
represented by a beta distribution with a mean of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1 (Iklaga,
2017) while the investment adjustment cost parameter, χ, is represented by a gamma distri-
bution with mean 4.0 and a relatively large standard deviation of 3.0 (Iklaga, 2017; Ncube
and Balma, 2017). The intra-temporal elasticities are represented by gamma distributions.
The elasticity of substitution between oil and non-oil (core) goods is set to a mean of 0.2
(Hollander et al., 2018; Medina and Soto, 2005) while the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods for consumption (ηc) and investment (ηi) are 0.6 each in line
with Hollander et al. (2018).
The reaction coefficients in the monetary policy function are assumed to follow gamma
distributions with the coefficient for inflation (ωπ) centered at 1.5 while the coefficients for
output (ωy) and exchange rate (ωq) are each set to 0.125, respectively (Iklaga, 2017; Smets
23In 2018, about 36.8 per cent of adults in Nigeria were financially (EFInA, 2018).
24This parameter controls how households’ savings/investment decision is affected by structural shocks.
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and Wouters, 2007). Our assumptions regarding the Taylor rule coefficients imply that the
central bank responds actively to inflation in line with its mandate of price stability. The
fuel pricing rule parameter, ν, is set to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.3 in line
with Allegret and Benkhodja (2015) and a standard deviation of 0.1. This means that 30
per cent of the variations in international oil price is transmitted to retail price of fuel.
The autoregressive coefficients for the exogenous disturbances are uniformly set to follow
beta distributions centered at 0.50 in line with (Smets and Wouters, 2007). However, we
assume larger standard deviations of 0.25 to reflect some level of uncertainty about the
assumed parameter values. Finally, with regards to the distribution for the parameters of
the shock processes, we allow for a relatively flat priors as in Medina and Soto (2007).
Thus, an inverse gamma distribution with a mean of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 4.0 is
assumed for each of the shock processes. While the assumed mean for the shocks are in line
with Smets and Wouters (2007), the assumed standard deviation of 4.0 is much larger than
2.0 in Smets and Wouters (2007) and 3.0 in Medina and Soto (2007). As earlier explained,
this is to reflect our uncertainty about the assumed priors and allow the data determine the
parameter values.
3.6 Results
We simulate 3,000,000 draws each from two parallel chains of the the random walk Metropolis-
Hastings, discarding the first 30 per cent of the draws as burn-in. The two chains yielded
acceptance ratios of 30.4 and 30.6 per cent, respectively, implying that the two chains drew
their samples from the same ergodic distribution. In this section, we present the posterior
distributions of the estimated parameters and analyse the business cycle drivers of the small
open oil-producing economy. Also, we analyse the Bayesian impulse responses, especially
with respect to a 1.0 per cent negative oil price shock. To address our research question on
the role of fuel subsidies, we used the estimated parameters to simulate two models under
alternative assumptions regarding the pass-through effects of international oil price to the
retail fuel price. Next, we examine the implications of the presence of hand-to-mouth con-
sumers and fiscal cyclicality for the response of the economy to a number of shocks. Finally,
we conduct some monetary policy analyses.
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3.6.1 Business cycle moments
We evaluate the statistical moments produced by the estimated model vis-a-vis similar mo-
ments that characterise actual observations from the data. This helps to provide insights
regarding the extent to which the model mimics the underlying characteristics of the Ni-
gerian economy. Table 3.5 reports the standard deviation of some endogenous variables as
well as their cross-correlations with aggregate output.
The estimated model reasonably replicates the volatilities in interest rate and the real
exchange rate. However, it over-predicted the volatility in output and under-predicted the
volatilities in headline and core measures of inflation. In line with expectation and the
observed data, the core measure of inflation turns out less volatile than its headline counter-
part. The performance with regard to output is a common outcome in studies of emerging
economies (Iklaga, 2017).
Table 3.5: Data and model implied business cycle moments
Total GDP Headline inflation Core inflation Interest rate Exchange rate
Standard Deviation
Data 0.21 0.59 0.56 0.44 0.27
Model 1.01 0.22 0.21 0.41 0.27
Cross-correlation with Total GDP
Data 1.00 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.10
Model 1.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.10
In the lower panel of Table 3.5, we present the cross-correlations between total GDP and
the selected endogenous variables; namely: total inflation, core inflation, interest rate and
real exchange rate. Generally, our estimated model reasonably predicts the cross-correlations
between the selected endogenous variables and output. While the model over-predicts the
correlation between output and headline inflation, the reverse is the case for core inflation. In
line with observed data, the estimated model shows that core inflation is more correlated with
output than headline inflation. The model closely mimics the observed positive correlation
between output and the real exchange rate and the negative correlation between output and
interest rate observed in the data.
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3.6.2 Posterior moments
Table 3.6 reports the assumptions for the prior distribution of the estimated parameters, the
posterior means, and the 90 per cent credible sets. The parameters in the utility function are
estimated to be lower than their priors. For instance, at σ = 1.4, the estimated relative risk
aversion parameter is lower than 2.0 initially assumed but slightly higher than 1.38 estimated
by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US economy. This implies that the savings/investment
behaviour of households are more sensitive to structural shocks in Nigeria. Our estimate is
also higher than the 1.07 obtained by Iklaga (2017) for the Nigerian economy. The estimated
labour supply elasticity (φ = 1.44) is about the same value as the assumed prior of 1.45 while
the estimated external habit parameter, ϕc, is 0.4 compared to the assumed prior of 0.7. The
posterior mean for the share of Ricardian consumers, γR, is 0.69. This is higher than the
estimate of 0.62 obtained by Iklaga (2017) for the period 2003-2015.
The elasticity of substitution between households’ oil and non-oil consumption (ηo) is es-
timated at 0.19, which is same as 0.19 estimated for South Africa by Hollander et al. (2018).
The estimated elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in the core con-
sumption basket of the household is ηc = 0.61,which is slightly higher than the value of 0.59
obtained by Hollander et al. (2018) for the South African economy. Also, the household’s
elasticity of intra-temporal substitution between domestically produced goods and imported
investment goods is ηi = 0.62. The estimated Calvo price parameter for domestically pro-
duced goods, θh = 0.72, is higher than the assumed prior of 0.70 while that of the imported
goods, θf , is estimated at 0.69. This implies that the prices of domestically produced goods
are stickier than those of imported goods, contrary to the findings by Hollander et al. (2018)
for the South African economy.
Turning to the fuel pricing rule, which governs the dynamics of the fuel consumption
subsidy regime, our results show that the government bears more than half of the effects
of international oil prices on domestic fuel price under its subsidy programme. The estim-
ated pass-through parameter, ν = 0.43, is higher than the value of 0.30 initially assumed.
This implies an incomplete pass-through of international oil prices into domestic fuel price,
as expected of an economy with a fuel subsidy programme. To our knowledge, this paper
represents the first attempt at estimating such pass-through coefficient for an oil produ-
cing emerging economy with a fuel subsidy regime. In this paper, we argue that a proper
analysis of the business cycle effects of an oil price shock under our model set up requires
an understanding of the pass-through effects of international oil price to the retail price
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of fuel25. Our counterfactual simulations regarding the macroeconomic implications of the
fuel subsidy regime for the resource-rich economy shown in sub-section 3.6.6 are based on
alternative assumptions regarding the pass-through coefficient in the fuel pricing rule. Our
benchmark simulation corresponds to the estimated value of the pass-through parameter
(ν = 0.43) while the alternative scenario is based on a value of unity, ν = 1, implying
complete pass-through of international oil price into retail fuel price.
The estimated Taylor rule suggests that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is quite active
in containing inflationary pressure while also keeping an eye on output and exchange rate
developments. The estimated CBN’s reaction coefficient on inflation, ωπ = 2.86, is higher
than our assumed prior of 1.50, the 1.45 obtained by Iklaga (2017) and 1.405 estimated
for an oil-importing economy of South Africa (Hollander et al., 2018). Furthermore, the
estimated reaction coefficients on output, ωy = 0.12, and exchange rate, ωq = 0.11, are lower
than their assumed prior of 0.125. Thus, in setting the policy rate, the monetary authority
focuses on inflation and, in addition, pays attention to output and the exchange rate. The
estimated interest rate smoothing parameter, ρr = 0.22, is low but comparable to the value
of 0.21 obtained by Richard and Olofin (2013) for Nigeria over the period 1986-2004 and 0.26
obtained by Medina and Soto (2005) for the resource-rich economy of Chile. Overall, the
observed policy behaviour of the CBN is consistent with the findings of Richard and Olofin
(2013) and Adebiyi and Mordi (2016). In terms of fiscal policy, the estimated posterior mean
of the feedback parameter with respect to output, ωgy = 0.35, is lower than the assumed prior
of 0.40 and suggests that government spending was pro-cyclical during the sample period.
Also, the fiscal policy persistence parameter is estimated at 0.49, which is slightly lower than
the assumed prior of 0.5.
Most of the shock processes are more persistent than assumed. The shocks with high
persistent parameters include international oil price, ρp∗o = 0.92; foreign risk premium, ρµ∗ =
0.86; domestic risk premium, ρµ = 0.79; and domestic total factor productivity, ρah = 0.77.
These shocks may account for the medium to long term forecast error variance of the real
variables in our model (Smets and Wouters, 2007).
25While the domestic retail fuel price is administered by the federal government, the effective price paid
by economic agents often differs from one part of the country to another. Such differences are usually
amplified during periods of product scarcity as there is lack of institutional capacity to enforce country-wide
compliance by fuel retailers. To capture this reality in our model, we assume that part of the changes to
international price of fuel is unofficially passed to domestic consumers of fuel via a law of one price gap for
fuel price.
106
Table 3.6: Prior and posterior estimates
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distributionDensity Mean Std. Dev. Mean 90% HPD Int.
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: γR Beta 0.60 0.10 0.692 0.562 0.824
Labour supply elasticity: φ Gamma 1.45 0.10 1.439 1.274 1.600
Relative risk aversion: σ Inv. Gamma 2.00 0.40 1.409 1.109 1.694
External habit: ϕc Beta 0.70 0.10 0.438 0.310 0.568
Investment adj. cost: χ Gamma 4.00 3.00 6.181 1.751 10.490
Fuel pricing parameter: ν Beta 0.30 0.10 0.429 0.190 0.640
Oil - core cons. elasticity: ηo Gamma 0.20 0.10 0.188 0.044 0.328
For. - dom. cons. elasticity: ηc Gamma 0.60 0.20 0.609 0.287 0.926
For. - dom. inv. elasticity: ηi Gamma 0.60 0.20 0.615 0.286 0.933
Calvo - domestic prices: θh Beta 0.70 0.10 0.719 0.620 0.826
Calvo - import prices: θf Beta 0.70 0.10 0.691 0.525 0.860
Policy parameters
Taylor, π: ωπ Gamma 1.500 0.200 2.857 2.579 3.141
Taylor, y: ωy Gamma 0.125 0.050 0.118 0.043 0.191
Taylor, q: ωq Gamma 0.125 0.050 0.109 0.040 0.176
Taylor, smoothing: ρr Beta 0.500 0.250 0.224 0.054 0.382
Fiscal, y : ωgy Normal 0.400 0.500 0.351 -0.470 1.184
Fiscal, smoothing: ρgc Beta 0.500 0.250 0.487 0.073 0.896
Autoregressive coefficients of shocks
Dom. productivity: ρah Beta 0.50 0.25 0.771 0.593 0.957
Oil productivity: ρa0 Beta 0.50 0.25 0.502 0.100 0.905
Dom. risk premium: ρµ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.786 0.703 0.871
Law of one price gap-oil: ρψo Beta 0.50 0.25 0.608 0.250 0.957
Int’l oil price shock: ρp∗o Beta 0.50 0.25 0.923 0.827 0.987
For. risk premium: ρµ∗ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.859 0.790 0.929
For. inflation: ρπ∗ Beta 0.40 0.25 0.138 0.001 0.257
For. monetary policy: ρr∗ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.442 0.303 0.584
Standard deviation of shocks
Dom. productivity: ξaht Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.246 0.105 0.407
Oil productivity:ξaot Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.076 0.024 0.133
Dom. risk premium: ξµt Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.162 0.132 0.192
Dom. fiscal policy:ξgct Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.098 0.023 0.177
Law of one price gap-oil: ξψ
o
t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.904 0.444 1.490
Dom. monetary policy: ξrt Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.379 0.300 0.455
Int’l oil price shock: ξp
∗
o
t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.151 0.130 0.171
For. risk premium: ξµ
∗
t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.041 0.032 0.050
For. inflation: ξπ∗t Inv. Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.005 0.004 0.006
For. monetary policy: ξr∗t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.101 0.079 0.121
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However, shocks relating to domestic monetary policy, fiscal policy and oil sector productivity
are less persistent. At ξaht = 0.25, the standard deviation of the domestic total factor
productivity shock is relatively low, compared to the estimated standard deviation for shocks
relating to law of one price gap for fuel price (ξψ
o
t = 0.90), and domestic monetary policy
(ξrt = 0.38). At 0.90, the estimated standard deviation for the shock to law of one price gap
for oil price is volatile, reflecting possible inefficiencies in the pricing of petroleum products
in the country.
3.6.3 Bayesian impulse responses
In this section, we present the Bayesian impulse responses to four structural shocks relating
to international oil price, total factor productivity, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. We
consider the responses of the economy to a negative international oil price shock and positive
innovations to domestic productivity, monetary policy, and fiscal policy.
The responses of the economy to 1.0 per cent negative international oil price shock is
shown in Figure 3.6. Following a decline in oil prices, the oil firms become less profitable,
leading to a reduction in the oil firms’ demand for materials sourced from the domestic
economy and a decline in oil output (as implied by equation 3.55). In view of the size of the oil
sector (26% of GDP) as well as the impacts of oil price declines on government consumption,
aggregate GDP falls and the effect is quite persistent. However, private consumption rises
as more income becomes available to households following a negative oil price shock - oil
constitutes part of the consumption basket of the household in our model, implying that a
decline in oil price releases more resources to households to spend. A negative oil price shock
causes the non-oil sector to become relatively more attractive as more productive resources
are directed from the oil to the non-oil sector. The inflow of productive resources into the
non-oil sector as well as the increased private consumption due to the income effect from
lower oil price and reduced marginal cost lead to an increase in non-oil GDP. However, the
increase in non-oil output is suppressed initially due to the reduced demand for non-oil goods
by the oil sector and the substitution effect that reduces household’s demand for home and
foreign goods in favour of oil.
Since the price of fuel features in the real marginal cost equation of domestic firms
(equation 3.43), a negative oil price shock generates lower marginal cost and leads to a fall
in domestic inflation. However, the instrumentality of exchange rate pass-through causes
import prices to rise following a depreciated exchange rate. The combined effects of a
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negative oil price shock on the prices of domestic and imported goods cause core inflation to
increase. Thus, the increases in headline and core measures of inflation are induced by the
depreciation in exchange rate. The monetary authority responds to the initial exchange rate-
induced rise in headline inflation by embarking on an interest rate hike, a move that further
exacerbates the contractionary effects of the negative oil price shock on the aggregate GDP.
In a nutshell, a 1.0 per cent negative international oil price shock contracts aggregate GDP
by about about 0.02 per cent upon impact, reduces domestic inflation, depreciates the real
exchange rate, and increases headline as well as core measures of inflation. Consequently,
the central bank of the small open resource-rich economy increases the interest rate in line
with its inflation objective.
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Figure 3.6: Bayesian impulse response to a negative oil price shock
Figure 3.7 shows that a positive total factor productivity shock leads to an increase in
both headline GDP and non-oil output, albeit with an initially muted response by domestic
output. All the measures of inflation decline, with domestic inflation recording the most
impact. While domestic inflation fell upon impact, the response of headline inflation is
initially muted as a consequence of the real exchange rate depreciation. In response to
the lower inflationary pressure, the central bank cuts the interest rate. These results are
consistent with the findings by Iklaga (2017) and Medina and Soto (2007). There is an initial
decline in private consumption (partially due to the lower consumption of imported goods
arising from the pass-through effects of exchange rate into import prices) while government
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consumption increases, suggestive of a crowding-out effect.
A positive monetary policy shock of 1.0 per cent contracts domestic output by about 0.05
per cent upon impact while also reining-in inflationary pressures. All measures of inflation
decline with headline inflation recording the most impact. Also, the contractionary monetary
policy reduces aggregate demand, causing an appreciation in the real exchange rate (Figure
3.8). We observe some degree of immediate exchange rate overshooting as the real exchange
rate appreciates substantially below its long run level following a monetary policy shock
that influences the interest rate differential between the domestic economy and the foreign
economy (Dornbusch, 1976). An increase in the domestic interest rate generates increased
capital inflows and appreciates the exchange rate as domestic assets become more attractive
to foreign investors.
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Figure 3.7: Bayesian impulse response to domestic technology shock
Lastly, Figure 3.9 shows that a 1.0 per cent positive shock to government spending
stimulates the economy marginally, leading to a less than 0.01 per cent increase in domestic
output upon impact and about 0.002 per cent increase in private consumption. Domestic
inflation rises while the headline and core measures of inflation decline initially due to weak
aggregate demand and lower import prices. Higher domestic prices causes a decline in the
terms of trade and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, leading to lower core and
headline inflation. Under an aggregate inflation-based Taylor rule, the initial decline in total
inflation requires a temporary reduction in interest rate, followed by an upward adjustment
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in order to stabilise the economy. The observed positive response of private consumption to
a positive fiscal policy shock is consistent with the outcomes expected under a model with
hand-to-mouth consumers (Galí et al., 2007).
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Figure 3.8: Bayesian impulse response to monetary policy shock
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Figure 3.9: Bayesian impulse response to a fiscal policy shock
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3.6.4 Business cycle drivers
In line with one of the research questions posed, the sources of business cycle fluctuations in
the oil-producing emerging economy with a fuel subsidy regime are analysed in this section.
The forecast error variance decomposition allows us to evaluate the relative contributions of
the different structural shocks to variations in key endogenous variables, such as total GDP
headline inflation, real exchange rate, and interest rate. In addition, we employ historical
decomposition to disentangle the relative importance of the different shocks to changes in
the observable variables during the sample period. For ease of presentation and analysis,
we group the shocks under five categories: (i) oil shocks - comprising shocks to oil sector
productivity, international oil price, and the law of one price gap for fuel; (ii) external shocks
- comprising shocks to foreign inflation, foreign interest rate and external risk premium; (iii)
domestic supply shocks - comprising shocks to domestic productivity and domestic risk
premium; (iv) monetary policy shock; and (v) fiscal policy shock.
Forecast error variance decomposition
In Table 3.7, we report the forecast error variance decomposition of total GDP, real exchange
rate, interest rate, CPI inflation, core inflation, domestic inflation and imported inflation.
As earlier explained, the shocks are categorised into five groups, namely: oil-related shocks,
external shocks, domestic shocks, monetary policy shock, and fiscal policy shock.
Total GDP: Monetary policy and oil shocks predominantly account for variations in total
output in the short run (1-4 quarters) while domestic shocks are important in the medium-
to long-term (5-20 quarters). The results show that the contribution of domestic shocks is
quite strong and persistent, contributing about 46.4 per cent of the variations in total GDP
in the first year and about 55.9 per cent up to the fifth year. However, in the first quarter,
monetary policy shocks account for about 51.4 per cent while its contribution wanes steadily
to about 19.6 per cent by the fifth year. The substantial contribution of monetary policy
shock to the evolution of output derives from the policy-induced rigidity to domestic prices
arising from the fuel subsidy regime. The subsidy regime distorts price signals, which limits
the strength of market-driven adjustments mechanisms in the economy and creates added
stabilisation roles for monetary policy. Fiscal policy is weak in driving aggregate demand
due to the incidence of low domestic revenue mobilisation (arising from revenue substitution)
as well as the implications of the inefficient fuel subsidy regime for fiscal budget. Thus, in
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the face of a contractionary response of output to negative oil price shocks, the central bank
faces an output stabilisation objective in addition to its inflation objective. The CBN is also
known for its developmental functions that cut across different sectors of the Nigerian eco-
nomy; including financing growth-enhancing projects in agriculture, manufacturing, power,
aviation, entertainment, etc. Table 3.7 also shows that the effect of oil shocks is non-trivial
and relatively persistent as they contribute about 26.0 per cent in the first quarter and 22.5
per cent up to the fifth-year.
Headline inflation: The most important shock explaining variations in aggregate inflation
(both in the short- and medium-term horizons) relates to monetary policy as it accounts for
about 48.9 per cent of the forecast variance in the first quarter and 37.9 per cent up to
the fifth year (Table 3.7). This implies that the monetary authority is quite effective in
driving inflation dynamics in line with its primary mandate. Furthermore, domestic supply
shocks (total factor productivity and domestic risk premium shocks) play a prominent role
in explaining variations in aggregate inflation, with its contribution to the forecast variance
increasing from 23.8 per cent in the first quarter to about 35.2 per cent by the fifth year. This
shows that the effect of domestic supply shocks on the headline inflation is quite persistent.
Core, domestic and imports inflation: Our model set up allows us to disentangle the
effects of shocks on the different components of inflation. In Table 3.7, the variance decom-
positions for core inflation, domestic inflation and imports inflation are reported. Across
these three measures, the contributions of domestic shocks are quite dominant and persist-
ent, with the largest effect manifesting in domestic inflation (it accounts for an average of
about 84.7 per cent of the forecast variance in domestic inflation in the first 20 quarters).
Monetary policy plays a dominant role in explaining variations in core inflation, implying
that the CBN is quite successful at driving the dynamics of this measure of inflation both in
the short- and medium-term horizons. However, when decomposed into its two components
(domestic and imports inflation), we find that the monetary authority has a greater strength
in containing imports inflation, probably due to a strong exchange rate channel of monetary
policy. For instance, whereas monetary policy explains 32.2 per cent of the forecast variance
in imports inflation during the first quarter, its contribution to domestic inflation is lower
at about 16.7 per cent.
Real exchange rate: Domestic supply shocks (total factor productivity and domestic risk
premium) account for about 50.0 per cent of the total variation in real exchange rate over
the 1-5 year horizon.
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Table 3.7: Forecast error variance decomposition of endogenous variables
Shock 1 quarter 1 year 2 years 5 years
Variance decomposition of total GDP (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 18.39 46.43 55.80 55.86
External shocks 3.38 2.42 1.95 1.79
Oil shocks 26.00 21.37 20.04 22.53
Monetary policy shocks 51.37 29.46 21.95 19.58
Fiscal policy shocks 0.86 0.33 0.25 0.24
Variance decomposition of exchange rate (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 26.64 48.66 51.54 50.67
External shocks 27.86 16.42 15.41 14.69
Oil shocks 12.42 16.89 17.91 20.51
Monetary policy shocks 33.06 17.98 15.04 14.04
Fiscal policy shocks 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.09
Variance decomposition of interest rate (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 44.43 59.87 63.48 64.21
External shocks 48.22 32.37 29.26 28.57
Oil shocks 0.34 1.55 1.65 1.75
Monetary policy shocks 7.01 6.21 5.60 5.47
Fiscal policy shocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Variance decomposition of headline inflation (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 23.76 31.54 34.50 35.18
External shocks 26.93 26.39 25.22 24.89
Oil-related shocks 0.38 1.60 1.79 2.00
Monetary policy shocks 48.92 40.46 38.48 37.92
Fiscal policy shocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance decomposition of core inflation (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 24.31 32.57 35.42 36.02
External shocks 26.10 25.49 24.21 23.87
Oil-related shocks 1.30 2.67 3.22 3.54
Monetary policy shocks 48.29 39.27 37.15 36.56
Fiscal policy shocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance decomposition of domestic inflation (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 85.83 84.62 85.14 84.71
External shocks 0.80 1.28 1.37 1.49
Oil-related shocks 2.67 2.89 3.09 3.68
Monetary policy shocks 16.65 11.19 10.37 10.10
Fiscal policy shocks 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Variance decomposition of imports inflation (% contribution)
Domestic supply shocks 49.38 61.85 66.16 67.27
External shocks 16.71 11.96 10.11 9.54
Oil-related shocks 1.73 2.39 3.72 4.59
Monetary policy shocks 32.17 23.77 19.99 18.58
Fiscal policy shocks 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
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However, in the first quarter, external shocks (foreign inflation, foreign interest rate and
external risk premium shocks) and monetary policy innovations jointly explain about 60.9
per cent of exchange rate variations. Also, oil shocks account for a relatively substantial
part of total variations over the horizons considered, ranging from 12.4 per cent in the first
quarter to 20.5 per cent up to the fifth year. By the fifth year, oil price shocks constitute
the second largest category of shocks explaining the variations in Naira exchange rate, after
domestic shocks.
Interest rate: Domestic supply and external shocks are the key drivers of nominal interest
rates, jointly accounting for over 90.0 per cent of the forecast variance across all the horizons
considered. However, fiscal policy and oil price shocks contribute in a relatively negligible
way. This observed behaviour is not unusual for a resource-rich emerging economy desirous
of boosting growth; while also seeking to attract foreign capital in a bid to stabilise exchange
rate and domestic prices.
Historical decomposition
In this section, the historical decompositions of total GDP, headline inflation, real effective
exchange rate and the interest rate over the 2000:Q2 - 2018:Q2 period are presented. We
have maintained the grouping of the shocks as in the previous sub-section.
Total GDP: The historical contributions of the five groups of shocks to the evolution of
total GDP growth are shown in Figure 3.10. Over the sample period, aggregate output
recorded two spikes, both occurring between 2000 and 2005. The first spike, which occurred
in the second half of 2001 was largely caused by positive oil price shocks and monetary policy
easing by the CBN. Similarly, the second episode of increased output growth occurring during
the latter part of 2004 was driven by oil price shocks, monetary policy easing and improved
domestic productivity. During the period 2005 - 2010, output growth remained relatively
stable and above its average level with monetary policy shocks, domestic supply shocks and
oil shocks playing important roles. The first negative output growth recorded over the sample
period, which occurred in the third quarter of 2011, is largely explained by the monetary
policy tightening of the CBN aimed at containing mounting inflationary pressures that arose
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Also, domestic supply shocks as well as oil
price shocks resulting from a slight dip in the international price of oil contributed to the
negative output growth outcomes of 2011.
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Figure 3.10: Historical decomposition of output









Others + Initial Values
Fiscal policy shock    
Monetary policy shock  
Domestic supply shocks 
External shocks        
Oil-related shocks             
Figure 3.11: Historical decomposition of headline inflation
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The declining output growth, which started gradually in 2014 and led into a recession in
2016 is principally explained by oil price shocks and domestic supply shocks while monetary
policy seems to play a stabilising role during the period. The negative oil price shock
of the period 2014-2016 led to lower oil earnings, rapid depletion in the country’s foreign
exchange reserves and caused severe foreign exchange supply constraints. Thus, the negative
domestic supply shocks experienced during the recession was largely driven by lower total
factor productivity of domestic firms, occasioned partly by their inability to source foreign
exchange to import necessary production inputs. A striking observation from the analysis
of the historical decomposition of output growth during the sample period is that the two
negative growth outcomes were partially explained by oil price shocks.
Headline inflation: Figure 3.11 shows the historical decomposition of aggregate inflation.
Overall, monetary and domestic shocks largely account for the evolution of CPI inflation
during the sample period. While oil-related shocks played prominent roles during the period
2000-2010, monetary and domestic supply shocks are more predominant in the period 2011-
2018. The increased inflationary trend experienced during the 2004-2005 period is attrib-
utable to negative domestic supply shocks as well as external and monetary policy shocks.
Towards the end of the sample period, aggregate inflation declined steadily in response to a
hawkish monetary policy stance of the CBN, aimed at counteracting the inflationary effect
of exchange rate depreciation recorded during the period.
Real exchange rate: Oil-related shocks as well as monetary policy innovations played
non-trivial roles in the evolution of real exchange rate during the sample period. Prior to
the 2008/09 global financial crisis, the exchange rate exhibited high volatility, which was
mainly attributable to oil shocks and domestic supply shocks (i.e. total factor productivity).
The sharp depreciation recorded during the global financial crisis was subsequently met with
higher oil prices and monetary policy tightening by the CBN. Thus, a combination of favour-
able oil prices and positive monetary policy innovations explained the appreciation of the
exchange rate between 2009 and 2010. Subsequently, the exchange rate remained relatively
stable till the first half of 2015 when a sharp depreciation was again recorded, owing to oil
shocks, domestic supply innovations and external shocks. The massive depreciation in the
exchange rate in the period 2015-17 is principally explained by domestic supply shocks and
oil-related disturbances. During this period, the oil price crashed from about US$102/barrel
in the third quarter of 2014 to US$50/barrel in the second quarter of 2017.
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Figure 3.12: Historical decomposition of real exchange rate
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Figure 3.13: Historical decomposition of interest rate
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The consequent reduction in oil earnings during the period led to scarcity of foreign exchange
and substantial depletion in the country’s stock of external reserves. Faced with a near
currency crisis situation, the CBN devalued the domestic currency (Naira) and restricted
certain categories of importers from accessing the official window for foreign exchange supply.
Some stability was subsequently restored to the foreign exchange market owing to a rebound
in the price of crude oil in the third quarter of 2017 and the hawkish monetary policy stance
of the CBN during the period.
Interest rate: The historical decomposition of interest rate over the sample period is
shown in Figure 3.13. Similar to the findings of Hollander et al. (2018) for the South-
African economy, our results indicate that monetary policy and domestic supply (largely
risk premium shocks) shocks play non-trivial roles in the evolution of the nominal interest
rate. In addition, external shocks (i.e. foreign inflation and external risk premium shocks)
play relatively significant roles in explaining the hawkish monetary policy stance of the CBN
during the period of the global financial crisis.
3.6.5 Monetary policy analysis
In this section, we analyse the dynamic responses of selected macroeconomic variables to a
negative oil price shock under four alternative monetary policy rules. These are: (i) total
inflation-based policy rule, (ii) core inflation-based policy rule, (iii) domestic inflation-based
policy rule, and (iv) an export-price-based monetary policy rule of Frankel (2003). The
monetary policy reaction functions corresponding to the alternative rules are specified in
Table 3.3.
Figure 3.14 shows the impulse responses of the economy to 1.0 per cent negative inter-
national oil price shock under the alternative monetary policy rules. With the exception
of the outcomes recorded under an export price-based Taylor rule, a negative shock to the
international price of oil yields a highly persistent contractionary effects on total GDP, last-
ing over 40 quarters. Headline inflation rises upon impact owing to the higher imported
inflation caused by the depreciated real exchange rate. A negative oil price shock causes real
marginal cost to fall, leading to a decline in domestic inflation and an increase in domestic
output. These observed model dynamics are qualitatively similar under the headline, core
and domestic inflation-based policy rules, with only a few exceptions.
In quantitative terms, the domestic inflation-based Taylor rule outperforms its headline
and core inflation counterparts in terms of boosting total GDP, domestic output and private
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consumption following a negative oil price shock. On the other hand, both the core inflation-
based monetary policy rule and its headline inflation counterpart yield larger contractions in
total GDP following a negative shock to international oil price (Figure 3.14). The relatively
worse outcomes in output under the core and headline inflation-based Taylor rules are due
to the immediate contractionary monetary policy action taken by the central bank following
the oil shock (Bernanke et al., 1997). However, under the domestic inflation-based Taylor
rule, a negative oil price shock requires an interest rate cut. Such expansionary monetary
policy helps to ameliorate the contraction in aggregate GDP arising from the adverse oil
price shock. Also, higher levels of domestic output (non-oil GDP) and private consumption
are recorded under the domestic inflation-based monetary policy rule.
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Figure 3.14: Estimated impulse responses to a negative international oil price shock under
alternative monetary policy rules
Furthermore, Figure 3.14 shows that the core inflation-based Taylor rule performs better
than its competitors in taming headline inflation and moderating the level of exchange
rate depreciation. Our results suggest that an export price-based Taylor rule that features
domestic output and the export price of oil reverses the contractionary effects of a negative
terms of trade shock recorded under the other rules. It however amplifies the initial increase
in headline inflation due to a more depreciated real exchange rate and a higher exchange
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rate pass-through into inflation (Figure 3.14). In other words, the exchange rate effectively
provides a buffer against adverse terms of trade shocks under the export-price-based policy
rule; thus, minimising the associated negative output effect through expenditure switching
effects.
Furthermore, we conduct policy ranking based on a measure of systemic stability rep-
resented by an inter-temporal loss function of the central bank. As indicated by Woodford
(2002), welfare loss functions that are based on second-order approximations to household
utility yield similar approximations to those defined by a central bank loss function. Thus,
following Hunt (2006); Laxton and Pesenti (2003); Nisticò (2012) and Hove et al. (2015), we
assume that the central bank’s inter-temporal loss can be defined as a discounted weighted














where λy ≥ 0 and λq ≥ 0 are parameters representing the degree of central bank’s dislike
for output volatility, ỹ2t , and real exchange rate variability, ∆q̃2t , respectively. The first two
terms in equation (3.94) represent the costs associated with nominal fluctuations while the
third term stands for the costs associated with real fluctuations (Taylor and Williams, 2010).
Panel (A) of Table 3.8 reports macroeconomic fluctuations associated with alternative
monetary policy rules under a model with fuel subsidies. The corresponding optimised
simple rule parameters are reported in Table 3.9. In terms of output stabilisation, the
domestic inflation-based rule yields superior outcomes compared to the other competing
rules. However, it yields inferior outcomes in terms of price, exchange rate and interest
rate stabilisation. Following a negative oil price shock, the core inflation-based Taylor rule
is useful for stabilising prices (headline inflation, core inflation, real exchange rate, and
interest rate) followed by the total inflation-based monetary policy rule. Thus, while the core
inflation-based Taylor rule represents a useful strategy for stabilising the nominal variables
in the aftermath of an oil price shock, its domestic inflation-based counterpart yields superior
outcomes in terms of output stabilisation.
The export price targeting rule, though useful for managing the contractionary effects
of a negative oil price shock on output (Figure 3.14), generates a fairly elevated domestic
macroeconomic instability (Table 3.8). These findings are consistent with the simulation
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results of Vogel et al. (2015), which showed that pegging the export price comes at the cost
of loosing overall domestic stability. Also, while the domestic inflation-based Taylor rule
ameliorates the contractionary impact of a negative oil price shock on output (Figure 3.14),
it generates a relatively higher level of macroeconomic instability compared to the other
rules.
In panel (B) of Table 3.8, we report the macroeconomic fluctuations and policy losses
associated with the alternative monetary policy rule under a model that allows for complete
pass-through of international oil price to domestic fuel price - i. e. absence of fuel subsidy.
The domestic inflation-based Taylor rule retains its usefulness as a strategy for stabilising
aggregate output, even after a potential fuel subsidy reform. Also, as found under the subsidy
regime, the core inflation-based monetary policy rule yields superior outcomes in stabilising
core inflation, real exchange rate and interest rate under the no-subsidy regime. However,
while the core inflation-based Taylor rule out-performs its headline inflation counterpart in
stabilising total inflation under the subsidy regime, a monetary policy rule that features
a broader measure of inflation (i.e. headline inflation-based Taylor rule) yields superior
outcomes under a no-subsidy regime. The effectiveness of core inflation based Taylor is called
to question once domestic price rigidity induced by the fuel subsidy regime is removed.
Table 3.8: Macroeconomic fluctuations and losses under alternative monetary policy rules
Monetary policy rules Standard Deviations (%) Policy loss
ỹt π̃t π̃no,t q̃t R̃t
(A) Policy ranking under a model with fuel consumption subsidy
Headline inflation-based rule 0.1728 0.0018 0.0042 0.3238 0.0055 0.0208
Core inflation-based rule 0.1831 0.0015 0.0009 0.2983 0.0026 0.0151
Domestic inflation-based rule 0.1696 0.0049 0.0080 0.3259 0.0060 0.0252
Export-price-based rule 0.2034 0.0083 0.0048 0.2690 0.0040 0.0161
(B) Policy ranking under a model outwith fuel consumption subsidy
Headline inflation-based rule 0.1789 0.0018 0.0061 0.3353 0.0059 0.0242
Core inflation-based rule 0.1872 0.0051 0.0007 0.3050 0.0022 0.0199
Domestic inflation-based rule 0.1769 0.0020 0.0086 0.3410 0.0082 0.0268
Export-price-based rule 0.2048 0.0109 0.0053 0.2819 0.0054 0.0203
In the last column of Table 3.8, we report policy losses associated with the alternative
monetary policy rules considered in this paper. Lower values of the loss function correspond
to higher welfare (Adolfson et al., 2011). Thus, policies associated with lower policy loss
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values are ranked better compared to those with higher values. Our simulation results using
the model with fuel subsidies indicate that, for the Nigerian economy, a core inflation-based
monetary rule ranks best among its competitors. This is followed by the export-price-based
monetary policy rule with a loss function value of 0.0161. The worst performer is the
domestic inflation-based Taylor rule. These results are in contrast to the findings of Ferrero
and Seneca (2019), which demonstrated that the domestic inflation-based Taylor rule is more
welfare-enhancing in Norway. For an import-dependent oil-exporting emerging economy like
Nigeria, exchange rate plays a vital role in driving inflation dynamics. Thus, an inflation
measure that ignores the effects of exchange rate may not represent an appropriate anchor
for monetary policy design in such economies. Also, as shown in panels (A) and (B) of
Table 3.9, the core inflation-based Taylor rule assigns higher weight to real exchange rate
than its domestic inflation-based counterpart. In Table 3.8, we demonstrate that the policy
rankings are not sensitive to alternative assumptions regarding the degree of pass-through
from international oil price to domestic prices. In other words, the core inflation-based
monetary policy rule ranks best regardless of whether we feature fuel subsidies in our model
or not. However, we note that the core inflation-based Taylor rule exhibits higher interest
rate inertia and assigns greater weights to output following a fuel subsidy reform (Table 3.9).
On the other hand, it places less weights on inflation and real exchange rate compared to
the values recorded under the model with a subsidy regime.
Table 3.9: Optimised simple rule parameters
Parameters ρr ωπ ωy ωq Policy loss
(A) Optimised policy parameters under fuel consumption subsidy
Total inflation-based rule 0.2408 2.8660 0.1262 0.0478 0.0208
Core inflation-based rule 0.2286 2.8626 0.1125 0.0402 0.0151
Domestic inflation-based rule 0.2680 2.8555 0.1195 0.0317 0.0252
Export-price-based rule 0.9688 2.5431 0.6824 0.1092 0.0161
(B) Optimised policy parameters in the absence of fuel consumption subsidy
Total inflation-based rule 0.2424 2.8610 0.1238 0.0405 0.0242
Core inflation-based rule 0.2311 2.8617 0.1174 0.0326 0.0199
Domestic inflation-based rule 0.2971 2.8451 0.1465 0.0233 0.0268
Export-price-based rule 0.9598 2.5398 0.7565 0.1092 0.0203
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Our results confirm the policy trade-off confronting the central bank of a resource-rich
economy facing an oil price shock, which was highlighted in Ferrero and Seneca (2019). In
other words, the Central Bank of Nigeria faces a trade-off in the achievement of price stability
and output growth following a negative shock to international oil price. It is important that
the CBN is aware of these policy trade-offs while designing monetary policy strategies for
responding to emerging shocks. Also, we caution that while the CBN minimises its loss
function by adopting the core inflation-based Taylor rule, no “across-the-board” and “all-
times” monetary policy strategy exists for dealing with adverse terms of trade shocks in the
resource-rich economy.
3.6.6 Macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidy
In this sub-section, we simulate two economies based on different assumptions regarding the
size of the pass-through effect of international oil price into the retail price of fuel. The
first economy is based on our empirical model under which the pass-through parameter
is estimated at ν = 0.43. The second economy is based on a model simulated under an
assumption of complete pass-through, such that ν = 1 (i.e. a no subsidy regime). The
responses of the economy to 1.0 per cent negative shock to real international oil price under
these two alternative economies are presented in Figure 3.15.
Following a 1.0 per cent negative real oil price shock, aggregate GDP in the domestic
economy contracts under both models. However, the contraction under a model with fuel
subsidies (ν = 0.43) is more severe in the short run. In other words, removing the fuel
subsidy ameliorates the contractionary effects of a negative oil price shock on output in the
small open resource-rich economy. Non-oil GDP increases in the aftermath of a negative oil
price shock due to the associated lower real marginal cost faced by the firms as well as the
increased aggregate demand arising from additional income that is available to households.
Also, the amplified terms of trade effects arising from lower domestic prices boosts private
consumption and non-oil GDP. Thus, private consumption rises. As found for aggregate
GDP, the model without fuel subsidies (ν = 1) generates higher growth in non-oil GDP and
private consumption. In other words, the increases in non-oil output and private consumption
associated with a negative oil price shock are higher under an economy without fuel subsidies,
compared to the case for an economy with a fuel subsidy regime. These results are in
line with the findings of Siddig et al. (2014). Thus, in response to a negative oil price
shock, the economy with a fuel subsidy regime records higher decline in total GDP, lower
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private consumption and higher aggregate inflation in the short run. The initial higher
output loss and increased headline inflation under the model with fuel subsidy may not be
unconnected with the inefficiencies usually associated with energy price subsidy programmes
in oil-producing emerging economies (Clements, Mooij, Gupta and Keen, 2015).















Total GDP        















Non-oil GDP          
















Private Consumption  















-3 Headline Inflation   














Domestic Inflation   
















Imported Inflation   















Core Inflation       















Real Exchange Rate   















Empirical model (with fuel subsidy) Alternative model (without fuel subsidy)
Figure 3.15: Estimated impulse responses to negative international oil price shock under the
estimated and alternative domestic fuel pricing rules
Given a negative oil price shock, Figure 3.15 shows that domestic inflation declines more
under a model without fuel subsidies (ν = 1), owing to the complete pass-through effect
of international oil prices into the retail price of fuel. The effects of the negative oil price
shock are fully reflected in firms’ real marginal cost, leading to a downward adjustment in
the prices of domestically produced goods. In other words, the fuel subsidy regime adds
additional stickiness to the evolution of domestic prices, which causes domestic inflation to
be rigid downwards in the face of a negative oil price shock. The behaviour of imported
and core measures of inflation are quite similar in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
However, the immediate impact of a negative oil price shock on headline inflation differs
under the two models. Upon impact, headline inflation declines under the model without
fuel subsidy while the decline is delayed under the empirical model. The delayed response
of headline inflation under the model with fuel subsidy can be explained by the low pass-
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through effect of international oil price to domestic prices. Though the real exchange rate
depreciates more under the model without fuel subsidies, the inflationary impacts of such
depreciation on headline inflation is more than offset by the reduction in domestic inflation
under such a regime (i.e. ν = 1). On the other hand, the inflationary effects of exchange rate
depreciation cause headline inflation to rise under the economy with fuel subsidies (ν = 0.43)
since domestic inflation is sticky downwards.
Consequently, the monetary authority of the economy with a fuel subsidy regime increases
interest rate following a negative oil price shock, a move that pushes the economy further
into recession (Figure 3.15). On the other hand, the monetary authority of an economy
without a fuel subsidy regime faces no inflation threats following a negative oil price. It,
therefore, cuts rates in order to boost aggregate demand and increase domestic output. Of
course, such a move causes an immediate exchange rate overshooting as against the case
under the benchmark model where a delayed overshooting is observed (Figure 3.15). These
results provide useful insights into the macroeconomic implications of potential fuel subsidy
reforms in Nigeria.
Table 3.10: Variances of selected variables under alternative fuel pricing rules
Model Empirical model (ν = 0.43) Alternative model (ν = 1)
Aggregate GDP 0.1769 0.1841
Non-oil GDP 0.0281 0.0245
Private consumption 0.1060 0.1016
Headline inflation 0.0033 0.0038
Core inflation 0.0055 0.0076
Domestic inflation 0.0032 0.0046
Imported inflation 0.0058 0.0053
Real exchange rate 0.3208 0.3307
Interest rate 0.0076 0.0089
Furthermore, we investigate the level of macroeconomic instabilities associated with fuel
subsidy removal by reporting the variances of selected macroeconomic variables under the
empirical (ν = 0.43) and alternative (ν = 1) models in Table 3.10. It can be seen from
the table that, given an oil price shock, the alternative model is associated with slightly
higher volatility in aggregate GDP, headline inflation, core inflation, domestic inflation, real
exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, non-oil GDP, private con-
sumption, and imported inflation are insignificantly less volatile under a no subsidy regime.
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Overall, the results of our counterfactual simulations indicate that the extant fuel subsidy
regime in Nigeria has non-trivial implications for the economy’s response to an oil price
shock. In view of the macroeconomic instabilities observed under the alternative model, this
paper cautions that potential future subsidy reforms must be cautiously implemented.
Table 3.11: Variances of selected variables in the absence of fuel price subsidies
Fuel subsidy Hand-to-mouth Total GDP Headline inflation Interest rate RER
No Yes 0.1841 0.0038 0.0089 0.3307
No No 0.1818 0.0038 0.0103 0.2801
Next, we investigate whether the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers aggravate the
macroeconomic fluctuations associated with potential fuel subsidy reforms. Table 3.11
presents the variances of selected endogenous variables following a 1.0 per cent negative
oil price shock under two alternative models - i.e. with and without hand-to-mouth con-
sumers. Our results show that in the absence of fuel subsidies, the GDP and real exchange
rate are less volatile under the model without hand-to-mouth consumers. In other words,
the oil-producing emerging economy with a significant amount of hand-to-mouth consumers
is likely to experience greater macroeconomic instabilities in the aftermath of a fuel subsidy
removal. This result has implications for financial inclusion programmes being implemen-
ted by resource-rich countries as well as the sequencing of energy subsidy reforms in those
economies.
3.6.7 Oil price shock and fiscal cyclicality
In this subsection, we examine the implications of fiscal cyclicality for the response of the
economy to an oil price shock under a total inflation-based Taylor rule. To this end, we
simulate two economies: (i) the empirical model, which is based on the estimated fiscal cyc-
licality parameter of ωgy = 0.35, implying fiscal pro-cyclicality; and (ii) an alternative model,
which is based on a fiscal cyclicality parameter of ωgy = −0.35, implying a counter-cyclical
fiscal policy. Figure 3.16 shows the responses of selected endogenous variables to a negative
international oil price shock under these two fiscal policy regimes. Quite noticeable depar-
tures are found in the responses of GDP, domestic output, private consumption, domestic
inflation and the exchange rate. In terms of output, a counter-cyclical fiscal policy ameli-
orates the contractionary effects of a negative oil price shock on GDP while also generating
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higher domestic output. However, lower private consumption is recorded in about the fourth
quarter, probably due to some crowding out effects of government consumption.
















Total GDP                  
















Domestic Output      
















Private Consumption  















-3 Total Inflation      















Domestic Inflation   
















Imported Inflation   















Core Inflation       














Real Exchange Rate   















Pro-cyclical fiscal policy Counter-cyclical fiscal policy
Figure 3.16: Estimated impulse responses to negative international oil price shock under
different stance of fiscal policy
In addition, a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance generates lower exchange rate depre-
ciation in the aftermath of a negative oil price shock. Upon impact, a 1.0 per cent negative
shock to real international oil price causes domestic inflation to decline by 2 basis points
under a pro-cyclical fiscal policy and 1.5 basis points under a counter-cyclical fiscal policy
(this is attributable to the inflationary pressures generated by the counter-cyclicality of gov-
ernment spending in response to falling total GDP).
Table 3.12: Variances of selected variables under alternative fiscal policy regimes
Model Total GDP Total inf. Int. rate RER Core inf. Consumption
ωgy = 0.35 0.1769 0.0033 0.0076 0.3208 0.0055 0.1060
ωgy = −0.35 0.1408 0.0030 0.0063 0.2147 0.0047 0.0907
Table 3.12 shows that, following a negative oil price shock, lower macroeconomic instabil-
ities are recorded under a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. These results suggest that monetary
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policy may be more successful at stabilising both prices and output under a counter-cyclical
fiscal regime. Thus, our results support the view that there are gains from counter-cyclical
fiscal policy measures in resource-rich emerging economies facing an adverse terms of trade
shock.
3.6.8 Role of hand-to-mouth consumers
In order to assess the implications of hand-to-mouth consumers for our model dynamics, we
re-estimated the model parameters with the assumption that all consumers are Ricardian.
Table 3.13 shows the estimated parameters. First, the parameters in the utility function
- relative risk aversion and labour supply elasticity, are slightly higher under the model
without hand-to-mouth consumers. These are in line with the findings reported by Iklaga
(2017). Also, the estimated consumption habit parameter is higher under the model without
hand-to-mouth consumers. Second, the Calvo price parameter is higher for domestic goods
than imported goods across the two models.
Third, the central bank focuses less on inflation under the model without hand-to-mouth
consumers (ωπ = 2.81) compared to the outcomes under the model with hand-to-mouth
consumers (ωπ = 2.86). However, the central bank reaction coefficients to output and ex-
change rate are higher under the model without hand-to-mouth consumers. These imply
that monetary policy responds less to inflation but more to output and exchange rate under
the model where all the agents are Ricardian. Fourth, in terms of fiscal policy, the estim-
ated fiscal cyclicality parameter shows that government spending is more pro-cyclical under
the model with hand-to-mouth consumers. Fifth, both monetary and fiscal policy are less
persistent under the model with non-Ricardian consumers. While the estimated standard
deviation of external shock variables are similar across the two models, most of the domestic
shock variables exhibit higher standard deviations under the model without hand-to-mouth
consumers.
Next, we analyse the implications of the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers for the
responses of selected endogenous variables to three exogenous disturbances relating to oil
price, monetary policy and fiscal policy. In Figure 3.17, we present the impulse responses to
1.0 per cent negative international oil price shock under the model with and without hand-
to-mouth consumers. The model dynamics are qualitatively similar under the two models.
However, the present of hand-to-mouth consumers seem to amplify the contractionary effects
of a negative oil price shock on output.
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Table 3.13: Priors and posterior estimates for model with and without hand-to-mouth con-
sumers
Parameter Hand-to-mouth No hand-to-mouthMean 90% HPD Int. Mean 90% HPD Int.
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: γR 0.692 0.562 0.824 1.000 -
Labour supply elasticity: φ 1.439 1.274 1.600 1.449 1.287 1.614
Relative risk aversion: σ 1.409 1.109 1.694 1.423 1.124 1.710
External habit: ϕc 0.438 0.310 0.568 0.439 0.309 0.569
Investment adj. cost: χ 6.181 1.751 10.490 6.460 1.888 10.872
Fuel pricing parameter: ν 0.429 0.190 0.640 0.420 0.198 0.624
Oil - core cons. elasticity: ηo 0.188 0.044 0.328 0.198 0.045 0.344
For. - dom. cons. elasticity: ηc 0.609 0.287 0.926 0.600 0.280 0.910
For. - dom. inv. elasticity: ηi 0.615 0.286 0.933 0.602 0.276 0.912
Calvo - domestic goods: θh 0.719 0.620 0.826 0.782 0.672 0.896
Calvo - imported goods: θf 0.691 0.525 0.860 0.696 0.533 0.865
Policy parameters
Taylor, π: ωπ 2.857 2.579 3.141 2.810 2.495 3.141
Taylor, y: ωy 0.118 0.043 0.191 0.131 0.047 0.213
Taylor, q: ωq 0.109 0.040 0.176 0.123 0.045 0.198
Fiscal, yo: ωyo 0.351 -0.470 1.184 0.339 -0.490 1.172
Autoregressive coefficients of shocks
Dom. productivity: ρah 0.771 0.593 0.957 0.596 0.206 0.921
Oil productivity: ρa0 0.502 0.100 0.905 0.502 0.109 0.913
Dom. risk premium: ρµ 0.786 0.703 0.871 0.767 0.677 0.859
Dom. fiscal policy: ρgc 0.487 0.073 0.896 0.502 0.105 0.931
Law of one price gap-oil: ρψo 0.608 0.250 0.957 0.591 0.262 0.894
Dom. monetary policy: ρr 0.224 0.054 0.382 0.249 0.072 0.415
Int’l oil price shock: ρp∗o 0.923 0.827 0.987 0.926 0.870 0.989
For. risk premium: ρµ∗ 0.859 0.790 0.929 0.861 0.791 0.933
For. inflation: ρπ∗ 0.138 0.001 0.257 0.138 0.001 0.257
For. monetary policy: ρr∗ 0.442 0.303 0.584 0.440 0.299 0.582
Standard deviation of shocks
Dom. productivity: ξaht 0.246 0.105 0.407 0.685 0.127 1.739
Oil productivity:ξaot 0.076 0.024 0.133 0.080 0.023 0.146
Dom. risk premium: ξµt 0.162 0.132 0.192 0.167 0.134 0.200
Dom. fiscal policy:ξgct 0.098 0.023 0.177 0.083 0.023 0.152
Law of one price gap-oil: ξψ
o
t 0.904 0.444 1.490 0.897 0.457 1.431
Dom. monetary policy: ξrt 0.379 0.300 0.455 0.371 0.292 0.448
Int’l oil price shock: ξp
∗
o
t 0.151 0.130 0.171 0.151 0.130 0.171
For. risk premium: ξµ
∗
t 0.041 0.032 0.050 0.041 0.032 0.050
For. inflation: ξπ∗t 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006
For. monetary policy: ξr∗t 0.101 0.079 0.121 0.101 0.079 0.122
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In other words, the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers in our model generates deeper
recessions following a negative oil price shock. This finding implies that financial inclu-
sion programmes are capable of boosting economic resilience and growth in oil-producing
emerging economies facing negative terms of trade shocks (Sethi and Acharya, 2018).
Furthermore, following a negative oil price shock, the model with hand-to-mouth con-
sumers generates lower domestic prices but higher exchange rate depreciation in about the
first two quarters. Thus, inflationary pressures resulting from exchange rate depreciation are
ameliorated under the model without hand-to-mouth consumers. Figure 3.18 shows that,
under the model with hand-to-mouth consumers, private consumption rises in response to a
positive fiscal policy shock. However, the model without hand-to-mouth consumers generates
a negative response of private consumption to a government spending shock. Thus, under our
model set up, we confirm Galí et al. (2007)’s proposition that incorporating non-Ricardian
consumers help generate a positive response of private consumption to a positive government
spending shock. Turning to the implications of the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers for
the model response to monetary policy shocks, Figure 3.19 indicates very minor departures
across the selected endogenous variables, with the exception of private consumption.
















































Private Consumption  















-3 Total Inflation      















Domestic Inflation   
















Imported Inflation   















Core Inflation       














Real Exchange Rate   















Model with hand-to-mouth consumers Model without hand-to-mouth consumers
Figure 3.17: Estimated impulse responses to negative international oil price shock under a
model with and without hand-to-mouth consumers.
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Figure 3.18: Estimated impulse responses to government spending shock under a model with
and without hand-to-mouth consumers.
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Figure 3.19: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary policy shock under a model with
and without hand-to-mouth consumers.
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In Figure 3.19, the responses of the economy to a positive monetary policy shock are
qualitatively similar under the model with and outwith hand-to-mouth consumers. However,
a positive monetary policy shock causes bigger reduction in private consumption under the
model with hand-to-mouth consumers while domestic inflation declines more. Upon impact,
the contractionary monetary policy causes aggregate private consumption to decline more
under the model with hand-to-mouth consumers as fewer people are able to smoothen their
consumption. This implies a larger reduction in the demand for domestic goods, which causes
domestic inflation to fall more compared to the case under the model outwith hand-to-mouth
consumers.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the roles of oil price shocks and fuel subsidies in driving business
cycles of a resource-rich emerging economy. We set up a suitable TANK model that takes
cognisance of a number of important features. These include (i) additional price rigidity
arising from a fuel subsidy regime (ii) high dependence on oil (iii) presence of hand-to-
mouth consumers (iv) oil-driven fiscal policy and (v) inefficient financial sector. The model
is estimated via Bayesian method using Nigerian data for the period 2000:Q2-2018:Q2. Based
on the estimated model, we analyse business cycle fluctuations in the resource-rich economy;
evaluate the relevance of certain model features, including the fuel subsidy regime; and
conduct some monetary policy exercises.
We find that monetary policy shocks and oil price movements are important drivers of
output in the short run (1-4 quarters) while domestic supply shocks (such as, productivity
and domestic risk premium shocks) explain most of the fluctuations in the medium- to long-
term horizons. Particularly, the contribution of oil shocks to output variations is about 21
per cent in the short run, while they also account for about 23 per cent by the twentieth
quarter.
On the other hand, inflation dynamics are largely driven by monetary policy and domestic
supply shocks both in the short- and medium-term horizons. In particular, monetary policy
shock plays a dominant role in explaining the forecast variance of headline and core inflation
as it contributes an average of about 38.0 and 36.6 per cent, respectively, up to the fifth year.
This tends to imply that monetary policy is active in containing inflationary pressures during
the sample period. However, oil shocks play a less prominent role due to the low pass-through
133
effects arising from the extant fuel subsidy regime in the country. A further disaggregation
of core inflation into its domestic and imported components shows that monetary policy
contributes more to the evolution of the latter than the former. In terms of historical
decomposition, we find that episodes of output contractions over the sample period (including
the 2016 economic recession) are generally associated with oil and domestic supply shocks.
Also, the high inflationary episode of 2004-2005 is attributable to negative domestic supply
shocks as well as external and monetary policy shocks.
A negative international oil price shock generates non-trivial and persistent contraction-
ary impacts on total output (GDP), lasting over 40 quarters. The oil firm’s profit declines
in response to lower oil prices, leading to a reduction in its demands for capital and mater-
ial inputs as well as a fall in oil revenues available to government. Domestic output falls
initially owing to the reduced demand for materials produced by domestic non-oil produ-
cing firms. The non-oil goods producing firms in turn reduce their input demand; which,
coupled with lower oil prices, lead to lower marginal cost. Thus, domestic inflation falls
while imported inflation rises due to the depreciation of the exchange rate. However, private
consumption of domestic goods rises due to increased terms of trade which causes domestic
goods to be cheaper compared to imported goods. Following a negative oil price shock, do-
mestic inflation-based monetary rule requires an interest rate cut while its core and headline
inflation counterparts elicit a contractionary monetary policy. Thus, the domestic inflation-
based Taylor rule ameliorates the contractionary impact of a negative oil price shock on
output while the core inflation-based variant is more successful at moderating the associated
headline inflation and exchange rate depreciation.
We estimate that about 43 per cent of changes to international oil prices is transmitted
into domestic fuel price in Nigeria. The presence of fuel subsidy adds additional stickiness
to domestic prices which in turn alters the dynamics of aggregate inflation and indeed,
the response of monetary policy to an oil price shock. Having shown that the size of the
pass-through parameter governs the dynamics of fuel subsidy payments, we simulate two
models based on different assumptions regarding the parameter. Our results show that the
contractionary effects of a negative oil price shock on output is ameliorated under the model
without fuel subsidies. Abolishing the fuel subsidy regime has fiscal, growth, and welfare
implications. We caution that future reforms must necessarily accommodate the deployment
of well-targeted safety nets as well as the evolution of sustainable adjustment mechanisms.
The paper, however, notes that retaining the subsidy programme has some appeal in terms
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of its ability to generate relative macroeconomic stability, compared to the case under a
no-subsidy regime.
In responding to a negative oil price shock, the central bank faces a dilemma of either sta-
bilising output or prices. Following an oil price shock, the domestic inflation-based monetary
reaction function represents a good strategy for stabilising output while its core-inflation-
based counterpart is effective for stabilising prices. The export price-based Taylor rule
(Frankel, 2003) generates a countercyclical effect on output, though at the expense of overall
macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, monetary policy analysis conducted based on an ad-
hoc central bank loss function reveals that the lowest loss function value is obtained under
the core inflation-based monetary policy rule. This implies that, among its competitors, the
core-inflation-based Taylor rule that features output and real exchange rate ranks best as a
strategy for stabilising the economy. This is followed by the export-price based policy rule,
the headline inflation-based rule, and finally the domestic inflation-based rule. We further
demonstrate that the obtained policy ranking is robust to alternative assumptions relating
to the presence/absence of fuel consumption subsidies in the economy. The policy trade-offs
observed in this paper tend to suggest that no “across-the-board” monetary policy strategy
exists for dealing with adverse terms of trade shocks in the resource-rich economy. It is there-
fore important that the CBN is cognisant of the trade-offs highlighted in this paper while
designing monetary policy strategies for responding to emerging macroeconomic shocks.
The model developed in this paper is useful for the joint analysis of monetary and fiscal
policies as well as the evaluation of the macroeconomic implications of energy pricing reforms
in resource-rich countries. A more thorough analysis of the interactions between monetary
and fiscal policy under our model set up is a viable area of research. Using our model for
such an effort allows for an assessment of the revenue substitution phenomenon (Salti, 2008;
Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán, 2003), which potentially complicates the automatic stabilisers
role of fiscal policy in resource-rich emerging economies. Also, examining monetary and fiscal
policy behaviours before and after the 2008/09 global financial crisis (GFC) under our model
set up is a useful exercise. Such analysis will contribute to the understanding of the evolution
of macroeconomic policies in oil-producing emerging economies, especially in the post-GFC
period. The model developed in this paper could be extended to accommodate a Sovereign
Wealth Fund (SWF) as a mechanism for managing resource revenues in the resource-rich




Monetary-Fiscal Interaction in an
Oil-Producing Emerging Economy
4.1 Introduction
Monetary and fiscal policies play important roles in driving inflation dynamics and overall
macroeconomic outcomes (Cebi, 2012; Davig and Leeper, 2009; Leeper, 1991; Leeper and
Leith, 2016). However, given that these policies are usually implemented by separate inde-
pendent institutions, their objectives may conflict at times. For instance, an unsustainable
fiscal policy arising from the fiscal authority’s desire to stabilise output may cause the central
bank to embark on debt monetization; which in turn compromises the price stability objective
of monetary policy (Ozatay, 1997). Also, since monetary policy decisions have implications
for the evolution of fiscal variables, it follows that monetary policy effectiveness is dependent
on how the fiscal authority responds to monetary shocks (Cao and Illing, 2019). This sort of
policy interconnectedness and its macroeconomic implications explain why policy makers are
generally interested in characterising the policy behaviours of monetary and fiscal authorit-
ies. There is consensus in literature that effective monetary-fiscal interaction facilitates the
achievement of desired macroeconomic objectives, particularly with regards to price stability
(Leeper and Leith, 2016).
From a theoretical perspective1, Leeper (1991) formalised the categorisation of equilib-
rium policies into ’active’ and ’passive’ regions using a stochastic maximising model. Ex-
1The pioneering efforts at developing a theory to explain the interaction between monetary and fiscal
policy were made by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Leeper (1991).
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ploring the model’s stability characteristics in line with Blanchard and Kahn (1980)2, Leeper
(1991) showed that a combination of policy parameters from either of the two regions yields
one stable and one unstable root, consistent with the notion of saddle-path equilibrium.
This implies that either monetary or fiscal policy must be active and the other passive for a
unique equilibrium to exist. Thus, an active behaviour uniquely determines the equilibrium
pricing function while the passive policy prevents government debt from being explosive.
The intuition behind Leeper’s (1991) exposition is that the determinacy of the macroeco-
nomic system is dependent not only on the response of monetary policy to inflation but also
the fiscal response to public debt.
The foregoing analysis delineates possible policy combinations into four disjoint regions
based on the policy parameter space. These are: region I - active monetary and passive fiscal
policy; region II - passive monetary and active fiscal policy; region III - passive monetary
and passive fiscal policy; and region IV - active monetary and active fiscal policy. Most
traditional macroeconomic models designed for policy analysis are based on the idea of mon-
etary dominance, which is consistent with region I in the sense of Leeper (1991). Under this
framework, monetary policy actively responds to inflation according to the Taylor principle
while fiscal policy adjusts to balance the government’s inter-temporal budget (Ascari, Florio
and Gobbi, 2017; Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Walsh, 2010). However,
the monetary dominance view has been subjected to intense scrutiny following the 2008/09
global financial crisis (GFC)3. It is believed that the accumulation of fiscal debts in the wake
of the crisis had non-trivial implications for inflation and the conduct of monetary policy
(Debrun and Kinda, 2017; Leeper and Leith, 2016; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). This led to
the emergence of a recent strand of the literature studying the evolution of monetary-fiscal
interactions before and after the GFC (Libich and Nguyen, 2015).
Several studies have examined the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies,
especially in the context of developed economies (see e.g. Afonso, Alves and Balhote 2019;
Davig and Leeper 2009; Davig, Leeper, Galí and Sims 2006; Kliem, Kriwoluzky and Sarferaz
2016; Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci 2004; Traum and Yang 2011). For instance, using data
for the period 1955-2007, Traum and Yang (2011) confirmed the monetary dominance view
for the United States during the pre-Volcker period, consistent with active monetary and
2According to Blanchard and Kahn (1980), a sufficient condition for the existence of saddle-path equilib-
rium requires that one root of the system lies inside the unit circle and one root lies outside.
3Leeper and Leith (2016) observed that quite a number of countries responded to the crisis by initiating
joint policy actions involving drastic interest rate cuts and increased fiscal spendings
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passive fiscal policy of Leeper (1991). On the other hand, Davig et al. (2006) and Davig and
Leeper (2009) provided empirical evidence in support of passive monetary and active fiscal
policy in the US during 1955Q1-1966Q4, a period preceding the great inflation. In the case
of Turkey, Cebi (2012) observed a combination of active monetary policy and passive fiscal
policy for the period 2002-2009 and argued that such a policy mix was instrumental to the
country’s impressive macroeconomic performance during the period.
In this paper, we argue that there are a number of reasons to believe that the nature
of policy interactions may differ materially between resource-importing advanced economies
and their resource-exporting emerging counterparts. First, the drivers of output and prices
are potentially different across the two settings. For instance, compared to the outcomes
observed in advanced oil importing economies, oil price shocks have been known to generate
contrasting and more severe effects on real and nominal variables in oil-producing emerging
economies (Berument et al., 2010; Cunado and De Gracia, 2005; Mork et al., 1990). The
varied outcomes are often explained by differences in shock propagation mechanisms, de-
gree of oil intensity, and policy responses (Berg et al., 2013; Bernanke et al., 1997; Kinda,
2013; Romero, 2008; Snudden, 2016). Second, small open resource-rich emerging econom-
ies (RREEs) exhibit certain characteristics that significantly increase their vulnerabilities
to external shocks in general and resource-related shocks in particular. Such characteristics
are often taken for granted in the analysis of policy interactions for commodity-importing
advanced countries. For instance, in RREEs, fiscal and foreign exchange earnings are usu-
ally dominated by resource rents. This sort of dominance is usually associated with fiscal
volatility (Barnett and Ossowski, 2002; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012), policy pro-cyclicality (Ab-
dih et al., 2010; Aregbeyen and Fasanyan, 2017; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012), revenue substitution
(Salti, 2008; Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán, 2003), and resource curse (Mehlum et al., 2006;
Sachs and Warner, 1995; Salti, 2008; Xavier, 1997)4. Another important feature, especially
of most oil producing emerging economies relate to the use of fuel consumption subsidies for
attenuating the impacts of oil price shocks on the domestic economy. In a number of cases,
such subsidy arrangements have been shown to distort price signals, generate inefficient con-
sumption, and create serious fiscal sustainability concerns (Clements et al., 2015; Murphy,
Villafuerte and Ossowski, 2010; Soile and Mu, 2015). Barring other country-specific factors,
these stylised facts may cause monetary and fiscal policies to interact differently in RREEs.
4Salti (2008) argue that a relatively higher share of resource rents in total fiscal revenue causes resource
rent to corrupt institutions, thereby leading to lower economic growth.
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In literature, the extent to which some of these unique characteristics matter for the
interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in RREEs remains unclear and largely un-
explored. To address this gap and contribute to the understanding of monetary-fiscal inter-
actions in resource-rich economies whose policies are substantially driven by resource-related
shocks, we pose a number of questions: (i) how do monetary and fiscal policies respond to
resource-price shocks in a RREE with an energy subsidy regime? (ii) what is the charac-
terisation of monetary-fiscal interactions in a RREE whose fiscal policy is largely driven by
resource-related flows? (iii) did the 2008/09 GFC alter the dynamics of monetary and fiscal
policy interaction in the RREE? (iv) does the nature of fiscal response to resource revenues
matter for the interplay of monetary and fiscal policy in the RREE? (v) does monetary policy
response to exchange rate matter for the characterisation of monetary-fiscal interactions in
the RREE? We address these questions by developing a suitable DSGE model, which is
estimated using Nigerian data for the period 2000:Q2 - 2018:Q2. Particularly, the estimated
coefficients in the monetary and fiscal rules are explored to derive useful insights regarding
the nature of policy interactions in Nigeria over the last two decades.
We report a number of interesting results. First, we show that a 1.0 per cent negat-
ive resource-price shock contracts output, depreciates the real exchange rate and increases
headline inflation in the RREE. In response, the central bank embarks on contractionary
monetary policy while primary deficit increases. We find evidence of active monetary policy
and passive fiscal policy over the full sample. This is consistent with the policy mix character-
ised under region 1 of Leeper (1991) and in line with the monetary dominance view. Contrary
to expectation, taxes respond negatively to debt under our benchmark model. Thus, gov-
ernment consumption plays a more significant role than taxes in stabilising debt. Second,
the 2008/09 global financial crisis did not significantly alter the observed monetary-fiscal
policy mix in the RREE. However, monetary policy became more active in the post-crisis
period while government spending became more passive, implying better policy interaction.
Furthermore, we find evidence of counter-cyclical government spending prior to the GFC
and a pro-cyclical stance in the post-crisis period. Regardless of the nature of cyclicality of
government spending, our results show that primary deficit decreases with increasing debt
levels. Third, once resource-related flows are excluded from the fiscal rules, it turns out that
taxes respond positively to debt. Fourth, a Taylor rule that excludes real exchange rate is
also associated with a positive response of taxes to debt. Regardless of the type of monetary
and fiscal policy rules considered in the paper, government spending responds negatively
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to increasing levels of debt; a behaviour that helps achieve the government’s debt stabilisa-
tion objective. These results are useful for the design of appropriate monetary, fiscal and
exchange rate policies in small open resource-rich economies.
This paper makes three key contributions. First, from a theoretical point of view, it
extends the small open economy of (Gali and Monacelli, 2005) to allow for a resource sec-
tor, fuel subsidy regime, fiscal policy, and revenue substitution. These extensions reflect the
economic characteristics of most RREEs and allow for the joint analysis of monetary and
fiscal policies. Second, it documents empirical findings regarding monetary and fiscal policy
interaction in RREEs whose fiscal policies are largely driven by resource flows, focusing on
Nigeria. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at characterising monetary-fiscal inter-
actions under an economic setting that allows for fuel subsidies and revenue substitution in
the fiscal rule. Third, it compares policy interactions before and after the GFC; contributing
to the debate on the effects of the crisis on the behaviour of monetary and fiscal authorities
in resource-rich emerging economies.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional
framework for monetary and fiscal policy coordination in Nigeria and presents some stylised
facts. In Section 3, we outline the DSGE model employed for our analysis, with special focus
on monetary and fiscal policy rules and the implications of their behaviours for the charac-
terisation of policy interaction in the RREE. Section 4 describes the estimation procedure
and the data used. In Section 5, we characterise monetary-fiscal interactions in Nigeria and
highlight how the observed interactions depend on policy responses to resource revenues and
the exchange rate. The implications of the 2008 global financial crisis for the conduct of
monetary and fiscal policies in the RREE are also discussed. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Nigeria: Policy Framework and Selected Indicators
4.2.1 Institutional framework for policy coordination
The CBN Act of 2007 charges the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) with the responsibility
of ensuring monetary and price stability, among other mandates. On the other hand, the
Finance Act of 1958 empowers the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) to administer and
control the finances of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). These provisions imply
that the FMF is responsible for fiscal policy while the CBN conducts monetary policy. Apart
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from empowering the FMF to formulate fiscal policies, the Finance Act also mandates the
Ministry to collaborate with the CBN in formulating policies for curbing inflation in the
economy. Thus, while these two agencies are independent of each other in the conduct of
their policies, specific committees exist both at the CBN and the FMF for the purpose of
facilitating collaboration between the two institutions towards the achievement of certain
macroeconomic objectives. The composition and objectives of some of those committees are
discussed next.
(i) Monetary Policy Committee
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the CBN is responsible for the formulation of
monetary and credit policy. It determines the appropriate policy rate that is consistent with
price stability as defined by the central bank. The committee comprises the Governor and
four Deputy Governors of the CBN, two external board members, the Permanent Secretary of
FMF, and a secretary, who is usually the Head of CBN’s Monetary Policy Department. The
CBN Act of 2007 provides for the representative of the fiscal authority (FMF) on the MPC.
The MPC meets every other month and has a calendar of meetings. During the bimonthly
meetings, the committee considers developments in the domestic and global economy and
subsequently takes appropriate monetary policy decisions based on majority votes. The CBN
has instrument independence, implying that the Banks’ monetary policy decisions are not
required to be approved by a higher authority.
(ii) Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordinating Committee
The Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordinating Committee (MFPCC) of the Debt Manage-
ment Office (DMO) provides a forum for effective coordination and harmonization of mon-
etary, fiscal and debt management policies and strategies of Nigeria. The MFPCC meets
quarterly and is chaired by the Director-General of the DMO. Other institutional mem-
bers of the Committee include DMO, CBN, FMF, Budget Office of the Federation (BOF),
Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF), Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Pension Commission (PENCOM), Federal
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), National Insurance Commission (NAICOM), National Bur-
eau of Statistics (NBS), and the National Planning Commission (NPC). Amongst others,
the MFPCC aims to harmonize the objectives of monetary, fiscal, and debt policies towards
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achieving overall macro-economic stability. It also ensures that the strategies for implement-
ing these policies are properly synchronized so that they are complementary rather than
conflicting. Thus, the Committee provides a platform for enhancing monetary-fiscal interac-
tions, especially with regards to the financing of fiscal deficit and the management of public
debt.
(iii) Fiscal Liquidity Assessment Committee
The Fiscal Liquidity Assessment Committee (FLAC) of the CBN meets weekly to share
relevant data on fiscal operations that could impact on domestic liquidity. It conducts fiscal
liquidity forecast and offers policy advice on fiscal issues to the Management of the CBN.
Thus, the FLAC provides an avenue for monetary and fiscal authorities to interact for the
purpose of articulating complementary macroeconomic policy decisions for the Nigerian eco-
nomy. The FLAC is chaired by the Director of CBN’s Monetary Policy Department. Other
institutional members of the Committee include the DMO, BOF, FMF, FIRS, Nigerian Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), Nigeria
Customs Service, and the OAGF.
4.2.2 Stylised facts on selected macroeconomic indicators
Nigeria is sixth largest oil producing country in the world and Africa’s biggest oil exporter.
As shown in Figure 4.1e, the contribution of oil to the country’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) averaged about 18 per cent during 2000 and 2007. This implies that developments
in the international oil market could have significant implications for the domestic economy.
Figure 4.1g shows that the international price of oil increased steadily and substantially
prior to the GFC of 2008/09, rising by 253.5 per cent from its level in 2000 to slightly above
US$100/barrel in 2008. However, two major episodes of significant oil price declines have
been recorded since the GFC. The first episodic decline occurred during the 2008/09 crisis
(36.7 per cent decline from an average price of US$101 per barrel in 2008 to an average of
US$64 in 2009) while the second one, which occurred during 2013-2016 was more significant
and persistent (a decline of 60.5 per cent from an average price per barrel of US$111 in
2013 to an average of US$44 in 2016). Despite these declines, the average price of oil in
the post-GFC period remain three times as high as its average for the period 2000-2003.
It is believed that the size and persistence of the 2014-2016 oil price decline contributed
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substantially to the country’s economic recession of 2016 - its first recession in 25 years
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(i)   Inflation rate (%)
Figure 4.1: Time series pattern of selected macroeconomic and policy indicators
The country recorded a decline in GDP growth from 14.6 per cent in 2002 to 7.2 per cent
in 2008, implying that the steady rise in international oil price during the pre-GFC period
failed to drive output (Figures 4.1g and 4.1h). Inflation trended downwards during 2003-
2007. However, a couple of spikes were recorded in the post-2008/09 crisis period, driven
partly by the pass-through effects of exchange rate to domestic prices – as major exchange
rate adjustments were implemented in the aftermath of the oil price declines of 2008-09 and
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2014-2016 (Figure 4.1i). Notably, the oil price decline of 2014-2016 led to a decline in GDP
and an increase in inflation (Figure 4.1g and Figure 4.1i). On the other hand, the less
persistent oil price decline of 2008/09 produced an opposite effect as output increased while
inflation declined.
How did monetary and fiscal authorities respond to the aforementioned developments in
prices and output? Figure 4.1d shows a systematic decline in interest rate during 2003-2007
in response to the deflationary trend experienced during the period. On the other hand,
monetary policy was accommodative during the 2016 economic recession as the interest rate
was lowered (albeit with significant inertia) in response to the negative output growth despite
the higher inflation rate recorded during the period. In terms of fiscal policy, government
consumption as a ratio of GDP fell steadily in the face of the declining GDP growth during
2002-2006, suggestive of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy (Figure 4.1f ). Similarly, non-oil revenue
as a share of GDP fell significantly from about 11.1 per cent in 2001 to about 2.4 per cent
in 2006 (Figure 4.1c). The tax to GDP ratio was quite low and below 4.0 per cent between
2008 and 2018.
The country built some fiscal space in the pre-GFC period by narrowing deficits and
reducing debt (Figures 4.1a and 4.1b). The deficit to GDP ratio improved significantly from
-2.7 per cent in 2001 to about -0.1 per cent in 2008 due to favourable oil prices (Figure
4.1g) and lower government expenditure (Figure 4.1f ). However, the two oil price reversals
recorded in the post-GFC period significantly worsened the ratio from its level in 2008 to
about -3.2 per cent in 2017. In response to the behaviour of deficit-to-GDP ratio, the debt-
to-GDP ratio exhibited a U-shape with a trough established during the GFC (Figure 4.1a).
Intuitively, the oil price (Figure 4.1g) and the deficit to GDP ratio (Figure 4.1b) displayed
an inverted U-shape during the sample period; implying that an increase in oil price was
associated with lower fiscal deficit.
How did monetary and fiscal policies respond to oil price movements during the 2000-
2018 period? The increases in oil price recorded in the 5-year period preceding the GFC was
associated with declining trend in GDP growth, fall in prices, decreasing deficit-to-GDP ratio,
falling debt-to-GDP ratio, and interest rate cuts. On the other hand, during the oil price
recovery of 2009-2011, the GDP increased, inflation fell, deficit-to-GDP increased leading to
a higher debt-to-GDP ratio, and interest rate fell. Thus, while the oil price increase of the
pre-GFC period was associated with a contractionary fiscal policy, the oil price recovery of
the post-GFC period was associated with expansionary fiscal policy. Under both episodes,
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monetary policy was expansionary.
The response of monetary and fiscal policies to episodes of declining oil prices was also
mixed. During the oil price reversal of 2008-09, Nigeria’s GDP grew, inflation declined, fiscal
deficit widened (expansionary fiscal policy), debt-to-GDP ratio increased, and the interest
rate rose (contractionary monetary policy). On the other hand, the oil price reversal of 2013-
2016 was associated with a decline in GDP, increase in inflation, widening of fiscal deficit
(expansionary fiscal policy), rise in debt to GDP ratio, and an initial increase in interest rate
followed by a cut in 2016.
The analyses presented in this sub-section seem to suggest that, in response to domestic
and external economic developments, monetary and fiscal policies behaved in a varied man-
ner. Thus, a number of questions can be posed. First, what is the appropriate character-
isation of the nature of monetary and fiscal policy interaction in Nigeria during the period
2000-2018? Second, did the GFC and the episodic declines in oil price in the post-GFC
period alter the nature of monetary-fiscal interaction in the RREE? Third, how important
are oil price instabilities and its implied fiscal volatility for the characterisation of monetary-
fiscal interaction in the RREE? Fourth, in the face of rising debts and elevated fiscal deficits,
what mechanism stabilises debt in the RREE? This paper seeks to address these questions
using the structural model developed in the next section.
4.3 The Model
In this paper, we develop a New Keynesian model that is suitable for the joint analysis of
monetary and fiscal policies in a resource-rich emerging economy. To this end, we extend
Gali and Monacelli (2005) by incorporating: an oil sector as in Ferrero and Seneca (2019), oil
in domestic consumption as in Medina and Soto (2005), oil in domestic production (Allegret
and Benkhodja, 2015), a domestic fuel pricing rule that implies an implicit subsidy regime
(Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015); and an inefficient financial sector as in Smets and Wouters
(2007). In addition, we allow for fiscal rules that respond to oil-related flows (Algozhina,
2015). The model features nominal and real rigidities that impact on agents’ decisions.
The economy is inhabited by seven agents: households, non-oil goods producing firms, final
goods producers, import goods retailers, oil producing firms, fiscal authority and the central
bank. The economic environment within which each of the agents operates as well as their
optimisation problems are presented next. The first order conditions and the log linearised
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version of the characterising equations are presented in Appendix C. The variables expressed
in real terms are denoted by small letters.
4.3.1 Households
Household consumption, Ct, is a composite index comprising non-oil consumption bundle,
















where parameter ηo > 0 measures the degree of substitution between core and fuel consump-
tion and γo represents the share of domestic consumption devoted to fuel consumption, Co,t.
Expenditure minimization subject to equation (4.1) yields the demands for non-oil (core)
consumption and fuel consumption as follows:











where Pro,t represents the subsidised price of imported fuel5, Pno,t is the price of core goods,
and Pt is the aggregate consumer price index. Furthermore, core consumption bundle, Cno,t is
defined as a composite index given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator
















where ηc > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in the
core consumption basket and the parameter γc measures the share of domestic consumption
sourced from the rest of the world by way of non-oil imports. Minimising the household’s
expenditure subject to equation (4.2) yields the demands for Ch,t and Cf,t as follows:











5The price of imported fuel is not simply the domestic currency price of fuel but rather a convex com-
bination of the landing price of fuel and the domestic price of fuel in the previous period. Thus, following
Allegret and Benkhodja (2015), Pro,t is determined based on a fuel pricing rule given as Pro,t = P 1−νro,t−1P νlo,t
where the landing price of fuel, Plo,t, is the current world price of fuel expressed in local currency.
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where Ph,t represents the price of domestically produced goods, Pf,t is the price of imported
goods (expressed in domestic currency) and Pno,t is the core consumption price index. The
corresponding equations for the aggregate consumer price index, Pt, and core consumption
price index, Pno,t, are standard as follows:
Pt =
[




1−ηo , Pno,t =
[






We consider two types of consumers in the model economy: Ricardian (R) and non-Ricardian
(NR). The Ricardian consumers comprise a fraction (γR) who are optimisers and have
unconstrained access to the financial markets. A representative household in this category is
able to smooth its consumption over time by buying and selling financial assets without any
form of constraints (Galí, 2018). On the other hand, the non-Ricardian consumers represent
the remaining fraction (1 − γR) who are non-optimisers and financially constrained. Thus,
they completely consume their labour income within the period (Gabriel et al., 2010; Melina
et al., 2016). However, both categories of households have identical preferences as each
representative household derives utility from private consumption, Ct, and dis-utility from
labour, Nt.
In order to make inter-temporal consumption and savings decisions, the representative

















where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator, the superscript R indicates that
the household is Ricardian, CRt is the representative household’s current level of consumption,
Ct is the economy-wide consumption level, NRt is the number of hours worked, β ∈ (0, 1)
is a discount factor, σ is relative risk aversion coefficient, and φ > 0 is the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply. While equation (4.3) is separable in both consumption
goods and labour effort, we assume that consumption is subject to external habit formation,
implying that the habit stock is proportional to aggregate past consumption. The parameter
ϕc ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption.
The representative Ricardian household makes its inter-temporal decisions by maximising
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equation (4.3) subject to a per period budget constraint:
PtC
R












t + Rh,tKh,t + Bt + εtB
∗
t + Dt − TXt. (4.4)
On the right hand side of equation (4.4), the Ricardian consumer earns labour income,
WtN
R
t , by supplying NRt hours of work at a nominal wage rate, Wt. The household also
earns rental income, Rh,tKh,t, by leasing an amount of non-oil capital, Kh,t, to the domestic
(non-oil) firms at a rental rate, Rh,t. The household receives an aliquot share, Dt, from the
profits of the firms and enters the period with the stock of nominal domestic bonds, Bt,
and foreign bonds, B∗t , which mature in period t + 1. Bt+1 and B∗t+1 represent household’s
investments in domestic and foreign bonds at the end of period t, respectively; while the
nominal exchange rate is denoted by εt. Each domestic bond pays a gross nominal rate of
return, Rt, in domestic currency while its foreign counterpart pays an exchange rate adjusted
nominal rate of return, R∗t . We allow for domestic risk premium, µt, over the monetary
policy rate when households hold domestic assets as well as a stochastic disturbance term
that represents the risk premium faced by households when borrowing abroad, µ∗t (Hollander
et al., 2018; Smets and Wouters, 2007). It is assumed that both µt and µ∗t evolve as first order
autoregressive processes with an exogenous shock. On the expenditure side, the household
purchases consumption goods, CRt , at the cost of Pt per unit; and non-oil investment goods,
Ino,t, at the cost of Pi,t per unit. Lastly, TXt represents per-capita lump-sum net taxes from
the government.
The non-oil investment goods, Ino,t, comprise home-produced, Ih,t, and foreign-produced,
















where γi is the share of imports in aggregate non-investment goods and ηi is the elasticity of
intra-temporal substitution between domestically produced and imported investment goods.
Minimising the representative Ricardian household’s cost subject to equation (4.5) yields the
demand equations for home-produced and imported investment goods as follows:





















Finally, the representative Ricardian household accumulates non-oil capital as follows:








where parameter 0 < δh < 1 represents the capital depreciation rate. The investment




















where χ ≥ 0 is the sensitivity parameter governing the size of adjustment cost. The details of
the optimisation problem yielding the equations for consumption Euler, demand for foreign
bonds, supply of capital, and demand for investment are presented in Appendix C.1.
Non-Ricardian consumers
In view of the fact that the non-Ricardian consumers are incapable of inter-temporal optim-
isation, we assume that the representative consumer in that category chooses its consump-


















t − TXt. (4.9)
Labour packer and wage setting
Each household, j, supplies its differentiated labour, Nt (j), in a monopolistic market to a
representative firm that aggregates the different labour types into a single labour input, Nt,













where the elasticity of substitution between differentiated jobs is represented by parameter
ηw. The labour-aggregating firm’s profit is maximised subject to equation (4.10) in order to
obtain the demand equation for differentiated labour, Nt (j), and the aggregate wage level,
















We assume that a fraction of households, 1 − θw, is chosen at random to optimally set
their wages in each period while the remaining fraction, θw, keeps their wages at the previous
period’s level. Each household who is able to optimally reset its wage contract evaluates the
disutility of labour relative to the utility arising from its labour income. Thus, the optimal
wage setting problem involves maximising equation (4.3) subject to the household budget
constraint as well as the demand for the differentiated labour. This yields the optimal reset
wage equation given by:
















where W •t (j) is the optimal reset wage, and θw measures the degree of nominal wage rigidity.










Following Medina and Soto (2016), we make a simplifying assumption that the non-Ricardian
households set wages equal to the average wage set by the Ricardian households. Finally, we




t + (1− γR)CNRt , (4.14)
Nt = γRN
R
t + (1− γR)NNRt , (4.15)
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4.3.2 Firms
There are four categories of firms operating in the economy, namely: the final goods firm, the
intermediate goods producing firms, the foreign goods importing firms and the oil-producing
firm. The economic environments in which each of these firms operate are discussed next.
Final goods firms: These perfectly competitive firms produce final goods, Yh,t, by bund-
ling domestically produced differentiated goods, Yh,t (zh), using a constant returns to scale











where parameter ϵh > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among different intermediate
goods. The first-order condition for the firm’s optimization problem yields a standard down-
ward sloping demand function for intermediate inputs, Yh,t (zh) , as well as the corresponding
















where Ph,t (zh) is the price charged on each intermediate good, zh, produced by an interme-
diate goods producing firm. The demand for export-bound intermediate goods, Y ∗h,t (zh), as
well as the corresponding price aggregator, P ∗h,t, can be derived in an analogous manner.
Intermediate goods firms: There is a continuum of intermediate goods firms, indexed
by zh ∈ [0, 1] producing differentiated goods in a monopolistically competitive environment.
Each representative intermediate-goods firm combines capital, refined oil (which is imported
from abroad) and labour using a constant returns to scale technology as follows:




where Yh,t (zh) is the output of the intermediate firm zh; Kh,t (zh) represents capital input;
Oh,t (zh) is refined fuel; and Nt (zh) denotes the labour input. The parameters 1 > αkh > 0,
1 > αoh > 0 and 1 > αnh > 0 are elasticities of the intermediate firm’s output with respect
to capital, refined oil and labour inputs, respectively. Under the assumption of constant
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returns to scale, αkh + αoh + αnh = 1. The total factor productivity, Ah,t, follows a first order




. We solve the
optimization problem of the intermediate goods producers in two stages. In the first stage,
each firm chooses its input factors to minimize total cost
min
Nt(zh),Kh,t(zh),Ot(zh)
WtNt (zh) +Rh,tKh,t (zh) + Pro,tOh,t (zh) , (4.19)
subject to equation (4.18). The first order conditions yield the optimal input combinations,
which are then substituted into the production function to derive an expression for the real













where mct = MCtPt is the real marginal cost, rh,t =
Rh,t
Pt




is the real domestic price of imported fuel (which is determined based on a
pricing rule, wt = WtPt is the real wage, and ph,t =
Ph,t
Pt
is the real price of domestically
produced goods.
In the second stage, the intermediate goods producers maximize their expected discoun-
ted profits by choosing the price at which they sell their goods. Following Calvo’s (1983)
staggered pricing model, we allow a proportion of the intermediate goods producing firms,
(1− θh), to reset their prices optimally in any given period while the other fraction, θh, who
are unable to re-optimise their prices maintain the price at last fixing. Profit maximisation
subject to the demand for intermediate goods (shown in equation 4.17) yields the optimal















where θh ∈ [0, 1] is an index of price stickiness (Calvo, 1983) and P •h,t represents the optimal






h,t−1 + (1− θh)
(
P •h,t
)1−ϵh] 11−ϵh . (4.22)
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We allow for some firms to also produce intermediate goods that can be bundled for the
export market. Thus, in an analogous manner, profit maximisation subject to the demand
for intermediate goods meant for the export market, Y ∗h,t (zh) , yields an optimal reset price,
P ∗•h,t, for such a commodity while the associated Calvo parameter is denoted as θhf .
The import goods retailers: As in Medina and Soto (2007), we ameliorate the expendit-
ure switching effect of exchange rate movements by allowing for incomplete exchange rate
pass-through into import prices in the short-run through local-currency price stickiness.
Thus, a group of perfectly competitive assemblers produce a final foreign good, Yf,t, by
combining a continuum of differentiated imported varieties, Yf,t (zf ), using a Dixit-Stiglitz











where the parameter ϵf > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among different im-
ported goods. The first-order condition for the firm’s optimization problem, which entails
maximising the import goods retailers’ profit function subject to the aggregation technology
in equation (4.23) yields a downward sloping demand function for imported intermediate
goods, Yf,t (zf ), and a corresponding price index for imported goods, Pf,t, given as:














where Pf,t (zf ) is the price charged on an imported intermediate product,zf . In turn, each
import goods retailer has monopoly power to determine the domestic price of their varieties,
albeit infrequently as in Calvo (1983). The frequency at which prices can be optimally reset
is guided by a price stickiness parameter, θf . Thus, an importing firm has a probability, θf ,
of keeping the price of its good fixed in the next period and a probability, 1−θf , of optimally
resetting its price. For a firm that can reset its price, P •f,t (zf ), it does so by maximising
the present value of its expected profits. Thus, by law of large numbers, the pricing rule for





f,t−1 + (1− θf )
(
P •f,t
)1−ϵf] 11−ϵf . (4.24)
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The oil firm: The representative oil firm combines materials sourced from the domestic
economy, Mt, and oil-related capital, Ko,t, to produce oil output, Yo,t. The oil output is sold
in the international crude oil market at a price, p∗o,t. The firm employs a constant return to






where Ao,t represents the oil technology and the parameters αko and αmo ∈ (0, 1) represent the
elasticities of oil output with respect to oil-related capital and material inputs, respectively.
We assume that the oil-related capital is accumulated by foreign direct investment, FDI∗t ,
as follows:
Ko,t = (1− δo)Ko,t−1 + FDI∗t , (4.26)
where δo represents the rate at which oil-related capital depreciates. Foreign direct invest-




)ρfdi (p∗o,t)1−ρfdi , (4.27)
where parameter ρfdi measures the extent of inertia in the accumulation of foreign direct
investment. We assume that the real international price of oil and the oil technology evolve

















As in Algozhina (2015), we assume that the oil firm (which is jointly owned by foreign direct
investors and the government) receives its revenues net of royalties levied by government on
production quantity at a rate τ as follows: Πo,t = (1− τ) εtp∗o,tYo,t.
4.3.3 Open economy features
The domestic economy being modelled in this paper is a small open economy, implying that
activities in the foreign economy are not impacted by developments in the domestic economy.
The relationship between the small open economy and the rest of the world is described in
this section.
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Real exchange rate, terms of trade and incomplete pass-through: Following Mon-
acelli (2005), we assume law of one price gap such that importing firms have some power in
the determination of the prices of their goods. The law of one price gap, Ψt, is given by the








where P ∗t is aggregate consumer price index of the foreign economy, Pf,t is the average price
of imported goods in terms of domestic currency and εt is the nominal exchange rate. We
assume that law of one price holds for exports but not for imports. The real exchange
rate, qt, is defined as the ratio of foreign price index expressed in domestic currency to the







We can re-write the equation for the law of one price gap (equation 4.29) by making use of





where pf,t = Pf,tPt denotes the real price of imported goods
7. Also, log-linearising equation
(4.30) and taking the rate of change yields an equation for the evolution of the real exchange
rate, qt, presented in equation (C.89), Appendix C.2. Finally, we define the terms of trade,
St, of the domestic economy as the domestic currency price of imports, Pf,t, relative to the





and log-linearised as in equation (C.90), Appendix C.2.
International risk sharing: The domestic consumption is linked with foreign consump-
tion by assuming that agents in the rest of the world have access to the same set of bonds and
6The law of one price gap, Ψt, takes the value of one if the law of one price (LOP) holds.
7Variables in small letters are in real terms, deflated by the aggregate consumer price index, Pt
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share the same preferences with their domestic counterparts. Thus, a condition analogous




















Simplifying equation (4.33) and making use of the definition of the real exchange rate, qt, in
equation (4.30) yields the international risk sharing equation as follows:








where ϱ represents a constant that depends on the relative initial conditions in asset holdings








as in Gali and Monacelli (2005).
4.3.4 Policy rules
Fiscal policy
Each period, the government receives revenues from lump-sum tax, TXt, issues one period
bonds that results in a net debt position, Bt, and receives oil revenues in form of royalties
from the oil firm, ORt. The revenues are used to finance government expenditure on public
goods, Gc,t, and service debt, Bt+1Rt . Finally, when the need arises, the government makes
subsidy payments, OSt, within a framework that allows for the stabilisation of domestic fuel
price. The government’s budget constraint is given by




Equation (4.35) shows that an increase in government spending, Gc,t, can be financed either
by increasing taxes, generating more oil revenues or issuing more debt. As in Medina and
Soto (2007), we assume that government consumption basket consists of imported goods,


















where ηg is the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically produced goods
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consumed by government and γg is the share of foreign goods in government’s consumption
basket. The demands for home and foreign goods are derived by minimising government’s
consumption cost subject to equation (4.36). This yields:






















where Pg,t is the deflator of government expenditure. In order to allow for fuel consumption
subsidy in the small open economy, we follow Allegret and Benkhodja (2015). We assume
that aggregate refined oil, Ot, is produced abroad and imported into the small open eco-
nomy at a landing price, Plo,t, (i.e. the cost of importing a litre of fuel into the domestic
economy, expressed in domestic currency) by the government. In turn, the government sells











The variable P ∗o,t is the foreign currency price of oil abroad, εt is the nominal exchange
rate and Ψot is the law of one price gap associated with the import price of fuel. The
parameter 0 < ν < 1 governs the extent to which government subsidises fuel consumption.
When ν = 1, the implicit subsidy regime seizes to exist while ν = 0 implies complete price
regulation. Thus, the implicit fuel subsidy payment by government is given by the difference
between the value of fuel imports expressed in domestic currency and the amount realised
from fuel sales in the domestic economy as follows:
OSt = (Plo,t − Pro,t)Ot, (4.40)
8This is similar to the specification in Poghosyan and Beidas-Strom (2011)
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where total imported fuel (Ot) comprises fuel consumption by households, Co,t, and con-
sumption by domestic firms, Oh,t. On the revenue side of the budget constraint (Equation
4.35), the government collects lump-sum taxes and oil revenues. The amount of oil revenue,




where τ is the royalty rate on oil production quantity, Yo,t denotes oil output, and εt is the
nominal exchange rate. Following Algozhina (2015), we consider backward looking fiscal
policy reaction functions that allow government consumption and tax level to respond to
lagged debt and output. In addition, we allow taxes and government consumption to respond
to oil revenue and oil subsidy payments. Thus, our linearised benchmark fiscal policy rules
are specified as follows:
g̃c,t = ρgg̃c,t−1 + (1− ρg)
[
ωbb̃t−1 + ωgyỹt−1 + ωosõst + ωorõrt
]
+ ξGct , (4.42)
t̃xt = ρtxt̃xt−1 + (1− ρtx)
[
φbb̃t−1 + φyỹt−1 + φosõst + φorõrt
]
+ ξtxt , (4.43)
where the parameters ρg and ρtx represent the degree of smoothing in government spending
and tax rules, respectively. The parameters ωb, ωgy, ωos and ωor are government consump-
tion feedback coefficients with respect to lagged domestic debt, lagged output, oil subsidy
payments and oil revenues, respectively. In equation (4.43), taxes respond to lagged debt,
lagged output, oil subsidy payments and oil revenues with feedback parameters φb , φy , φos
and φor, respectively. Tax shock and government spending shock are represented by ξtxt and
ξGct respectively, and given by an exogenous process.
A negative value for φor implies revenue substitution between tax and oil revenues. The
notion of Ricardian equivalence requires that increasing debt levels are associated with higher
taxes and lower government consumption (i.e. φb > 0, ωb < 0). This parameter combination
implies passive fiscal policy where deficit shocks are financed with future taxes (Leeper, 1991).
A combination of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy espouses the monetary
dominance view under which monetary shocks drive prices and fiscal shocks are immaterial.
According to Leeper (2005), such a policy equilibrium is appropriate for the implementation
of an interest rate-based inflation targeting regime. On the other hand, a parameter com-
bination of the form φb < 0, ωb > 0 connotes active fiscal policy; a situation where the fiscal
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authority fails to adjust taxes strongly enough in response to deficit shocks and government
expenditure does not adjust in a manner that stabilises debt. A combination of passive
monetary policy and active fiscal policy represents a unique equilibrium that is consistent
with the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) proposed by Woodford (1995). Under such
an equilibrium, inflation is seen as both a fiscal and monetary phenomenon.
In order to explore the idiosyncrasies of monetary-fiscal interactions in small open resource-
rich economies, we exclude resource-related flows from the fiscal rules specified above and
compare our results. Thus, in addition to equations (4.42) and (4.43), we consider the
following alternative fiscal policy rules:




+ ξGct , (4.44)




+ ξtxt . (4.45)
Equations (4.44) and (4.45) are similar to the rules specified in Leeper (1991) and Traum
and Yang (2011).
Monetary policy
The central bank follows a simple Taylor rule in setting the short term nominal interest rate,
Rt. Thus, the linearised monetary policy rule is specified as follows:
R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t] + ξrt , (4.46)
where the central bank responds to aggregate inflation, πt = PtPt−1 ; domestic output, yh,t;
and real exchange rate, qt. The parameter ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter
capturing monetary policy inertia. The parameters ωπ, ωy and ωq are the policy coefficients
chosen by the central bank with respect to inflation, domestic output and real exchange
rate, respectively. The monetary policy shock, ξrt , is assumed independent and identically
distributed (iid). Equation (4.46) is consistent with a managed floating exchange rate regime
(Sangare, 2016).
In line with the Taylor principle, the feedback coefficient on inflation is expected to be
greater than unity, i.e. ωπ > 1. Under such circumstance, the monetary authority is uncon-
strained and can thus respond strongly to inflation in order to achieve price stability. This
is consistent with the notion of active monetary policy in the categorisation of equilibrium
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policies by Leeper (1991). On the other hand, monetary policy is passive if it is constrained
by private and fiscal policy behaviour in such a way that money stock is allowed to respond
to deficit shocks, ωπ < 1, (Leeper, 1991). In this case, the fiscal authority independently
determines its budget while the monetary authority is required to adjust monetary policy in
order to satisfy the government budget constraint. This is usually the case when the central
bank pursues macroeconomic objectives other than price stability, such as output growth.
4.3.5 Market clearing and aggregation
Domestic output, Yh,t, is absorbed by household’s consumption of domestically produced
goods, Ch,t; materials input used up by oil producing firms, Mt; government consumption
of domestically produced goods, Gh,t; non-oil exports, C∗h,t; and domestic investment9, Ih,t.
Consequently, the domestic resource constraint is given by Ph,tYh,t = Ph,tCh,t + εtP ∗h,tC∗h,t +
Ph,tMt+Ph,tIh,t+Ph,tGh,t. On the other hand, the aggregate GDP, Yt, which combines both
oil (Yo,t) and non-oil output (Yh,t) is given by PtYt = Ph,tYh,t + εtP ∗o,tYo,t + IMt = Ph,tCh,t +
Ph,tMt+Ph,tIh,t+Ph,tGh,t+NXt. Net exports (NXt) is given by NXt = EXt− IMt, where
EXt is aggregate exports and IMt represents aggregate imports. Aggregate exports, EXt,
comprises oil exports (EXo,t measured as εtP ∗o,tYo,t) and non-oil exports (EXno,t measured
as εtP ∗h,tC∗h,t). Similarly, aggregate imports, IMt, comprises oil imports (IMo,t measured
as Plo,tOt) and non-oil imports (IMno,t measured as Pf,tYf,t); where the quantity of non-oil
goods import into the economy is given by: Yf,t = Cf,t + If,t + Gf,t. Setting the current










t−1 + nxt − (1− τ) qtp∗o,tyo,t + qtfdi∗t , (4.47)














Overall, the small open economy is driven by twelve stochastic shocks relating to real
international oil price (ξp
∗
o
t ), oil sector productivity (ξaot ), law of one price gap in oil price
(ξψ
o
t ), domestic total factor productivity (ξ
ah
t ), domestic monetary policy (ξrt ), government
9Which is used to augment the stock of physical capital available for use in the production process in
period t+ 1
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consumption (ξGct ), tax (ξtxt ), domestic risk premium (ξ
µ
t ), domestic supply (ξ
πh
t ), foreign
monetary policy (ξr∗t ), foreign inflation (ξπ
∗
t ), and foreign risk premium (ξ
µ∗
t ).
4.3.6 Rest of the world








where P ∗h,t is the price of domestically produced goods in foreign currency, P ∗t is the aggregate
consumer price index in the foreign economy, and C∗t is aggregate foreign consumption. The
parameter, η∗, represents the foreign price elasticity of demand for domestic goods while
the share of domestic goods in foreign consumption is captured by γ∗. The IS curve for the














where ϕ∗c is the habit formation parameter in the foreign economy and σ∗ is the relative risk
aversion coefficient. The variables C∗t , R∗t and π∗t represent consumption, interest rate and
inflation rate in the foreign economy. The central bank in the foreign economy sets interest
rate in a similar fashion as the domestic economy by following a Taylor rule. The linearised
monetary policy rule for the foreign economy is specified as follows:
R̃∗t = ρr∗R̃
∗











where ρr∗ represents the interest rate smoothing parameter in the foreign economy while ωπ∗
and ωy∗ are the feedback coefficients for inflation and output, respectively. Bars denote the
steady state levels of the variables and ξr∗t represents monetary policy shock in the foreign
economy. Finally, inflation rate in the foreign economy is assumed to follow an AR (1)
process as follows: π∗t =
(
π∗t−1




The Bayesian methodology outlined in Schorfheide (2000) is used to estimate a log-linearised
version of our model. This modelling approach is useful for combining the robust micro
foundations of the model with an intuitive probabilistic distribution of the observables (Smets
and Wouters, 2007). Also, Bayesian estimation facilitates the estimation of the key structural
parameters of the model by allowing for the incorporation of additional information on the
model parameters in the form of prior distributions.
In the first step towards estimating our model, we solve the system of linear rational
expectations equations by casting our log-linearized set of equations presented in Appendix
C.2 into a canonical form that conforms with the solution method proposed by Sims (2002).
After the solution is obtained, measurement equations are added in order to link the observ-
able variables to the vector of state variables in a state-space representation. We use data
on fifteen variables: yt, ct, ino,t, qt, πt, πno,t, rt, y∗t , π∗t , r∗t , p∗o,t, bt, txt, gc,t, yo,t, while the remain-
ing variables are assumed to be unobserved. The choice of observable variables are guided
by data availability as well as the need to properly identify certain structural and policy
parameters that are of specific interest to our empirical investigation.
The measurement equations are used to construct the likelihood function (i.e. the prob-
ability of observing the data given the model parameters) for the structural parameters via
Kalman filter10. The likelihood function is then combined with the prior distribution of the
parameters in order to obtain the posterior density function. Finally, we numerically derive
the posterior distribution of the parameters from the posterior density by running two par-
allel chains and generating 150,000 draws in each chain based on the Metropolis-Hastings
Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm. We discard 30 per cent of the first draws
as burn-in.
4.4.2 Data
The model developed in the previous section is estimated for the Nigerian economy using
73 quarterly observations on 15 selected macroeconomic variables over the sample period of
10This is computed under the assumption of normally distributed disturbances.
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2000Q2 - 2018Q2 11. Nigeria represents the small open economy in our model set up while
the rest of the world consists of Nigeria’s major trading partners of the Euro area, the United
States, and India12.
The domestic variables, which relate to the Nigerian economy are: per capita real do-
mestic GDP (yh,t), per capita real consumption (ct), per capita real investment (ino,t), real
effective exchange rate (qt), headline consumer price index (pt), core consumer price index
(pno,t), nominal interest rate (Rt), oil output (yo,t), government debt (bt), tax revenue (txt)
and government consumption (gc,t). We use data on the three fiscal variables (i.e. bt, txt, gc,t)
as well as two oil sector variables (p∗o,t, yo,t) for the model estimation in order to properly
identify the parameters in the fiscal policy rule and generate plausible characterisation of the
macroeconomic policy mix. Data set on the domestic variables are sourced from the National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistics database.
The foreign economy variables include trade-weighted foreign real GDP per capita (y∗t ),
trade-weighted foreign aggregate CPI (P ∗t ), trade-weighted foreign interest rate (R∗t ), and
the real international price of oil (P ∗o,t). The data set used for the computation of the trade-
weighted foreign variables as well as the international price of oil are retrieved from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
We carry out necessary transformations on the data set in order to make them model
consistent. First, we demean and deseasonalise relevant variables. Since the variables implied
by our model are stationary, we remove trend from the data by taking first difference in the
logarithm of the variables with the exception of the domestic and foreign interest rates. In
order to avoid the problem of stochastic singularity when evaluating the likelihood function
(and also to account for possible inaccuracies in national accounts data for the domestic
economy), we balance the number of observables with the number of stochastic disturbances
in our model by incorporating four measurement errors relating to domestic output (ξyobst ),
consumption (ξcobst ), investment (ξiobst ), and oil output (ξ
yoobs
t ).
11The choice of the estimation sample is largely influenced by data availability for the domestic economy.
12These three regions account for about 65 per cent of Nigeria’s total external trade over the last two
decades. In the normalised weights for the computation of the foreign variables, the Euro area is predominant




The values of the calibrated parameters are presented in Table 4.1. The parametrization is
done to fit quarterly data with values borrowed from standard values assumed by Gali and
Monacelli (2005) for small open economies. We also took values from studies on resource-
rich emerging economies, such as Romero (2008), Wolden-Bache et al. (2008), Hove et al.
(2015), Ferrero and Seneca (2019), and Iklaga (2017). We set the discount factor, β, equal
to 0.99 (Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 2017); the depreciation rate, δ, equal to
0.025 (Algozhina, 2015; Allegret and Benkhodja, 2015; Iklaga, 2017); the share of imports in
household’s investment, γi, equal to 0.2; and the share of imports in household’s consumption,
γc, equal to 0.35 in line with sample data and close to 0.4 assumed by Gali and Monacelli
(2005).
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Definition Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.990
Depreciation rate in both the oil and non-oil sectors δh = δo 0.025
Share of imports in household’s consumption γc 0.400
Share of fuel in household’s consumption γo 0.085
Share of imports in household’s investment γi 0.200
Calvo - wages θw 0.750
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital αkh 0.330
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to oil αoh 0.120
Elasticity of domestic output with respect to labour αnh 0.550
Elasticity of oil output with respect to capital αko 0.700
Elasticity of oil output with respect to materials αmo 0.300
Share of imports in government’s consumption γg 0.120
Elasticity of substitution between foreign & domestic goods - Govt. ηg 0.600
Share of household fuel consumption in total fuel imports γco 0.750
Persistence in oil sector foreign direct investment process ρfdi 0.300
Calvo - exports goods θhf 0.700
Foreign relative risk aversion σ∗ 1.000
Foreign habit formation ϕ∗c 0.000
Intra-temporal elasticity in foreign demand ηc∗h 0.790
Coefficient of inflation in Taylor Rule - foreign economy ωπ∗ 1.500
Coefficient of output in Taylor Rule - foreign economy ωy∗ 0.500
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Furthermore, we set the elasticity of domestic output with respect to capital, αkh, equal
to 0.33 (Algozhina, 2015; Rasaki and Malikane, 2015); elasticity of domestic output with
respect to labour, αnh, equal to 0.55 (Ncube and Balma, 2017); elasticity of oil output with
respect to capital, αko , equal to 0.7 (Algozhina, 2015); elasticity of oil output with respect
to materials, αmo , equal to 0.3 (Algozhina, 2015; Ferrero and Seneca, 2019), elasticity of
substitution between foreign and domestic goods consumed by government, ηg, equal to 0.6
(Hollander et al., 2018).
Table 4.2: Steady state ratios
Ratio Symbol Value
Domestic consumption to domestic output C̄h/Ȳh 0.690
Investment to domestic output Īno/Ȳh 0.150
Domestic materials to domestic output M̄/Ȳh 0.010
Government consumption to domestic output Ḡc/Ȳh 0.070
Non-oil export to output C̄∗h/Ȳh 0.070
Import to domestic output ¯IM/Ȳh 0.150
Share of non-oil export in aggregate export 1−Ȳo/ĒX 0.050
Share of oil in GDP ȲO/Ȳ 0.260
Fiscal debt to oil revenue B̄/ŌR 0.700
Taxes to oil revenue ¯TX/ŌR 0.050
Government consumption to oil revenue ¯pgGc/ŌR 0.700
Non-oil imports to total import C̄f/ ¯IM 0.400
Fuel import to total import Ō/ ¯IM 0.300
Oil sector foreign direct investment to net exports ¯qFDI/N̄X 0.300
Exports to net exports ĒX/N̄X 0.600
Imports to net exports 1−ĒX/N̄X 0.400
Foreign debt service payments to net exports ¯qB∗R∗/N̄X 0.020
Foreign debt to net exports ¯qB∗/N̄X 0.3112
Oil profit repatriation to net exports (1−τ) ¯qP ∗o Yo/N̄X 0.600
Public goods imports to total import Ḡf/ ¯IM 0.050
Fuel subsidy payments to oil revenue ŌS/ŌR 0.200
Fuel sales value to fuel subsidy payments ¯ProO/ŌS 0.300
Domestic debt service payments to oil revenue ¯B/R/ŌR 0.020
Fuel import value to fuel subsidy payments ¯qP ∗oO/ŌS 0.300
The foreign economy’s monetary policy reaction to inflation, ωπ∗ , is set equal to 1.50
(Hollander et al., 2018) while the response to output, ωy∗ , is set to 0.50 (Hollander et al.,
2018). The second category of parameters were calibrated so as to match the corresponding
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data sample mean while the last set of parameters correspond to the implied steady state
values from the model setup. The steady state ratios reported in Table 4.2 are derived using
data for the Nigerian economy spanning the last three decades.
Prior moments
Table 4.3 presents the prior distributions for the parameters to be estimated. The priors
relating to parameters for the small open economy were formed partly based on the data and
Iklaga (2017) while those for the foreign economy are based on Smets and Wouters (2007).
In cases where limited information is available to form credible priors, we allow such priors
to have a more diffuse distribution than those typically found in related literature.
Of particular interest to our study are the parameters in the monetary and fiscal policy
rules. The reaction coefficients in the monetary policy function are assumed to follow gamma
distributions with the coefficient for inflation (ωπ) centered at 1.5 while the coefficients for
output (ωy) and real exchange rate (ωq) are each set to 0.125 (Iklaga, 2017; Smets and
Wouters, 2007). Most of the parameters relating to the fiscal rules are based on Algozhina
(2015) as follows: response of lump-sum taxes to fiscal debt, φb, (0.40), response of lump-sum
taxes to fuel subsidy payments, φos, (0.10), and response of lump-sum taxes to oil revenue,
φor, (0.30). The assumed priors for the response of government consumption to debt, oil
revenue, and fuel subsidies are set to -0.30, 0.00, and 0.8, respectively. Following Cebi (2012),
we assume zero priors for the responses of the fiscal rules to output in a bid to allow the
data reveal the nature of fiscal cyclicality in the resource-rich economy.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 4.3 reports the prior and posterior distributions for the estimated structural and policy
parameters. The estimates for the shock persistence parameters and the standard deviation
of shocks are presented in Table C.1 of Appendix C.3. The parameter for labour supply
elasticity, φ, which controls the response of hours to structural shocks is estimated at 1.47.
This is is slightly higher than the assumed prior of 1.45. At 1.35, the estimated relative risk
aversion parameter (σ) implies that the response of savings/investment decision of households
to structural shocks is not as high as 2.0 initially assumed. It is, however, higher than the
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1.31 obtained by Iklaga (2017) for the Nigerian economy and lower that the value of 1.38
estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US economy. At ϕc = 0.41, the estimated
consumption habit parameter is lower than the assumed 0.70 and the value of 0.71 estimated
by Iklaga (2017).
Table 4.3: Prior and posterior estimates for the full sample, 2000Q2-2018Q2
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distributionDensity Mean Std Dev Mean 90% HPD Int.
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: γR Beta 0.60 0.10 0.438 0.310 0.574
Labour supply elasticity: φ Gamma 1.45 0.10 1.473 1.312 1.631
Relative risk aversion: σ Inv. Gamma 2.00 0.40 1.347 1.077 1.596
External habit: ϕc Beta 0.70 0.10 0.413 0.285 0.538
Investment adj. cost: χ Gamma 4.00 3.00 2.995 1.076 4.800
Fuel pricing parameter: ν Beta 0.30 0.10 0.338 0.113 0.553
Oil - core cons. elast.: ηo Gamma 0.20 0.10 0.158 0.038 0.272
For. - dom. cons. elast.: ηc Gamma 0.60 0.20 0.631 0.295 0.945
For. - dom. inv. elast.: ηi Gamma 0.60 0.20 0.613 0.297 0.919
Calvo - domestic prices: θh Beta 0.70 0.10 0.592 0.463 0.732
Calvo - import prices: θf Beta 0.70 0.10 0.594 0.432 0.758
Monetary policy parameters
Taylor, π: ωπ Gamma 1.500 0.20 2.866 2.588 3.141
Taylor, y: ωy Gamma 0.125 0.05 0.086 0.033 0.137
Taylor, q: ωq Gamma 0.125 0.05 0.127 0.040 0.209
Taylor, smoothing: ρr Beta 0.500 0.25 0.279 0.082 0.478
Fiscal policy rules parameters
Tax, b: φb Normal 0.40 1.00 -0.053 -1.158 1.114
Tax, or: φor Normal 0.30 1.00 -0.051 -0.333 0.235
Tax, os: φos Normal 0.10 1.00 0.836 0.343 1.283
Tax, y: φy Normal 0.00 0.50 0.107 -0.650 0.885
Tax, smoothing: ρtx Beta 0.50 0.25 0.539 0.370 0.718
Govt. Cons., b: ωb Normal -0.30 0.20 -0.171 -0.453 0.130
Govt. Cons., or: ωor Normal 0.00 0.20 1.207 1.156 1.265
Govt. Cons., os: ωos Normal 0.80 1.00 -0.047 -0.215 0.093
Govt. Cons., y: ωgy Normal 0.00 0.50 1.188 0.673 1.704
Govt. cons., smoothing: ρgc Beta 0.50 0.25 0.139 0.041 0.233
The elasticity of substitution between oil and non-oil goods, ηo, is estimated at 0.16,
which is slightly lower than the assumed prior value of 0.2. The elasticity of intra-temporal
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substitution between domestically produced and imported investment goods consumed by
the household, ηi, is estimated at 0.61, which is about the same value as the assumed prior
of 0.60.
The estimated Calvo price parameters for domestically produced goods and imported
goods are estimated at about 0.59, compared to their respective priors of 0.7. The fuel
pricing rule parameter, ν, which governs the extent to which government subsidises the
consumption of fuel in the domestic economy is estimated at about 0.34; implying a pass-
through of about 34.0 per cent from international oil price changes to domestic petrol price.
The estimated fuel pricing rule has implications for the evolution of domestic prices and the
response of monetary policy to an oil price shock.
Turning to the estimated monetary policy reaction function, equation (4.51) shows that
the feedback coefficient on inflation is about 2.07, implying that the CBN was quite aggressive
in responding to price inflation during the sample period. The estimated feedback coefficient
for inflation is higher than unity, which is consistent with the Taylor principle and the
active monetary policy argument of Leeper (1991). In addition to inflation, the monetary
authority responds to output and the exchange rate as their feedback coefficients in the
estimated Taylor rule are 0.06 and 0.09, respectively. At ρr = 0.28, the estimated interest
rate smoothing parameter is quite low, compared to the assumed prior of 0.5. It is, however,
slightly higher than 0.26 obtained by Medina and Soto (2005) for the Chilean economy, 0.27
obtained by Romero (2008) for the Mexican economy, and 0.20 estimated by Olayeni (2009)
for Nigeria over the 1986-2004 period.
R̃t = 0.279R̃t−1 + 2.066π̃t + 0.062ỹh,t + 0.092q̃t (4.51)
t̃xt = 0.539t̃xt−1 − 0.024b̃t−1 + 0.049ỹt−1 + 0.385õst − 0.023õrt (4.52)
g̃c,t = 0.139g̃c,t−1 − 0.147b̃t−1 + 1.023ỹt−1 − 0.041õst + 1.039õrt (4.53)
The estimated tax rule for the oil-producing emerging economy is shown in equation
(4.52). It reveals that the feedback parameter with respect to lagged debt, φb, is -0.02.
Though statistically insignificant (Table 4.3), the estimated negative response of taxes to
debt is contrary to expectation. This unexpected response reflects the weak domestic tax
systems in most resource rich emerging economies and highlights the revenue substitution
phenomenon discussed in Berg et al. (2013) and Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán (2003). The
responses of taxes to output, oil subsidy payments and oil revenues are estimated at 0.05,
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0.39 and -0.02, respectively. These imply that taxes rise in response to increased fuel subsidy
payments but falls with increased oil revenues. The estimated negative response of taxes
to oil revenues in equation (4.52) provides evidence of revenue substitution in the resource-
rich emerging economy, similar to the finding by Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán (2003) for
the Mexican economy. As shown in Table 4.3, only fuel subsidies turned out statistically
significant in the tax rule.
The estimated government spending rule presented in equation (4.53) indicates that the
response of government consumption to debt is -0.15. This implies that government con-
sumption declines with increased debt levels. This is consistent with the tenets of Ricardian
fiscal policy and in line with the passive fiscal policy characterisation of Leeper (1991). Also,
government spending responds positively to output (1.02), negatively to fuel subsidy pay-
ments (-0.04), and positively to oil revenues (1.04). It is important to note that the estimated
negative response of government spending to fuel subsidy payments implies that the subsidy
regime constrains the ability of fiscal policy to effectively drive aggregate demand in the
oil-producing emerging economy. Our results indicate that only oil revenue and output are
statistically significant in the estimated government spending rule (Table 4.3).
Since both taxes and government spending decrease with increasing debt levels, our
results suggest that government spending (which, as shown in equation (4.53) has a higher
fiscal feedback coefficient on debt) plays a non-trivial role in stabilising debt. Also, equations
(4.52) and (4.53) provide evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy as both taxes and government
spending rise with increased output. The degree of fiscal smoothing is higher in the tax
rule than in the government spending rule, contrary to the findings of Cebi (2012) for the
developed economy of Turkey. This further buttresses our view regarding the weak tax
systems in the resource-rich emerging economy and the active role of government spending
as a tool for debt stabilisation.
4.5.2 The effects of a negative oil price shock
In this section, we discuss the implications of a negative real international oil price shock
for selected real and nominal variables. We pay particular attention to how monetary and
fiscal policies respond to the shock. As shown in Figure 4.2, a 1.0 per cent negative shock to
the real international price of oil leads to a contraction of about 2 basis points in total GDP
upon impact. Since oil is included in the production technology of firms, real marginal cost
declines following a negative shock to real international oil price, causing domestic inflation
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to fall. However, the pass-through effects of the depreciated real exchange rate to domestic
prices causes imported goods inflation to rise. Thus, following a 1.0 per cent negative real
oil price shock, the combined effects of higher imported inflation and lower domestic prices
generates an increase of 0.5 basis points in core inflation. Similarly, the headline inflation
rises, albeit by a smaller magnitude than the core inflation.
In response to increased headline inflation, the CBN embarks on a contractionary mon-
etary policy with an initial interest rate hike of about 0.4 basis points. This is followed by
an interest rate cut that helps to boost output and consumption. The initial increase in
interest rate by the CBN exacerbates the contractionary impact of the oil price shock on
output. This highlights Ferrero and Seneca (2019)’s argument regarding the policy trade-off
confronting the monetary authority of small open resource-rich economies facing a negative
resource-price shock. In other words, the CBN faces the dilemma of stabilising either prices
or output in the aftermath of a negative real international oil price shock.
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Figure 4.2: Macroeconomic and policy responses to a negative real international oil price
shock
In terms of the responses of the fiscal variables, both government spending and taxes
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decline following a negative real oil price shock. The reduction in government spending in
response to lower oil revenues and aggregate output signifies fiscal pro-cyclicality, which is
consistent with the estimated equation (4.53) and the findings of Romero (2008) in a similar
study for the oil-exporting economy of Mexico. The observed weak response of taxes reflects
our earlier findings regarding the statistical insignificance of oil revenues in equation (4.52)
and the poor domestic tax mobilisation systems prevalent in most resource rich emerging
economies (Salti, 2008).
Following a negative oil price shock, the nominal interest rate rises initially but falls
subsequently, remaining below its steady state level for more than 20 quarters. This has
implications for the fiscal variables as a lower interest rate causes a reduction in debt. The
lower debt as well as the reduction in fiscal revenues arising from the negative oil price
shock provide impetus for the government to increase primary deficit. Thus, in rational
expectations equilibrium, primary deficit acts in a manner that stabilises debt. Whereas the
response of taxes is weak, government consumption falls strongly in response to the increased
primary deficit to ameliorate the deficit shock and stabilise debt.
4.5.3 Policy interactions before and after the 2008 GFC
This section examines whether the 2008/09 global financial crisis has implications for monetary-
fiscal interactions in the resource-rich economy. We partition the data sample into two as
follows: (i) pre-GFC sample, covering the period 2000Q2-2008Q4; and (ii) post-GFC sample,
covering the period 2009Q1-2018Q2. The model is fitted to the two data samples and we
compare our results, especially with regards to the estimated monetary and fiscal policy
rules. Table C.2 under Appendix C.3 reports the estimated structural and policy paramet-
ers for the two models while the estimated monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions are
summarised in equations (4.54) - (4.59).
The estimated monetary policy rules provide empirical evidence of an active monetary
policy in both the pre- and post-GFC periods, implying that the estimated monetary policy
reaction function obey the Taylor principle regardless of the occurrence of the GFC. However,
the pre-crisis period was associated with higher interest rate smoothing while the post-crisis
period was characterised by higher monetary policy responses to inflation, domestic output
and the real exchange rate. As shown in equations (4.54) and (4.57), the responses of
interest rate to inflation in the pre- and post-crisis periods were estimated at 1.33 and 1.63,
respectively. Thus, the CBN was more aggressive in containing inflation in the post-GFC
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period. This finding is further buttressed by the impulse responses of nominal interest rate
to an oil price shock presented in Figure 4.3.
Estimated policy rules for the pre-GFC period:
R̃t = 0.350R̃t−1 + 1.331π̃t + 0.092ỹh,t + 0.079q̃t (4.54)
t̃xt = 0.698t̃xt−1 − 0.014b̃t−1 + 0.032ỹt−1 + 0.074õst + 0.079õrt (4.55)
g̃c,t = 0.844g̃c,t−1 − 0.045b̃t−1 − 0.011ỹt−1 + 0.148õst + 0.029õrt (4.56)
Estimated policy rules for the post-GFC period:
R̃t = 0.267R̃t−1 + 1.625π̃t + 0.103ỹh,t + 0.098q̃t (4.57)
t̃xt = 0.281t̃xt−1 − 1.225b̃t−1 + 0.109ỹt−1 + 1.300õst + 0.106õrt (4.58)
g̃c,t = 0.064g̃c,t−1 − 0.140b̃t−1 + 0.371ỹt−1 − 0.067õst + 0.867õrt (4.59)
In terms of the tax rule, the estimated fiscal feedback coefficients on debt shown in
equations (4.55) and (4.58) indicate that taxes respond negatively to debt before and after
the GFC. This is contrary to theoretical expectation, but in line with our finding for the full
sample (equation (4.52)). This implies that the disturbances associated with the 2008 GFC
did not cause any significant change to tax policy in the resource-rich emerging economy.
However, the degree of tax smoothing is estimated to be higher in the pre-crisis sample, a
period of increasing oil prices. At an estimated value of about -1.23, the negative response
of taxes to debt was more elevated during the post-crisis period. In all, taxes were more
responsive to debt, output, fuel subsidies and oil revenues in the post-crisis period. As
shown in Figure 4.3, taxes appear to respond more to real international oil price shock in
the post-GFC period.
Turning to the government spending rule, equations (4.56) and (4.59) indicate that gov-
ernment spending falls in response to increasing debt levels. This is consistent with our
finding for the full sample (equation (4.53)) and in line with expectations. In other words,
government consumption acts to stabilise debt in both the pre- and post-GFC periods.
However, we note that government spending responds more to debt levels in the post-GFC
period; implying a more passive fiscal policy in the sense of Leeper (1991). As shown in
Figure 4.3, following a negative shock to real international oil price, both debt and govern-
ment consumption fall. However, as the negative effects of the oil price shock continues to
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taper off both in the pre- and post-GFC periods, government consumption falls further in
the post-GFC period as against the situation in the pre-GFC period.

















































































































































Figure 4.3: Impulse responses to a negative real international oil price shock, pre- and post-
global financial crisis periods
Also, government spending was substantially more persistent in the pre-GFC period; a
development that may not be unconnected with the favourable and stable oil prices recorded
during the period. Interestingly, while government spending was counter-cyclical during the
pre-GFC period (equation (4.56)), the positive feedback coefficient on output in the post-
GFC period imply a pro-cyclical fiscal policy regime (equation (4.59)). This is in line with
the impulse responses presented in Figure 4.3. Notably, the response of government spending
to fuel subsidy payments was positive in the pre-GFC period and negative in the post-GFC
period. While the positive response observed in the pre-GFC period is supported by the
steady rise in oil prices during the period, the negative feedback coefficient on fuel subsidies
in the post-GFC period is associated with episodic declines in global oil prices as well as
higher oil price volatility.
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4.5.4 Policy interactions under alternative fiscal rules
In this section, we investigate whether the nature of the fiscal rules considered in our bench-
mark model matters for monetary-fiscal interaction in the resource-rich economy. To this
end, we re-estimated our model under alternative fiscal rules that ignore oil-related flows
(i.e. oil revenues and fuel subsidy payments) as shown in equations (4.44) and (4.45). The
estimated parameters for the benchmark and alternative models are shown in Table C.3
under Appendix C.3 while the estimated monetary and fiscal reaction functions are reported
in equations (4.60) - (4.65).
Notably, the response of taxes to debt is sensitive to our alternative specifications re-
garding the conduct of fiscal policy. Whereas taxes respond negatively to increasing debt
under the benchmark specification in equation (4.61), we report a positive response under
the alternative model in equation (4.64). This result tends to suggest that the pursuit of
conservative fiscal rules may help resource-rich economies develop a more robust tax mo-
bilisation systems. Overall, results under the alternative model show that monetary policy
responds more actively to inflation while taxes respond positively to debt and government
consumption responds negatively to debt. The findings under the alternative model are
consistent with the results reported by Cebi (2012) for Turkey; and in line with the idea of
active monetary and passive fiscal policy of Leeper (1991).
Estimated policy rules under the model that includes oil related flows in the fiscal rules:
R̃t = 0.279R̃t−1 + 2.066π̃t + 0.062ỹh,t + 0.092q̃t (4.60)
t̃xt = 0.539t̃xt−1 − 0.024b̃t−1 + 0.049ỹt−1 + 0.385õst − 0.023õrt (4.61)
g̃c,t = 0.139g̃c,t−1 − 0.147b̃t−1 + 1.023ỹt−1 − 0.041õst + 1.039õrt (4.62)
Estimated policy rules under the model that excludes oil related flows from the fiscal rules:
R̃t = 0.243R̃t−1 + 2.126π̃t + 0.105ỹh,t + 0.086q̃t (4.63)
t̃xt = 0.643t̃xt−1 + 0.009b̃t−1 + 0.049ỹt−1 (4.64)
g̃c,t = 0.936g̃c,t−1 − 0.020b̃t−1 + 0.002ỹt−1 (4.65)
The monetary policy rule displays lower inertia and higher responses to inflation and
output under the alternative model. However, the response of monetary policy to the real
exchange rate is higher when resource-related flows are included in the fiscal rule. In other
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words, the response of fiscal policy to oil related flows imposes additional pressure on the
central bank to respond to exchange rate developments in the resource-rich emerging eco-
nomy.
The degree of fiscal smoothing in the tax rule is higher under the alternative model
while the response of taxes to output is the same under the two models. This provides
empirical evidence in support of the view that fiscal rules that ignore resource-relates flows
are associated with lower fiscal volatility. This also tend to suggest that the implement-
ation of a functional sovereign wealth fund in the resource-rich economy could engender
better macroeconomic stability. Similarly, government spending exhibit higher inertia once
resource-related flows are excluded from the fiscal rules. The implications of the alternative
fiscal rules for the response of the economy to an oil price shock are discussed next.













































































































































Benchmark model Alternative model
Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a negative real international oil price shock under alternative
fiscal rules
As shown in Figure 4.4, the contractionary impact of a negative oil price shock on ag-
gregate output is ameliorated under the mode that excludes oil-related flows from the fiscal
rules (alternative model). Furthermore, the fiscal rules that ignore oil-related flows yield
lower lower exchange rate depreciation and headline inflation. Monetary policy responds to
the lower headline inflation with an interest rate cut, which in turn attenuates the reduction
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in employment and boosts private consumption and non-oil GDP. These findings are in line
with the results reported by Medina and Soto (2016), which show that better macroeconomic
outcomes are achieved in the resource-rich economy of Chile once fiscal policy is muted to
commodity prices.
4.5.5 Policy interactions under alternative monetary policy rules
In view of the roles played by the exchange rate in the transmission of oil price shocks
to the resource-rich economy (Figure 4.2), we consider monetary-fiscal interactions under
two alternative assumptions regarding the central bank’s monetary policy reaction function.
These are: (i) a monetary policy rule that responds to real exchange rate as in our benchmark
model - managed floating exchange rate regime, and (ii) a monetary policy rule that does
not respond to real exchange rate depicted as the alternative model - floating exchange rate
regime (Sangare, 2016). The parameter estimates for the two models are reported in Table
C.4 under Appendix C.3 while the estimated monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions
are summarised in equations (4.66) - (4.71).
Estimated policy rules under the model that includes exchange rate in the Taylor rule:
R̃t = 0.279R̃t−1 + 2.066π̃t + 0.062ỹh,t + 0.092q̃t (4.66)
t̃xt = 0.539t̃xt−1 − 0.024b̃t−1 + 0.049ỹt−1 + 0.385õst − 0.023õrt (4.67)
g̃c,t = 0.139g̃c,t−1 − 0.147b̃t−1 + 1.023ỹt−1 − 0.041õst + 1.039õrt (4.68)
Estimated policy rules under the model that excludes exchange rate from the Taylor rule:
R̃t = 0.319R̃t−1 + 1.952π̃t + 0.061ỹh,t (4.69)
t̃xt = 0.543t̃xt−1 + 0.020b̃t−1 + 0.055ỹt−1 + 0.363õst − 0.034õrt (4.70)
g̃c,t = 0.125g̃c,t−1 − 0.146b̃t−1 + 1.039ỹt−1 − 0.066õst + 1.060õrt (4.71)
It is quite revealing that under a floating exchange rate regime (a Taylor rule that ex-
cludes real exchange rate), taxes respond positively to debt while government consumption
responds negatively to debt. These responses are in line with theoretical expectations, such
that both taxes and government spending act in a manner that stabilise debt. Thus, the
alternative model upholds the monetary dominance view for Nigeria, where fiscal policy is
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Ricardian and monetary policy obeys the Taylor principle. The estimated monetary policy
rules presented in equations (4.66) and (4.69) provide evidence of higher degree of interest
rate smoothing under the floating exchange rate regime (i.e. the alternative model), im-
plying lower interest rate volatility. The interest rate feedback coefficient on inflation is
lower under the alternative model while the responses of monetary policy to output under
the two models are about the same. Under both models, the size of the fiscal responses to
debt and output are similar. Similar to the findings under the benchmark model, equation
(4.70) shows that taxes decline with increasing oil revenues. This finding is in line with the
revenue substitution phenomenon highlighted by Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán (2003) for
the Mexican economy. Also, government consumption declines with increasing fuel subsidy
payments under the two models. This implies that increased subsidy payments constrains
fiscal space and limits the capacity of fiscal policy to drive desired macroeconomic objectives,
such as output stabilisation.
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Benchmark model Alternative model
Figure 4.5: Impulse responses to a negative real international oil price shock under alternative
Taylor rules
As shown in Figure 4.5, the impulse responses to a real international oil price shock under
the two models are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Following a negative oil price
shock, the the floating exchange rate regime yields a slightly more depreciated exchange
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rate, causing higher increases in the core and headline measures of inflation. Thus, a higher
headline inflation is observed under the alternative model. The central bank responds with
a relatively higher interest rate hike, which generates lower domestic inflation but comes at a
cost of lower employment, non-oil output and total GDP. Overall, while the alternative model
yields the desired response of taxes to debt, our results did not provide evidence of substantial
gains in terms of the overall response of the economy to a negative real international oil price
shock. In other words, regardless of whether monetary policy responds to real exchange rate
or not, an oil price shock has similar macroeconomic implications for the economy.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study monetary-fiscal interactions under a new-Keynesian DSGE model
of an oil exporting economy that accounts for three key characteristics. First, the domestic
economy is highly dependent on oil. Thus, we include fuel in the consumption basket of
households and the production technology of firms. Second, we allow for a fuel subsidy regime
that distorts domestic price signals and puts additional fiscal burden on the government.
Third, we specify fiscal rules that allows for the vulnerability of fiscal policy to resource-
related flows. The model is estimated for Nigeria using data on fifteen macroeconomic
variables for the period 2000Q2-2018Q2.
We document a number of useful results. First, we show that a negative shock to the real
price of oil contracts the aggregate GDP, depreciates the real exchange rate, and increases
headline inflation in the resource-rich emerging economy. The central bank responds with an
initial interest rate hike, while primary deficit increases. We report active monetary policy
and passive fiscal policy over the full sample. This implies a Ricardian fiscal policy and a
monetary policy reaction function that obeys the Taylor principle. To our knowledge, this
represents the first attempt at estimating the fiscal reaction function for Nigeria. Second,
the 2008/09 global financial crisis did not significantly alter the structure of monetary-
fiscal interaction in the RREE. However, both the monetary and fiscal policy rules are less
persistent in the post-crisis period while government spending was counter-cyclical in the
pre-crisis period.
Third, both taxes and government consumption fall in response to growing debt levels
under our benchmark model. Thus, government consumption causes primary deficit to
decline and acts to stabilise debt. However, once resource-related flows (oil revenues and fuel
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subsidy payments) are excluded from the fiscal rules, taxes respond positively to debt while
government spending responds negatively. These imply that fiscal rules that do not respond
to resource-related flows generate beneficial outcomes in terms of neutralising the revenue
substitution problem, activating the “automatic stabiliser” role of fiscal policy, reducing
fiscal pro-cyclicality, and enhancing overall macroeconomic stability in the small open oil-
producing economy. In other words, both taxes and government spending stabilise debt
under the alternative model consistent with the dictates of Ricardian fiscal policy. Fourth, an
alternative monetary policy rule under which the central bank does not respond to exchange
rate causes taxes to respond positively to increasing debt levels.
Future research efforts could benefit from a number of methodological and model exten-
sions. In terms of the methodology, the model could be adapted to study the interaction
between monetary and fiscal policy in resource rich economies using a Markov switching
DSGE model (Goncalves, Portugal and Aragon, 2016). This approach enables the study of
policy interactions under a setting that allows the parameters of the policy rules to switch
between active and passive regimes over time. Second, even though the tasks of monetary
and macro-prudential policies are conducted by the same institution in most economies, the
objectives of the two policies have been found to contradict at times, especially since the
occurrence of the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, extending the model developed in
this paper to allow for the joint analysis of monetary, fiscal, and macro-prudential policy has
a lot of appeal.
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Chapter 5
Key Findings and Directions for
Future Research
The dynamic effects of oil price shocks on oil-importing advanced economies have been
thoroughly investigated from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In contrast, the
literature on oil-producing emerging economies is relatively scanty and still evolving. In this
thesis, we argue that resource-rich emerging economies exhibit unique features that either
exacerbate their response to adverse terms of trade shocks or increase their vulnerabilities.
These include high dependence on oil as a source of energy, foreign exchange and fiscal
revenues; dependence on fuel importation due to low domestic refining capacity; inefficient
fuel consumption subsidy regimes; fiscal volatility and pro-cyclicality; revenue substitution;
presence of hand-to-mouth consumers; financial market inefficiencies; and high import de-
pendence. Ignoring some of these features in theoretical models of oil-producing emerging
economies has implications for the understanding of business cycle dynamics and macroe-
conomic policies in those economies. This thesis, which comprises three related papers,
contributes to the debate on the oil-macroeconomy nexus in small open oil-producing emer-
ging economies. It pays attention to some of the features mentioned above. The key issues




Paper 1: In the first paper, we study the macroeconomic implications of ignoring two
key features in DSGE models often used to analyse business cycle dynamics and monetary
policy in resource-rich economies: (i) capital accumulation and (ii) oil intensity of domestic
output. We argue that while it is common practice to abstract from these features for the
reasons of tractability (see e.g. Ferrero and Seneca, 2019; Galí, 2015; Gali and Monacelli,
2005; Romero, 2008; amongst others), the implications of such model simplification for the
response of oil-producing economies to an oil price shock has not been explored till date. To
fill this gap, we extend the model developed by Ferrero and Seneca (2019) accordingly and
compare our results with those generated from the original model. The main results are as
follows:
1. Abstracting from physical capital in DSGE models of an oil-producing economy leads
to the under-estimation of the economy’s response to an oil price shock (Vásconez et al.,
2015). Following a negative international oil price shock, the reduction in demand for
materials input by the oil firms is substantially larger under the model with capital,
leading to a more severe contractionary effects on domestic output when compared
to the case under the model without capital. Under a CPI inflation-based Taylor
rule, the higher exchange rate pass-through to prices recorded under the model with
capital causes the central bank to be relatively more hawkish in response to an oil
price shock; thus exacerbating the contractionary response of output (Bernanke et al.,
1997). However, under the model with capital, the economy rebounds faster due to
firm’s investment dynamics in response to interest rate adjustments implemented by
the central bank.
2. Including oil as a factor input in domestic production attenuates the contractionary
effects of a negative oil price shock on non-oil GDP as firms respond to the lower
marginal cost arising from the reduction in input prices. In terms of inflation, the
lower marginal cost recorded under the model that features oil intensity generates
lower domestic inflation; which further reduces the influence of imported inflation on
headline inflation. Thus, accounting for oil intensity moderates the contractionary
impact of a negative oil price shock on output and limits the pass-through effects of
exchange rate into CPI inflation.
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3. Once capital is included, the central bank is able to achieve greater macroeconomic
stability by responding not only to inflation and output, but also exchange rate. In
addition, contrary to the results reported by Ferrero and Seneca (2019), allowing for
interest rate inertia in the central bank’s reaction function reduces policy loss under
our benchmark model that includes capital. Thus, of the competing alternative mon-
etary policy rules considered under our benchmark model, a Taylor rule that features
inflation rate, output, real exchange rate and interest rate inertia (IFDITRyq) emerges
as the optimal monetary response to an oil price shock.
4. These findings highlight the need for a cautious interpretation of quantitative results
emanating from DSGE models of small open oil-producing economies that abstract
from capital and oil intensity. Monetary policy exercises conducted on the basis of
such restricted models should also be interpreted with caution.
Paper 2: We study business cycle dynamics in an oil producing emerging economy with an
inefficient fuel subsidy regime. In line with the overarching objective of the thesis, we account
for a number of emerging economy features, including: presence of hand-to-mouth consumers,
inefficient financial market, fuel importation, oil in household consumption, resource-driven
fiscal policy, fiscal pro-cyclicality, and revenue substitution. The model, which is estimated
for the Nigerian economy, is used to address a number of questions that have been ignored
in literature. We report a number of interesting results as follows:
1. Output fluctuations are driven mainly by oil and monetary policy shocks in the short
run and domestic supply shocks in the medium term. Specifically, oil shocks account for
about 23 per cent of variations in output up to the fifth year, while fiscal policy appears
muted. Impulse response analyses show that a negative oil price shock generates
persistent negative impact on the aggregate GDP and a short-lived positive effect on
headline inflation consistent with the findings of Ferrero and Seneca (2019). Non-
oil GDP is however boosted due to lower input prices and the transfer of productive
resources from the oil sector to the non-oil sector. On the other hand, monetary and
domestic supply shocks jointly account for around 72 per cent of short run variations
in headline inflation while oil-price shocks play a less prominent role due to the low
pass-through effect arising from the fuel subsidy regime.
2. We estimate that about 43 per cent of changes to international oil prices is transmit-
ted into domestic fuel price in Nigeria. The implied fuel consumption subsidy adds
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additional rigidity to domestic prices which in turn alters the dynamics of aggregate
inflation and indeed, the response of monetary policy to an oil price shock. Following
a negative oil price shock, a zero-subsidy regime generates lower output contraction,
lower headline inflation, but higher real exchange rate depreciation in the short run.
This implies that the fuel subsidy regime accentuates the contractionary effects of a
negative oil price shock while also constraining the capacity of fiscal policy to drive
output growth in the long run. However, retaining the subsidy programme has some
appeal in terms of its ability to generate relative macroeconomic stability, compared
to the situation under a no-subsidy regime. We argue that subsidy reforms potentially
has fiscal, growth, and welfare implications for the economy and caution that a suc-
cessful reform must necessarily accommodate the deployment of well-targeted safety
nets as well as the evolution of sustainable adjustment mechanisms.
3. Given an oil price shock, the core inflation-based monetary policy reaction function that
features output and real exchange rate represents an optimal strategy for stabilising
the Nigerian economy in the aftermath of an oil price shock. This finding is robust
to alternative assumptions regarding the inclusion/exclusion of fuel subsidy regime in
our model. Core inflation-based Taylor rule outperforms its competitors in stabilising
prices and exchange rate but leads to output instability in the short run. However, a
domestic inflation-based monetary policy rule yields superior outcomes in stabilising
output. While an export price targeting rule reverses the contractionary effects of a
negative oil price shock on aggregate GDP, it comes at the expense of overall domestic
stability (Vogel et al., 2015). These results imply that monetary policy faces a trade-
off between inflation and output stabilisation objectives (Ferrero and Seneca, 2019).
Therefore, we argue that no “across-the-board” and “all-seasons” monetary strategy
exists for dealing with adverse terms of trade shocks in the resource-rich economy. It is
important that the CBN is aware of these trade-offs while designing monetary policy
response to an oil price shock.
4. Following an oil price shock, a counter-cyclical fiscal policy regime aids the effectiveness
of monetary policy in stabilising both real and nominal variables. This highlights the
need for effective interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in Nigeria. The pres-
ence of hand-to-mouth consumers amplifies the contractionary effects of lower oil prices
on output and consumption while the inflationary pressures resulting from exchange
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rate depreciation are ameliorated in the absence of hand-to-mouth consumers.
Paper 3: The paper studies the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in a resource-
rich emerging economy whose fiscal policy is driven strongly by resource-related flows. Fol-
lowing Leeper (1991), we classify policy into active and passive regions by examining the
behaviour of monetary and fiscal authorities. Our DSGE model features nominal and real
rigidities, including an additional price stickiness that arises from a domestic fuel pricing
rule. The fuel pricing rule gives rise to an implicit fuel subsidy regime with significant fiscal
implications. Thus, we specify backward-looking fiscal rules that respond to debt, output,
and oil related flows - i.e. receipts from resource rent and payments for fuel subsidy. On the
other hand, monetary policy responds to inflation, domestic output and the real exchange
rate. The model is fitted to Nigerian data in order to analyse the country’s experience over
the last two decades. Specifically, we characterise monetary-fiscal interaction in Nigeria over
the period 2000:Q2 - 2018:Q2 and examine the sensitivity of our results to (i) the 2008/09
global financial crisis (ii) alternative fiscal policy rules and (iii) alternative monetary policy
reaction functions. Our key findings are as follows:
1. Over the full sample, 2000:Q2 - 2018:Q2, we find evidence of active monetary and
passive fiscal policy. This policy mix corresponds to the monetary dominance view
where fiscal policy respects the government budget constraint and monetary policy
responds sufficiently to inflation. In rational expectations equilibrium, primary deficit
decreases with increasing debt levels. Contrary to expectations, the response of taxes to
debt is negative and statistically insignificant due to low domestic revenue mobilisation
in the resource-rich small open economy. However, government spending responds
negatively to debt in line with expectation. These results highlight the weak domestic
revenue mobilisation systems in the resource-rich emerging economy and the role of
government expenditure as a tool for debt stabilisation. In addition, the estimated
tax rule confirms the presence of revenue substitution in the resource-rich economy.
We recommend that, in addition to strengthening the institutional arrangements for
enhancing monetary-fiscal coordination, the design and implementation of dynamic
tax policies that are less sensitive to resource-related flows are crucial for ensuring
debt sustainability and macroeconomic stability in the country. It is expected that the
recently passed 2020 Finance Act, if effectively enforced, will help the country improve
its revenue mobilisation drive and reduce the incidence of deficit bias in Nigeria.
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2. The findings reported above are robust to the occurrence of the 2008/09 global financial
crisis. In other words, although the estimated monetary and fiscal policy rules exhibit
less inertia in the post-crisis period; our results indicate active monetary and passive
fiscal policy both in the pre- and post-crisis periods. The less persistent policy rules
estimated for the post-crisis period could be partly explained by the higher volatility in
oil prices during the period. In order to reduce policy and macroeconomic volatilities,
it is recommended that the country embraces a fiscal rule that is based on cyclically
adjusted balances while also strengthening existing fiscal institutions.
3. Once the responses of the fiscal rules to oil-related flows are muted, the fiscal feed-
back parameter in the tax rule turns positive; implying that taxes become positively
responsive to debt in line with expectation. A comparison of impulse responses un-
der the alternative fiscal rules further showed that macroeconomic gains accrue to the
resource-rich economy when policies do not respond to resource-related flows. Rule-
based fiscal policies supported by an appropriate institutional framework are capable of
helping emerging economies to attain fiscal solvency, achieve macroeconomic stability,
and ensure intergenerational equity (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012). Thus, this paper calls for
the strengthening of fiscal institutions and existing rules for managing oil earnings as
a useful strategy for achieving greater policy harmony, long-term growth, and overall
macroeconomic stability in the country.
4. Excluding real exchange rate from the Taylor rule causes taxes to adjust positively to
debt while interest rate exhibits greater inertia. These suggest that a policy that allows
for a more market determined exchange rate facilitates smoother domestic adjustments
that enhances the capacity of taxes to respond positively to deficit shocks and activates
the “automatic stabiliser” role of fiscal policy.
5. Over the full sample, we find evidence of pro-cyclical government spending driven by
the fiscal authority’s behaviour in the post-GFC period. In most emerging econom-
ies, fiscal policy pro-cyclicality are often partly caused by political economy pressures
(Huidrom, Kose and Ohnsorge, 2016). Therefore, the implementation of proper in-
stitutional mechanisms (comprising fiscal rules, stabilisation funds, and medium-term
expenditure frameworks) can help the country avoid pro-cyclical bias, achieve fiscal
discipline and build fiscal space. Sufficient political will must also be demonstrated in
support of the country’s sovereign wealth fund.
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5.2 Study limitations and directions for future research
In this section, we highlight some limitations of our study and indicate potential areas of
future research. In paper 1, the extent to which oil producing economies are dependent on
oil as a source of energy may not have been adequately captured. Thus, including oil in
the consumption basket of households represents a useful extension for analysing the direct
effects of oil price shocks on households consumption as well as the appropriateness of core
inflation-based monetary policy rule (Medina and Soto, 2005). Second, determining the
extent to which our findings regarding the roles of capital accumulation and oil intensity
may differ under a model that allows for a fuel subsidy regime as well as alternative fiscal
rules represents an avenue for future work (Di Bella et al., 2015; Estache and Leipziger,
2009).
The second paper can be extended in a number of ways. First, the model could be
extended to accommodate a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) as a mechanism for managing
resource revenues in the resource-rich economy. Under such a setting, the macroeconomic
and welfare benefits of the SWF can be explored. Second, we made a simplifying assumption
that the central bank does not accumulate foreign reserves and the small open economy is
not foreign exchange constrained. This assumption could be relaxed as in Senbeta (2011). In
an economy characterised by fuel imports, the full impacts of an inefficient fuel consumption
subsidy as well as the macroeconomic implications of its removal can be better explored by
allowing for external reserves accumulation and foreign exchange constraints in the domestic
economy.
In paper 3, we assume parameter constancy in the estimation of the monetary and fiscal
policy rules. Future research efforts could benefit from a number of extensions. From a
methodological point of view, the model could be adapted to study the interaction between
monetary and fiscal policy within the framework of a Markov switching DSGE model. This
approach enables the study of policy interactions under a setting that allows for regime shifts
in the estimation of the parameters in the policy rules (Goncalves et al., 2016). Second,
the 2008/09 global financial crisis led to increased recognition of macro-prudential policies
as an important tool for preserving financial stability (Zhang and Zoli, 2016). Therefore,
extending the model to include a financial sector is appealing as it allows for the study of
macro-prudential policy, in addition to monetary and fiscal policies.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Model variants
A.1.1 Benchmark model (mod1)
In this Appendix, we provide detailed derivations of the relevant first-order conditions of
our benchmark model (mod1) described in the text. The relevant equations are summarised
in A.1.1.2 while the log-linearized model is presented in A.1.1.3. The shock processes are
presented in A.1.1.4. Variables in expressed in real terms are denoted by small letters. Also,
variables with tildes represent log-deviations of such variables from their steady state values
while the steady state variables are represented with bars. Thus, for any variable say Yt,the







• Household optimization problem: The representative household maximise utility by











subject to the nominal budget constraint:




t+1εt = WtNt +Rr,tKt +Bt + εtB
∗
t +Dt − T t, (A.2)
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and the process of capital accumulation:







































where the λct and λkt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with household budget constraint
and the law of motion for capital, respectively. In order to derive the first-order conditions,
we set the partial derivatives of L with respect to Ct, Nt, Bt+1, Kt+1, I t, λct and λkt equal to

















































Combining equations (A.5) and (A.6), we derive the expression for real wage, which is
equation (2.7) in the text as:
Wt
Pt
= Nφt Ct. (A.10)
The consumption Euler equation shown as equation (2.7) in the text is derived by combining










where Qt = (1 +Rt)−1 and πt = PtPt−1 .
Substituting for λct = 1PtCt from equation (A.5) into equation (A.8) and defining real rental











where the real rental rate is derived from the non-oil producing firm’s optimization
problem. Lastly, we apply equation (A.5) to (A.9) to derive the expression for investment




































Ph,t (j)Yh,t (j) dj, (A.14)


























Ph,t (j)Yh,t (j) dj. (A.16)










and the firm’s demand for intermediate goods, Yh,t (j) displayed in equation (2.17) of the
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text is derived from (A.17). The final goods pricing rule shown in equation (2.18) of the text










• Intermediate goods producers: The intermediate goods producer chooses optimal
quantities of factor inputs to employ by minimizing cost:
min
Nt(j),Kh,t(j),Ot(j)
WtNt (j) +Rh,tKh,t (j) + Po,tOt (j) , (A.19)
subject to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology:




The Lagrangian for the firm’s optimization problem can be written as:






αnh − Yh,t (j)
]
. (A.21)
The first-order condition with respect to Nt (j) is:
∂Lt (j)
∂Nt (j)























From equation (A.22), the real wage is derived as equation (A.23) and the intermediate
firm’s demand for labour is given by equation (A.24). Similarly, the first-order condition
with respect to KH,t (j) is:
∂Lt (j)
∂Kh,t (j)






















From equation (A.25), the real rental rate is derived as equation (A.26) and the intermediate
firm’s demand for capital is given by equation (A.27). Finally, the first-order condition with
respect to Ot (j) is:
∂Lt (j)
∂Ot (j)






















From equation (A.28), the real price of oil in domestic currency is derived as equation (A.29)
and the intermediate firm’s demand for oil input is given by equation (A.30). Based on














which are shown in the text as equations (2.22) and (2.23). By putting equations (A.24),
(A.27) and (A.30) into the production function (equation A.20), we obtain the firm’s marginal
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Price setting: An intermediate firm that qualifies to optimally reset its price, P •H,t (j) does








(1 + ζ)P •h,t (j)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
, (A.34)


















(1 + ζ)P •h,t (j)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
, (A.36)
with respect to P •H,t (j) . We suppress the index (j) since the firms face the same marginal
cost, and write the first-order condition as:















(βθ)s P 1+ϵh,t+smct+sYh,t+s = 0, (A.37)
Solving equation (A.37) for P •h,t, we obtain the optimal reset price shown in equation (2.28)
















• Oil producing firms: Each oil firm maximizes its profit:
Πo,t = Po,tYo,t −Rh,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (A.39)











t −Rh,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (A.41)
and take the partial derivative of equation (A.41) with respect to Ko,t and Mt in order to
















The definition of real price of oil, which is given as po,t = Po,tPt =
P ∗o,t
P ∗t
s1−γt in equation (2.32) of
the text has been imposed on equation (A.42) to obtain the demand for capital in equation







− Ph,t = 0. (A.44)
Similarly, substituting for po,t = Po,tPt =
P ∗o,t
P ∗t
s1−γt in equation (A.44) yields the oil firm’s











The set of non-linear equations characterizing the model is presented as follows:
Wt
Pt






























































































































































Yh,t = Ch,t +Mt + I t +Gc,t. (A.67)
Log-linearized equations
In this section, we summarize the set of first-order Taylor approximation of equations (A.46)
- (A.67). This leads to 23 characterizing equations of the benchmark model, mod1. Variables
with tildes represent log deviations from their respective steady state values while the steady
state values are denoted in bars without the subscript t.
m̃ct − γs̃t + ỹh,t = (1 + φ) ñt + c̃t, (A.68)
where the definition of the real wage shown in equation (A.23) has been used in (A.68).





















k̃t+1 = (1− δ) k̃t + δ̃it, (A.72)
c̃h,t = γs̃t + c̃t, (A.73)
c̃f,t = − (1− γ) s̃t + c̃t, (A.74)
π̃f,t = (1− γ) (s̃t − s̃t−1) + π̃t, (A.75)
c̃t = c̃
∗
t + (1− γ) s̃t, (A.76)
q̃t = (1− γ) + s̃t, (A.77)
π̃t = (1− γ) π̃h,t + γπ̃f,t, (A.78)







k̃h,t = w̃t + ñt − r̃h,t, (A.80)







hw̃t − Ãh,t + γs̃t, (A.82)
π̃h,t = βEtπ̃h,t+1 + κm̃ct, (A.83)
where, κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ
in equation (A.83) and the expression for real marginal cost, mct, is
shown in equation (A.82). The remaining log-linearized equations are as follows:
ỹo,t = Ão,t + α
k





o,t + (1− γ) s̃t + ỹo,t − r̃h,t, (A.85)
m̃t = p̃
∗
o,t + q̃t + ỹo,t − p̃h,t, (A.86)
p̃o,t = q̃t + p̃
∗
o,t, (A.87)














R̃t = ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) (ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t) + ξrt . (A.90)
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Exogenous processes
In the model, we accommodate 6 exogenous shocks (including the monetary policy shock)






Ãh,t = ρahÃh,t−1 + ξ
ah
t , (A.92)
Ão,t = ρa0Ão,t−1 + ξ
ao
t , (A.93)





g̃c,t = ρgg̃c,t−1 + ξ
gc
t , (A.95)
A.1.2 Intermediate model (mod2)
In this Appendix, we present a variant of the model with a non-oil sector which excludes
oil as a factor input. The model is quite similar to the one described in Appendix A.1.1 as
the behaviours of households, final goods producers, oil producers, government and central
bank remain unchanged while the open economy features are similarly valid. However, the
optimization problem of the intermediate goods producers is altered due to the exclusion of
oil in the production technology of the representative firm. This is shown below:
• Intermediate goods producers: The intermediate goods producer of this model variant
chooses capital and labour, minimizing cost:
min
Nt(j),Kh,t(j)
WtNt (j) +Rh,tKh,t (j) , (A.96)
subject to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yh,t (j) = Ah,tKh,t (j)
αkh Nt (j)
αnh . (A.97)
The constant returns to scale assumption implies that αkh + αnh = 1. The Lagrangian for the
firm’s optimization problem is:









The optimization problem above yields expressions for factor inputs and marginal cost which
are different from those obtained under mod1 presented in Appendix A.1.1. The first-order
conditions for labour is:
∂Lt (j)
∂Nt (j)
















Equation (A.99) and the definition Ph,t
Pt
= s−γt have been used to to derive the real wage




















As in the case of labour, equation (A.101) and the definition Ph,t
Pt
= s−γt have been used to
to derive the real rental rate shown in equation (A.102). Equations (A.99) and (A.102) are









where the real wage, wt, is as derived in equation (A.100) and the real rental rate, rh,t, is as
derived in equation (A.102). Finally, the firm’s marginal cost is obtained by substituting the














Equation (A.104) differs from (A.60) in the sense that the firm’s marginal cost under mod2 is
not affected by the price of oil. This implies oil price dynamics do not generate inflationary
effects via the firm’s cost of production mod2. Apart from the other relevant equations
presented in Appendix A.1.1, the relevant characterizing equations for mod2 are (A.97),
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(A.103) and (A.104). These are log-linearized, respectively as follows:










hw̃t − Ãh,t + γs̃t, (A.107)
Equation (A.107) implies that oil price dynamics do not directly feature in the Philips
curve for mod2. In addition to equations (A.105) - (A.107), the other relevant log-linearized
equations from the model presented in Appendix A.1.1 are equations (A.68) - (A.78), (A.83)
- (A.86) and (A.88) - (A.90). This makes a total of 21 equations characterizing the dynamics
of the model. We close the model by assuming an appropriate monetary policy rule similar
to those discussed in the text.
A.1.3 Baseline model (mod3)
The model considered here follows Gali and Monacelli (2005), which was extended by Fer-
rero and Seneca (2019) to include an oil sector. Unlike the model variants considered in
Appendices A.1 and A.2, the baseline model, mod3, completely abstracts from capital and
also excludes oil in the production technology of the intermediate goods producers. However,
the open economy features remain valid. Quite a number of changes are made to the model
presented in Appendix A.1.1. First, the exclusion of capital from the model implies that
the optimization problem of the representative household is altered. Second, the intermedi-
ate goods producers use a linear technology that feature only labour. Third, the oil firm’s
production technology features a single factor input (materials) produced by the final goods
firms. These modifications require that the optimization problems of the respective agents
be altered as follows:














The partial derivatives of equation (A.108) with respect to Ct, Nt and Bt+1 produce the rel-
evant equilibrium conditions for the household, same as those shown in equations (A.10) and
(A.11). The other relevant equations relating to the household and open economy features
are equations (2.14), (2.40) - (2.43), and (2.48).




WtNt (j) , (A.109)
subject to a linear technology:
Yh,t (j) = Ah,tNt (j) . (A.110)










Equation (A.111) replaces equation (A.23) in mod1 while equation (A.112) replaces equation
(A.33). Subject to the modification with regards to the expression for real marginal cost
in equation (A.112), the expression for Phillips curve shown in equation (A.83) remains valid.
• Oil sector firms: The representative oil firm seeks to maximize its profit:
Po,tYo,t − Ph,tMt, (A.113)









t − Ph,tMt, (A.115)








• Market clearing: The economy’s resource constraint becomes:
Yh,t = Ch,t +Mt +Gt. (A.117)
which differs from equation (A.67) as it excludes investment goods. Overall, the model is
characterized by a system of 15 equations, which are equations (A.10), (A.11),(2.14), (2.40)
- (2.43), (2.48), (A.116), (A.110), (A.112), (A.114), and (A.117). Subject to the modification
to the real marginal cost equation shown in equation (A.112), the Phillips curve derived in
equation (A.83) remains valid for the baseline model, mod3. Finally, the model is closed
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Figure A.1: Impulse responses to a negative international oil price shock for the three models
under a domestic inflation-based Taylor rule. mod1 is the benchmark model, which adds
capital and includes oil in the production technology of non-oil producing domestic firms.
mod2 is the intermediate model, which includes capital, but excludes oil from the production
technology of non-oil producing domestic firms. mod3 is the baseline model, which abstracts
from capital and excludes oil from the production technology of non-oil producing domestic
firms.
Figures A.1 and A.2 highlight the implications of our assumptions regarding capital and oil
intensity of domestic production.
Overall, it is shown that adding capital into the model amplifies the response of the economy
to an oil price shock, irrespective of the monetary policy rule in place. The inclusion of
oil as a factor input in domestic production initially dampens the contractionary effect of a
negative oil price shock upon impact. On the other hand, the responses of different measures
of inflation to an international oil price shock are amplified once capital is added into our
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model while the inclusion of oil input in domestic production further amplifies the responses.
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Figure A.2: Impulse responses to a negative international oil price shock for the three models
under a CPI inflation-based Taylor rule. mod1 is the benchmark model, which adds capital
and includes oil in the production technology of non-oil producing domestic firms. mod2
is the intermediate model, which includes capital, but excludes oil from the production
technology of non-oil producing domestic firms. mod3 is the baseline model, which abstracts
from capital and excludes oil from the production technology of non-oil producing domestic
firms.
A.2.2 Tables
Table A.1 shows macroeconomic fluctuations and policy losses associated with alternative
monetary policy rules under the intermediate model, mod2 (i.e. the model that incorporates
capital but excludes oil in the production technology of domestic non-oil producing firms).
Of the competing options, IFDITRys emerges as the best policy rule as it records the lowest
policy loss of 0.0332. This is followed by IFDITRy and FDITRy implying that the central
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bank is able to accrue some policy benefits by keeping an eye on domestic inflation, rather
than CPI inflation. This is in addition to paying attention to output, exchange rate and
allowing for interest rate inertia. Table A.4 presents the optimised Taylor rule parameters
used for calculating the policy loss calculations shown in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Macroeconomic fluctuations and policy loss under mod2
Regime Standard Deviations (%) Loss
ỹh,t c̃h,t π̃t π̃h,t q̃t R̃t
CITR 0.2793 2.0421 0.0717 0.1120 1.2253 0.1575 0.3025
DITR 0.2474 2.2290 0.3037 0.0002 1.3374 0.1298 0.0359
FCITRy 0.2819 2.0579 0.0894 0.1032 1.2347 0.1755 0.2814
FDITRy 0.2474 2.2295 0.3041 0.0014 1.3377 0.1305 0.0359
IFCITRy 0.2800 2.0666 0.1281 0.1045 1.2399 0.1244 0.2186
IFCITRyq 0.2645 2.1806 0.2469 0.0446 1.3084 0.1008 0.0671
IFDITRy 0.2485 2.2185 0.2899 0.0047 1.3311 0.1240 0.0337
IFDITRyq 0.2469 2.2214 0.2896 0.0077 1.3328 0.1233 0.0332
SCITR 0.3051 1.9901 0.0000 0.1433 1.1940 0.1188 0.4143
SDITR 0.2475 2.2291 0.3038 0.0000 1.3374 0.1296 0.0359
SNGDPGT 0.2362 2.2887 0.3705 0.0282 1.3732 0.1794 0.0692
Commitment 0.2471 2.2244 0.2906 0.0051 1.3347 0.1246 0.0324
Discretion 0.2478 2.2175 0.2872 0.0130 1.3305 0.1297 0.0354
Table A.2 shows the macroeconomic fluctuations and losses associated with alternative mon-
etary policy rules under the baseline model, mod3 (i.e. the model that abstracts from capital
and excludes oil from the production technology of domestic non-oil producing firms). The
optimised Taylor rule parameters used for generating the policy loss calculations presented
in Table A.2 are shown in Table A.5. As can be seen, DITR and FDITRy yield the lowest
policy losses emerging as the optimal policy rules. These are followed by the variants of
domestic inflation-based Taylor rules that feature output, exchange rate and interest rate
inertia.
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Table A.2: Macroeconomic fluctuations and policy loss under mod3
Regime Standard Deviations (%) Loss
ỹh,t c̃h,t π̃t π̃h,t q̃t R̃t
CITR 0.1168 0.2854 0.0091 0.0183 0.1713 0.0187 0.0130
DITR 0.1007 0.3021 0.0382 0.0000 0.1813 0.0151 0.0051
FCITRy 0.1128 0.2898 0.0140 0.0126 0.1739 0.0171 0.0101
FDITRy 0.1006 0.3023 0.0384 0.0007 0.1814 0.0144 0.0051
IFCITRy 0.1117 0.2897 0.0189 0.0156 0.1738 0.0046 0.0102
IFCITRyq 0.1028 0.2995 0.0323 0.0024 0.1797 0.0140 0.0056
IFDITRy 0.1029 0.2992 0.0332 0.0039 0.1795 0.0105 0.0055
IFDITRyq 0.1030 0.2991 0.0331 0.0038 0.1795 0.0106 0.0055
SCITR 0.1213 0.2819 0.0000 0.0220 0.1692 0.0146 0.0158
SDITR 0.1007 0.3021 0.0382 0.0000 0.1813 0.0151 0.0051
SNGDPGT 0.0914 0.3192 0.0622 0.0158 0.1915 0.0227 0.0085
Commitment 0.0994 0.3040 0.0405 0.0020 0.1824 0.0156 0.0051
Discretion 0.1003 0.3028 0.0387 0.0059 0.1817 0.0091 0.0056
The optimised simple rules parameters for the policy loss computations under our three
model variants are presented in Tables A.3 - A.5.
Table A.3: Optimised simple rule parameters, mod1
Parameters ρr ωπ ωy ωq
CITR 0.0000 2.1250 0.0000 0.0000
DITR 0.0000 12.6269 0.0000 0.0000
FCITRy 0.0000 2.0332 -0.0154 0.0000
FDITRy 0.0000 9.0878 -0.0858 0.0000
IFCITRy 0.2277 2.1229 -0.0098 0.0000
IFCITRyq 0.9980 0.6872 4.2795 -3.3446
IFDITRy 0.7249 9.3891 -0.0676 0.0000
IFDITRyq 0.5720 1.5825 -0.0059 -0.0889
SCITR 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000 0.0000
SDITR 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000 0.0000
SNGDPGT 0.0000 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000
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Table A.4: Optimised simple rule parameters, mod2
Parameters ρr ωπ ωy ωq
CITR 0.0000 2.1948 0.0000 0.0000
DITR 0.0000 754.9020 0.0000 0.0000
FCITRy 0.0000 2.5896 0.2455 0.0000
FDITRy 0.0000 270.5070 1.3787 0.0000
IFCITRy 0.9950 85.3257 28.0334 0.0000
IFCITRyq 0.9895 0.9076 2.3267 -0.5069
IFDITRy 0.9542 125.7870 0.2662 0.0000
IFDITRyq 0.5582 1.5714 0.0122 -0.0960
SCITR 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000 0.0000
SDITR 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000 0.0000
SNGDPGT 0.0000 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000
Table A.5: Optimised simple rule parameters, mod3
Parameters ρr ωπ ωy ωq
CITR 0.0000 2.0522 0.0000 0.0000
DITR 0.0000 2328.8900 0.0000 0.0000
FCITRy 0.0000 1.5004 0.0901 0.0000
FDITRy 0.0000 1.5013 0.1542 0.0000
IFCITRy 0.7974 1.4986 0.1364 0.0000
IFCITRyq -0.2386 0.9620 2.6251 1.4050
IFDITRy 0.7950 1.5005 0.1501 0.0000
IFDITRyq 0.8015 1.5184 0.1896 0.0227
SCITR 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000 0.0000
SDITR 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000 0.0000
SNGDPGT 0.0000 0.0000 ∞ 0.0000
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 First order conditions
Households
Ricardian consumers
















subject to the nominal budget constraint:
PtC
R












t (j) +Rh,tKh,t (j) +Bt (j) + εtB
∗
t (j) +Dt − TXt, (B.2)
and the process of capital accumulation:




















































where λRC,t and λRK,t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with household budget constraint
and the law of motion for capital, respectively. In order to derive the first-order conditions, we
set the partial derivatives of L with respect to CRt (j) , Bt+1 (j) , B∗t+1 (j) , Kh,t+1 (j) , Ino,t (j) ,
λRC,t and λRK,t equal to zero. Thus, the first-order conditions for CRt (j) , Bt+1 (j) , B∗t+1 (j) ,





























C,t+1Rh,t+1 − λRK,t + βEtλRK,t+1 (1− δh) = 0, (B.8)
∂L
∂Ino,t+1 (j)



























2 = 0. (B.9)
Combining equations (B.5) and (B.6), we derive the consumption Euler equation shown as
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The demand for foreign bonds shown as equation (3.19) in the text is derived by combining






















σ from equation (B.5) into equation
(B.8) and defining real rental rate as rh,t = Rh,tPt , we derive the expression for capital (equation





)σ rh,t+1 + λRK,t+1 (1− δh)
]
, (B.12)
where the real rental rate is derived from the non-oil producing firm’s optimization problem.
Lastly, we apply equation (B.5) to (B.9) to derive the expression for non-oil investment in












































subject to the nominal budget constraint:
PtC
NR
t (j) = WtN
NR
t (j)− TXt. (B.15)
As earlier assumed, this group of households neither invest in bonds nor accumulate capital.
Since they are non-optimizers, their entire disposable income is used to purchase consumption














t (j)−WtNNRt (j)− TXt
)
, (B.16)
where λRC,t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with household budget constraint of the






the partial derivatives of L in equation (B.16) with respect to CRt (j) and λNRC,t equal to zero.













The equilibrium conditions of the representative non-Ricardian household are described by
the optimal consumption level (equation B.17) and the budget constraint (equation B.15).
Labour supply and wage setting



















Wt (j)Nt (j) dj. (B.19)
















Nt (j) dj. (B.20)
The first order condition of the above problem with respect to Nt (j) yields the labour-



















which is shown in equation (2.47) of the text. In line with Calvo (1983), we assume that
1− θw fraction of households optimally define their wages while the remaining fraction, θw,
follows a rule that enables them to retain the wage level in the previous period as follows:
Wt (j) = Wt−1 (j) . (B.23)
A representative household that is able to reset wage level in period t does so by maximizing
its utility subject to its budget constraint, the capital accumulation process and the demand






























































































Finally, as shown in equation (2.48) of the text, the optimal reset wage can be written as:
















Equation (B.26) can be re-written specifically for each category, i = R,NR, of household as
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follows:
































Equations (B.27) and (B.28) define the labour supply by Ricardian and non-Ricardian house-










as shown in equation (3.30) of the text. Finally, consumption demand and hours of Ricardian
and non-Ricardian households can be aggregated as follows:
Ct = γRC
R
t + (1− γR)CNRt , (B.30)
Nt = γRN
R
t + (1− γR)NNRt , (B.31)








NRt (j) dj. And for non-










The representative final goods producer seeks to maximize its profit given by:
Πh,t (zh) = Ph,tYh,t−
1w
0
Ph,t (zh)Yh,t (zh) dzh, (B.32)












To describe the firm’s optimization problem, we put equation (B.33) into (B.32) as follows:
max
Yh,t(zh)












Ph,t (zh)Yh,t (zh) dzh. (B.34)
















where equation (B.35) is the firm’s demand for intermediate goods, Yh,t (zh) as claimed in
equation (3.35) of the text. The final goods pricing rule shown in equation (3.36) of the text
















WtNt (zh) +Rh,tKh,t (zh) + Pro,tOt (zh) , (B.37)
subject to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology:




The Lagrangian for the firm’s optimization problem can be written as:
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αnh − Yh,t (zh)
]
. (B.39)
The first-order condition with respect to Nt (zh) is:
∂L
∂Nt (zh)
























. The intermediate firm’s demand for labour is given
by equation (B.41). Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to Kh,t (zh) is:
∂L
∂Kh,t (zh)


















where wt = Rh,tPt . From equation (B.42), the real rental rate is derived, while the intermediate
firm’s demand for capital is given by equation (B.43). Finally, the first-order condition with
respect to Oh,t (zh) is:
∂L
∂Oh,t (zh)


















where pro,t = Pro,tPt . The intermediate firm’s demand for oil input is given by equation
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(B.44). Based on equations (B.41), (B.43) and (B.44), we obtain the intermediate firm’s













which are shown in the text as equations (3.41) and (3.42). By putting equations (B.41),
(B.43) and (B.44) into the production function (equation B.38), we obtain the firm’s marginal













Price setting by domestic firms: An intermediate firm that qualifies to optimally reset










P •h,t (zh)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
, (B.48)



















P •h,t (zh)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
. (B.50)















s P 1+ϵhh,t+smct+sYh,t+s = 0. (B.51)
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Solving equation (B.51) for P •h,t, we obtain the optimal reset price shown in equation (3.44)

































A set of competitive assemblers combine a continuum of differentiated imported varieties,












In order to determine their demand for differentiated imported goods, these firms maximize:
Πf,t (zf ) = Pf,tYf,t−
1w
0
Pf,t (zf )Yf,t (zf ) dzf , (B.55)
subject to equation (B.54) above. In order to solve the firm’s optimization problem, we put
equation (B.54) into (B.55) as follows:
max
Yf,t(zf)












Pf,t (zf )Yf,t (zf ) dzf . (B.56)

















where equation (B.57) is the firm’s demand for differentiated foreign goods, Yf,t (zf ) as
claimed in equation (3.49) of the text. The final goods pricing rule shown in equation (3.50)












Price setting by import goods retailers: An intermediate firm that qualifies to optim-







s Yf,t (zf )
[
P •f,t (zf )− εt+sP ∗f,t+s
]
, (B.59)
subject to the demand for its product:


















P •f,t (zf )− εt+sP ∗f,t+s
]
. (B.61)
Multiplying things out in equation (B.61) and recalling the definition of the law of one
price,Ψt = ϵtP ∗t /Pf,t, we can write the first-order condition as (after suppressing the index


















f,t+sYf,t+sΨt+s = 0. (B.62)
Solving equation (B.62) for P •f,t, we obtain the optimal reset price for imported goods shown
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f,t−1 + (1− θf )
(
P •f,t
)1−ϵf] 11−ϵf . (B.64)
Oil producing firms
The oil firm seeks to maximize its profit:
Πo,t = εtP
∗
o,tYo,t −Ro,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (B.65)















t −Ro,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (B.67)
In line with the expression for the optimal demand for oil-related capital by the oil firm









































and qt is the
real exchange rate. As explained in the text, the process for the accumulation of oil-related
capital, Ko,t, is given by:
Ko,t = (1− δo)Ko,t−1 + FDIt, (B.70)



















B.2 The non-linear system
Here, we summarise the non-linear equations of the model. Variables in real terms are
denoted as small letters while bars denote steady state levels.
Households’ intra-temporal decisions


















































































































































t (j)− TXt (B.88)
Labour supply and wage setting

























Aggregate consumption and hours
Ct =γRC
R
t + (1− γR)CNRt (B.91)
Nt =γRN
R
t + (1− γR)NNRt (B.92)
































































































































































































































































)ρπ∗ exp (ξπ∗t ) (B.127)
Market clearing and aggregation
Yh,t =Ch,t + C
∗
h,t +Mt + Ih,t +Gh,t (B.128)
Yt =Ct +Mt + Ino,t +Gh,t + nxt (B.129)








IMt =Plo,tOt + Pf,tYf,t (B.132)
















t−1 + nxt − (1− τ) qtp∗o,tyo,t + qtfdi∗t (B.135)
B.3 Log-linearized equations
In this Appendix, we summarise the log-linearised equations of the model. Variables with
tildes represent log-deviations of such variables from their steady state values while the
steady state variables are represented with bars. Thus, for any variable say Yt,the following







c̃no,t =c̃t − ηo (p̃no,t) (B.136)
c̃o,t =c̃t − ηo (p̃ro,t) (B.137)
c̃h,t =c̃no,t − ηc (p̃h,t − p̃no,t) (B.138)
c̃f,t =c̃no,t − ηc
[
q̃t − ψ̃t − p̃no,t
]
(B.139)
ĩh,t =ĩno,t − ηi (p̃h,t − p̃i,t) (B.140)
ĩf,t =ĩno,t − ηi (p̃f,t − p̃i,t) (B.141)









σ (1 + ϕc)
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Aggregate consumption and hours
c̃t =γRc̃
R
t + (1− γR) c̃NRt (B.149)
ñt =γRñ
R
t + (1− γR) ñNRt (B.150)
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Small open economy features
ψ̃t =q̃t − p̃f,t (B.151)
q̃t =q̃t−1 +∆ε̃t − π̃t + π̃∗t (B.152)












p̃h,t =p̃h,t−1 + π̃h,t − π̃t (B.155)
p̃hf,t =p̃hf,t−1 + π̃hf,t − π̃∗t (B.156)
p̃f,t =p̃f,t−1 + π̃f,t − π̃t (B.157)
w̃t =w̃t−1 + π̃w,t − π̃t (B.158)














p̃i,t =(1− γi) p̃h,t + γip̃f,t (B.161)











hw̃t − Ãh,t − p̃h,t (B.163)
π̃h,t =βπ̃h,t+1 +






(1− βθhf ) (1− θhf )
θhf
m̃ct − q̃t − p̃hf,t (B.165)
π̃w,t =βπ̃w,t+1 +














(1− βθf ) (1− θf )
θf
ψ̃t (B.168)
π̃no,t =p̃no,t − p̃no,t−1 + π̃t (B.169)
π̃o,t =p̃ro,t − p̃ro,t−1 + π̃t (B.170)
0 =γop̃ro,t + (1− γo) p̃no,t (B.171)
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Oil production
ỹo,t =Ão,t + α
k
o k̃o,t + α
m
o m̃t (B.172)
r̃o,t =q̃t + p̃
∗
o,t + ỹo,t − k̃o,t (B.173)
m̃t =q̃t + p̃
∗
o,t + ỹo,t − p̃h,t (B.174)
f̃dit =ρfdif̃dit−1 + (1− ρfdi) p̃∗o,t (B.175)
k̃o,t =(1− δo) k̃o,t−1 + δof̃dit (B.176)
Non-oil production







k̃h,t =w̃t + ñt − r̃h,t (B.178)





















õrt =q̃t + p̃
∗












(p̃ro,t + õt) (B.182)
g̃c,t =ρgc g̃c,t−1 + (1− ρg)
[
ωyoỹo,t − ωbb̃t + ωorõrt
]
+ ξGct (B.183)
t̃xt =φbb̃t−1 + φgg̃c,t + φosõst − φorõrt (B.184)
g̃h,t =g̃c,t − ηg (p̃h,t − p̃g,t) (B.185)
g̃f,t =g̃c,t − ηg (p̃f,t − p̃g,t) (B.186)
Monetary policy
R̃t =ρrR̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ωππ̃t + ωyỹh,t + ωq q̃t] + ξrt (B.187)
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Ãh,t =ρahÃh,t−1 + ξ
ah
t (B.199)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.12: Univariate convergence diagnostics
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Figure B.13: Multivariate convergence diagnostics
B.4.2 Priors and posteriors





































































































Figure B.15: Priors and posteriors





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.19: Pairwise collinearity patterns in the model
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Figure B.20: Identification of prior means
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Figure B.21: Identification of prior means
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 First order conditions
Households
Ricardian consumers

















subject to the nominal budget constraint:
PtC
R












t + Rh,tKh,t + Bt + εtB
∗
t + Dt − TXt (C.2)
and the process of capital accumulation:



















































where λRC,t and λRK,t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with household budget constraint
and the law of motion for capital, respectively. In order to derive the first-order conditions, we
set the partial derivatives of L with respect to CRt , Bt+1, B∗t+1, Kh,t+1, Ino,t, λRC,t and λRK,t equal






























C,t+1Rh,t+1 − λRK,t + βEtλRK,t+1 (1− δh) = 0, (C.8)
∂L
∂Ino,t+1































































σ from equation (C.5) into equation






)σ rh,t+1 + λRK,t+1 (1− δh)
]
, (C.12)
where the real rental rate is derived from the non-oil producing firm’s optimization problem.



















































t − TXt. (C.15)
As earlier assumed, this group of households neither invest in bonds nor accumulate capital.
Since they are non-optimizers, their entire disposable income is used to purchase consumption
















t −WtNNRt − TXt
)
, (C.16)
where λRC,t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with household budget constraint of the





, we set the
partial derivatives of L in equation (C.16) with respect to CRt and λNRC,t equal to zero. The













The equilibrium conditions of the representative non-Ricardian household are described by
the optimal consumption level (equation C.17) and the budget constraint (equation C.15).
Labour supply and wage setting


















Wt (j)Nt (j) dj. (C.19)
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Nt (j) dj. (C.20)
The first order condition of the above problem with respect to Nt (j) yields the labour-


















In line with Calvo (1983), we assume that 1 − θw fraction of households optimally define
their wages while the remaining fraction, θw, follows a rule that enables them to retain the
wage level in the previous period as follows:
Wt (j) = Wt−1 (j) . (C.23)
A representative household that is able to reset wage level in period t does so by maximizing
its utility subject to its budget constraint, the capital accumulation process and the demand






























































































Finally, the optimal reset wage can be written as:
















Equation (C.26) can be re-written specifically for each category, i = R,NR, of household as
follows:
































Equations (C.27) and (C.28) define the labour supply by Ricardian and non-Ricardian house-



















t + (1− γR)NNRt , (C.31)



















The representative final goods producer seeks to maximize its profit given by:
Πh,t (zh) = Ph,tYh,t−
1w
0
Ph,t (zh)Yh,t (zh) dzh, (C.32)











To describe the firm’s optimization problem, we put equation (C.33) into (C.32) as follows:
max
Yh,t(zh)












Ph,t (zh)Yh,t (zh) dzh. (C.34)
















where equation (C.35) is the firm’s demand for intermediate goods, YH,t (zh) as claimed in
equation (2.30) of the text. The final goods pricing rule is derived by substituting equation
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WtNt (zh) +Rh,tKh,t (zh) + Pro,tOt (zh) , (C.37)
subject to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology:




The Lagrangian for the firm’s optimization problem can be written as:






αnh − Yh,t (zh)
]
. (C.39)
The first-order condition with respect to Nt (zh) is:
∂L
∂Nt (zh)

























. The intermediate firm’s demand for labour is given
by equation (C.41). Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to Kh,t (zh) is:
∂L
∂Kh,t (zh)


















where wt = Rh,tPt . From equation (C.42), the real rental rate is derived, while the intermediate
firm’s demand for capital is given by equation (C.43). Finally, the first-order condition with
respect to Oh,t (zh) is:
∂L
∂Oh,t (zh)


















where pro,t = Pro,tPt . The intermediate firm’s demand for oil input is given by equation
(C.44). Based on equations (C.41), (C.43) and (C.44), we obtain the intermediate firm’s













By putting equations (C.41), (C.43) and (C.44) into the production function (equation C.38),
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Price setting by domestic firms: An intermediate firm that qualifies to optimally reset










P •h,t (zh)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
, (C.48)



















P •h,t (zh)− Ph,t+smct+s
]
. (C.50)















s P 1+ϵhh,t+smct+sYh,t+s = 0. (C.51)


































A set of competitive assemblers combine a continuum of differentiated imported varieties,












In order to determine their demand for differentiated imported goods, these firms maximize:
Πf,t (zf ) = Pf,tYf,t−
1w
0
Pf,t (zf )Yf,t (zf ) dzf , (C.55)
subject to equation (C.54) above. In order to solve the firm’s optimization problem, we put
equation (C.54) into (C.55) as follows:
max
Yf,t(zf)












Pf,t (zf )Yf,t (zf ) dzf . (C.56)
















where equation (C.57) is the firm’s demand for differentiated foreign goods, Yf,t (zf ). The fi-
nal goods pricing rule is derived by substituting equation (C.57) into the bundling technology
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Price setting by import goods retailers: An intermediate firm that qualifies to optim-







s Yf,t (zf )
[
P •f,t (zf )− εt+sP ∗f,t+s
]
, (C.59)
subject to the demand for its product:


















P •f,t (zf )− εt+sP ∗f,t+s
]
. (C.61)
Multiplying things out in equation (C.61) and recalling the definition of the law of one
price,Ψt = εtP ∗t /PF,t, we can write the first-order condition as (after suppressing the index


















f,t+sYf,t+sΨt+s = 0. (C.62)






















f,t−1 + (1− θf )
(
P •f,t
)1−ϵf] 11−ϵf . (C.64)
Oil-producing firms
The oil firm seeks to maximize its profit:
Πo,t = εtP
∗
o,tYo,t −Ro,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (C.65)















t −Ro,tKo,t − Ph,tMt, (C.67)
In line with the expression for the optimal demand for oil-related capital by the oil firm, the







































and qt is the real exchange rate. As explained in the
text, the process for the accumulation of oil-related capital, Ko,t, is given by:
Ko,t = (1− δo)Ko,t−1 + FDIt, (C.70)
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The log-linearised equations of the model are presented in this section. We denote variables
in log-deviations from steady state with tildes and represent steady state variables with bars.
Household decisions and small open economy features:
c̃no,t =c̃t − ηo (p̃no,t) (C.73)
c̃o,t =c̃t − ηo (p̃ro,t) (C.74)
c̃h,t =c̃no,t − ηc (p̃h,t − p̃no,t) (C.75)
c̃f,t =c̃no,t − ηc
[
q̃t − ψ̃t − p̃no,t
]
(C.76)
ĩh,t =ĩno,t − ηi (p̃h,t − p̃i,t) (C.77)









σ (1 + ϕc)
(












































t + (1− γR) c̃NRt (C.86)
ñt =γRñ
R
t + (1− γR) ñNRt (C.87)
ψ̃t =q̃t − p̃f,t (C.88)
q̃t =q̃t−1 +∆ε̃t − π̃t + π̃∗t (C.89)













p̃h,t =p̃h,t−1 + π̃h,t − π̃t (C.92)
p̃hf,t =p̃hf,t−1 + π̃hf,t − π̃∗t (C.93)
p̃f,t =p̃f,t−1 + π̃f,t − π̃t (C.94)
w̃t =w̃t−1 + π̃w,t − π̃t (C.95)














p̃i,t =(1− γi) p̃h,t + γip̃f,t (C.98)











hw̃t − Ãh,t − p̃h,t (C.100)
π̃h,t =βπ̃h,t+1 +






(1− βθhf ) (1− θhf )
θhf
m̃ct − q̃t − p̃hf,t (C.102)
π̃w,t =βπ̃w,t+1 +














(1− βθf ) (1− θf )
θf
ψ̃t (C.105)
π̃no,t =p̃no,t − p̃no,t−1 + π̃t (C.106)
π̃o,t =p̃ro,t − p̃ro,t−1 + π̃t (C.107)










σ∗ (1 + ϕ∗c)
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k̃h,t =w̃t + ñt − r̃h,t (C.113)
õh,t =w̃t + ñt − p̃ro,t (C.114)
ỹo,t =Ão,t + α
k
o k̃o,t + α
m
o m̃t (C.115)
r̃o,t =q̃t + p̃
∗
o,t + ỹo,t − k̃o,t (C.116)
m̃t =q̃t + p̃
∗
o,t + ỹo,t − p̃h,t (C.117)
f̃dit =ρfdif̃dit−1 + (1− ρfdi) p̃∗o,t (C.118)
k̃o,t =(1− δo) k̃o,t−1 + δof̃dit (C.119)
























































































g̃c,t =ρgg̃c,t−1 + (1− ρg)
[
ωbb̃t−1 + ωgyỹt−1 + ωosõst + ωorõrt
]
+ ξGct (C.128)
t̃xt =ρtxt̃xt−1 − (1− ρtx)
[
























õrt =q̃t + p̃
∗












(p̃ro,t + õt) (C.132)
g̃h,t =g̃c,t − ηg (p̃h,t − p̃g,t) (C.133)
g̃f,t =g̃c,t − ηg (p̃f,t − p̃g,t) (C.134)
Monetary policy:







Ão,t =ρa0Ão,t−1 + ξ
ao
t (C.137)


















Table C.1: Persistence and std. dev. of shocks under the benchmark model
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distributionDensity Mean Std. Dev. Mean 90% HPD Int.
Shock persistence
Dom. productivity: ρah Beta 0.50 0.25 0.823 0.605 0.998
Oil productivity: ρa0 Beta 0.50 0.25 0.986 0.972 1.000
Dom. risk premium: ρµ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.704 0.579 0.818
Law of one price gap-oil: ρψo Beta 0.50 0.25 0.962 0.923 0.998
Int’l oil price shock: ρp∗o Beta 0.50 0.25 0.896 0.838 0.958
Tax: ρtx Beta 0.50 0.25 0.539 0.370 0.718
For. risk premium: ρµ∗ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.831 0.767 0.895
For. inflation: ρπ∗ Beta 0.40 0.25 0.139 0.000 0.259
For. monetary policy: ρr∗ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.447 0.305 0.585
Standard deviation of shocks
Dom. productivity: ξaht Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.071 0.030 0.171
Oil productivity: ξaot Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.212 0.183 0.241
Dom. risk premium: ξµt Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.179 0.135 0.230
Dom. fiscal policy:ξgct Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.096 0.064 0.119
Law of one price gap-oil: ξψ
o
t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 1.397 0.474 2.688
Dom. monetary policy: ξrt Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.360 0.275 0.440
Int’l oil price: ξp
∗
o
t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.151 0.131 0.171
Domestic supply: ξπht Inv. Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.021 0.002 0.075
Tax: ξtst Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.169 0.145 0.193
For. risk premium: ξµ
∗
t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.044 0.035 0.054
For. inflation: ξπ∗t Inv. Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.005 0.004 0.006
For. monetary policy: ξr∗t Inv. Gamma 0.10 4.00 0.100 0.079 0.122
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Table C.2: Prior and posterior estimates for the pre- and post-GFC periods
Parameter Pre-GFC Post-GFCMean 90% HPD Int. Mean 90% HPD Int.
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: γR 0.695 0.568 0.828 0.611 0.455 0.770
Labour supply elasticity: φ 1.462 1.314 1.624 1.453 1.290 1.622
Relative risk aversion: σ 1.485 1.174 1.788 1.565 1.205 1.908
External habit: ϕc 0.508 0.359 0.655 0.504 0.358 0.643
Investment adj. cost: χ 9.032 2.412 15.049 6.181 1.060 11.604
Fuel pricing parameter: ν 0.374 0.207 0.537 0.189 0.079 0.298
Oil - core cons. elast.: ηo 0.186 0.051 0.324 0.205 0.043 0.361
For. - dom. cons. elast.: ηc 0.599 0.286 0.920 0.596 0.270 0.901
For. - dom. inv. elast.: ηi 0.618 0.274 0.945 0.586 0.272 0.881
Calvo - domestic prices: θh 0.820 0.686 0.984 0.677 0.528 0.825
Calvo - import prices: θf 0.693 0.533 0.854 0.655 0.483 0.845
Monetary policy parameters
Taylor, π: ωπ 2.048 1.601 2.497 2.217 1.797 2.639
Taylor, y: ωy 0.142 0.048 0.229 0.141 0.052 0.227
Taylor, q: ωq 0.122 0.044 0.195 0.133 0.049 0.209
Taylor, smoothing: ρr 0.350 0.149 0.557 0.267 0.063 0.446
Fiscal policy rules parameters
Tax, b: φb -0.046 -0.727 0.858 -1.704 -2.954 -0.754
Tax, or: φor 0.263 -0.430 0.884 0.148 -0.283 0.574
Tax, os: φos 0.245 -0.596 1.124 1.808 1.212 2.396
Tax, y: φy 0.105 -0.661 0.893 0.151 -0.652 0.905
Tax, smoothing: ρtx 0.698 0.473 0.949 0.281 0.098 0.464
Govt. Cons., b: ωb -0.291 -0.577 0.019 -0.149 -0.429 0.127
Govt. Cons., or: ωor 0.184 -0.216 0.595 0.926 0.771 1.107
Govt. Cons., os: ωos 0.951 -0.036 2.044 0.071 -0.094 0.238
Govt. Cons., y: ωgy -0.073 -0.843 0.729 0.396 -0.182 0.992
Govt. cons., smoothing: ρgc 0.844 0.711 0.990 0.064 0.002 0.127
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Table C.3: Prior and posterior estimates under alternative fiscal rules
Parameter Benchmark fiscal rule Alternative fiscal ruleMean 90% HPD Int. Mean 90% HPD Int.
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: γR 0.438 0.310 0.574 0.717 0.594 0.841
Labour supply elasticity: φ 1.473 1.312 1.631 1.434 1.266 1.592
Relative risk aversion: σ 1.347 1.077 1.596 1.414 1.120 1.709
External habit: ϕc 0.413 0.285 0.538 0.438 0.308 0.565
Investment adj. cost: χ 2.995 1.076 4.800 7.768 2.171 13.043
Fuel pricing parameter: ν 0.338 0.113 0.553 0.414 0.191 0.621
Oil - core cons. elast.: ηo 0.158 0.038 0.272 0.187 0.049 0.328
For. - dom. cons. elast.: ηc 0.631 0.295 0.945 0.614 0.283 0.929
For. - dom. inv. elast.: ηi 0.613 0.297 0.919 0.607 0.284 0.913
Calvo - domestic prices: θh 0.592 0.463 0.732 0.761 0.627 0.909
Calvo - import prices: θf 0.594 0.432 0.758 0.681 0.515 0.850
Monetary policy parameters
Taylor, π: ωπ 2.866 2.588 3.141 2.809 2.474 3.141
Taylor, y: ωy 0.086 0.033 0.137 0.138 0.049 0.229
Taylor, q: ωq 0.127 0.040 0.209 0.114 0.038 0.183
Taylor, smoothing: ρr 0.279 0.082 0.478 0.243 0.062 0.404
Fiscal policy rules parameters
Tax, b: φb -0.053 -1.158 1.114 0.025 -0.732 0.698
Tax, or: φor -0.051 -0.333 0.235 - -
Tax, os: φos 0.836 0.343 1.283 - -
Tax, y: φy 0.107 -0.650 0.885 0.136 -0.673 0.933
Tax, smoothing: ρtx 0.539 0.370 0.718 0.643 0.499 0.797
Govt. Cons., b: ωb -0.171 -0.453 0.130 -0.312 -0.607 -0.023
Govt. Cons., or: ωor 1.207 1.156 1.265 - -
Govt. Cons., os: ωos -0.047 -0.215 0.093 - -
Govt. Cons., y: ωgy 1.188 0.673 1.704 0.032 -0.758 0.879
Govt. cons., smoothing: ρgc 0.139 0.041 0.233 0.936 0.886 0.992
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Table C.4: Prior and posterior estimates under alternative Taylor rules
Parameter Benchmark Taylor rule Alternative Taylor ruleMean 90% HPD Int. Mean 90% HPD Int.
Structural parameters
Ricardian consumers: γR 0.438 0.310 0.574 0.448 0.317 0.580
Labour supply elasticity: φ 1.473 1.312 1.631 1.465 1.298 1.626
Relative risk aversion: σ 1.347 1.077 1.596 1.381 1.105 1.628
External habit: ϕc 0.413 0.285 0.538 0.447 0.321 0.574
Investment adj. cost: χ 2.995 1.076 4.800 2.944 1.431 4.467
Fuel pricing parameter: ν 0.338 0.113 0.553 0.336 0.138 0.534
Oil - core cons. elast.: ηo 0.158 0.038 0.272 0.162 0.038 0.276
For. - dom. cons. elast.: ηc 0.631 0.295 0.945 0.605 0.276 0.917
For. - dom. inv. elast.: ηi 0.613 0.297 0.919 0.590 0.277 0.887
Calvo - domestic prices: θh 0.592 0.463 0.732 0.638 0.514 0.787
Calvo - import prices: θf 0.594 0.432 0.758 0.609 0.451 0.764
Monetary policy parameters
Taylor, π: ωπ 2.866 2.588 3.141 2.867 2.590 3.141
Taylor, y: ωy 0.086 0.033 0.137 0.089 0.029 0.145
Taylor, q: ωq 0.127 0.040 0.209 - -
Taylor, smoothing: ρr 0.279 0.082 0.478 0.319 0.115 0.531
Fiscal policy rules parameters
Tax, b: φb -0.053 -1.158 1.114 0.043 -1.102 1.208
Tax, or: φor -0.051 -0.333 0.235 -0.075 -0.355 0.205
Tax, os: φos 0.836 0.343 1.283 0.794 0.329 1.290
Tax, y: φy 0.107 -0.650 0.885 0.120 -0.657 0.886
Tax, smoothing: ρtx 0.539 0.370 0.718 0.543 0.364 0.722
Govt. Cons., b: ωb -0.171 -0.453 0.130 -0.167 -0.439 0.116
Govt. Cons., or: ωor 1.207 1.156 1.265 1.211 1.164 1.272
Govt. Cons., os: ωos -0.047 -0.215 0.093 -0.075 -0.258 0.111
Govt. Cons., y: ωgy 1.188 0.673 1.704 1.187 0.642 1.730
Govt. cons., smoothing: ρgc 0.139 0.041 0.233 0.125 0.022 0.227
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